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In this dissertation, I have three separate essays in the context of Business-
to-Business (B2B) auctions; in each I introduce a complex problem regarding the
impact of information flows on auction’s performance which has not been addressed
by prior auction literature. The first two essays (Chapter 1 and 2) are empirical
studies in the context of online secondary market B2B auctions while the third essay
(Chapter 3) is a theoretical investigation and will contribute to the B2B procurement
auction literature. The findings from this dissertation have managerial implications
of how/when auctioneers can improve the efficiency or success of their operations.
B2B auctions are new types of ventures which have begun to shape how indus-
tries of all types trade goods. Online B2B auctions have also become particularly
popular for industrial procurement and liquidation purposes. By using online B2B
auctions companies can benefit by creating competition when auctioning off goods or
contracts to business customers. B2B Procurement auctions− where the buyer runs
an auction to procure goods and services from suppliers− have been documented
as saving firms millions of dollars by lowering the cost of procurement. On the
other hand, B2B auctions are also commonly used by sellers in ‘secondary market’
to liquidate the left-over goods to business buyers in a timely fashion.
In order to maximize revenues in either both industrial procurement or sec-
ondary market settings, auctioneers should understand how the auction participants
behave and react to the available market information or auction design. Auctioneers
can then use this knowledge to improve the performance of their B2B auctions by
choosing the right auction design or strategies.
In the first essay, I investigate how an online B2B secondary market auction
environment can provide several sources of information that can be used by bidders
to form their bids. One such information set that has been relatively understud-
ied in the literature pertains to reference prices available to the bidder from other
concurrent and comparable auctions. I will examine how reference prices from such
auctions affect bidding behavior on the focal auction conditioning on bidders’ types.
I will use longitudinal data of auctions and bids for more than 4000 B2B auctions
collected from a large liquidator firm in North America.
In the second essay, I report on the results of a field experiment that I carried
out on a secondary market auction site of another one of the nation’s largest B2B
wholesale liquidators. The design of this field experiment on iPad marketplace is
directly aimed at understanding how (i) the starting price of the auction, and (ii) the
number of auctions for a specific (model, quality), i.e., the supply of that product,
interact to impact the auction final price. I also explore how a seller should manage
the product differentiation so that she auctions off the right mix and supply of
products at the reasonable starting prices.
Finally, in the last essay, I study a norm used in many procurement auctions
in which buyers grant the ‘Right of First Refusal’ (ROFR) to a favored supplier.
Under ROFR, the favored supplier sees the bids of all other participating suppliers
and has the opportunity to match the (current) winning bid. I verify the conven-
tional wisdom that ROFR increases the buyer’s procurement cost in a single auction
setting. With a looming second auction in the future (with the same participating
suppliers), I show that the buyer lowers his procurement cost by granting the ROFR
to a supplier. The analytical findings of this essay highlights the critical role of in-
formation flows and the timing of information-release in procurement auctions with
ROFR.
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Reference Prices and Bidder Heterogeneity in Secondary Market
Online B2B Auctions
1.1 Introduction
”. . . the question of who makes the first bid, to cross the Rubicon and get over what
appears to be an unsurmountable hurdle for many listings, still remains, and is
worth pursuing” (Dholakia and Soltysinski, 2001, p. 235).
Imagine posting an item up for auction – just as a lottery holder eagerly awaits
the drawing of the ‘lucky numbers’, you wait with excitement for the first bid to
appear. Will the bid be high, will it be low? While you suspect that the first bid will
set the tone for the auction and affect your final profits, a definitive link between
the two has yet to be established. While existing work (Ku et al. 2006; Bapna
et al. 2008; Simonsohn and Ariely 2008) demonstrating the impact of the starting
price on the final price suggests that the first bid can set the trend for subsequent
bidding in an auction, the role of the first bid itself has never been explicitly studied.
This essay attempts to addresses this missing link in the literature, and examine
which information in the auction environment influence the first bid in the context
of online auctions.
The growth of the online auction platform has allowed researchers to accurately
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estimate the impact of auction characteristics such as the starting or reserve price
(Lucking-Reilly et al. 2000; Mithas and Jones 2007), auction duration (Haruvy and
Popkowski Leszczyc 2010), seller reputation (Dellarocas 2006), and an auction’s
ending rule (Roth and Ockenfels 2002) on the auction outcomes, with the most
important outcome being final price (see Pinker et al. 2003 for comprehensive
study on online auctions). More specific bidder behavior, such as sniping, herding
and searching, have also been studied (Dholakia and Soltysinski 2001; Bapna et al.
2004; Ku et. al 2006; Simonsohn and Ariely 2008). Much of this work is focused on
auction-level outcomes (rather than on individual bids) in the business-to-consumer
(B2C) sector, characterized by relatively well-understood and discrete products such
as music CDs, laptops and DVDs.
From this body of work, one of the key results pertinent to this paper is that,
even when bidding for objects whose value is fairly certain (e.g., DVDs, laptops),
bidders are influenced by others’ bidding behavior in the auction. Given this result,
it is then natural to ask, as did Dholakhi and Soltysinski (2001), what influences the
first bid/bidder? While this question is of interest within the well-studied environ-
ments of B2C auctions, it is of even greater economic importance in the burgeoning
B2B auctions, where the composition of items for sale is widely varied, often ill-
specified and prone to uncertain market valuation.
Using panel data from business-to-business (B2B) auctions conducted in the
field, we study at the bid level the impact of information observable from the bidding
behavior of others in the auction environment on the first bid. Specifically, we study
how multiple price signals, provided by the prices observed on concurrent auctions
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for similar products, influence the first bid in an auction when the product’s value
is uncertain. In addition, we examine how bidder heterogeneity moderates the
influence of these price signals on bids in the focal auction. Our work in this essay
adds to the literature thus by studying the relative impact of price signals viewed
by the bidder on the bids in the auction, contingent on bidder heterogeneity.
The data for this study comes from the B2B secondary market, where big-
box retailers such as Kmart and Target liquidate excess and returned inventory
at discounted prices. In an effort to remove excess inventory and returned goods
from their warehouses, retailers sell their salvage and returned goods through online
auction liquidation sites in bulk-pallet form. Since the pallets include both cus-
tomer returns and excess stock times, there is considerable uncertainty regarding
the quality and value of the merchandise in each pallet. On these auction sites,
other business buyers (such as off-price retailers, eBay power buyers and other such
entities) bid for these pallets. The size of this market was at least $50 billion during
the time of our data collection (2008-2009) and has experienced significant growth
since1. Our data comes from a proprietary dataset of all auction transactions at one
such excess inventory auction site, carried out over a period of five years (2003-2008)
and includes bidder data as well as specific bid-level data for all auctions during this
period. This dataset provides several features that are particularly conducive to
the tests we carry out; the seller did not vary the traditional auction parameters
studied in the literature, such as starting (reserve) price or auction duration. All
auctions were initiated for the same duration (2 days), the same starting price (10%
1http://www.ecommercebytes.com/cab/abn/y09/m09/i08/s01
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of the pallet’s declared retail value) and with no reserve price. Most importantly,
the dataset provides us with visibility into bidder behavior over time and informa-
tion about the state of the platform (such as current prices on concurrent auctions)
at the time of bidding, thereby allowing bid-level analysis, centered around specific
variables manifested at the time of the bid.
The marketing literature on reference prices (Mazumdar et al. 2005; Kalya-
naram and Winer 1995) provides a useful framework for identifying the relative
effect of concurrent price signals on a specific bidder and his/her bid. Reference
prices are standards or benchmarks against which the purchase or bid price of a
product is judged (Mazumdar et al. 2005). Prior work has identified two main
categories of reference prices that affect consumer decision-making; internal refer-
ence prices (IRP) and external reference prices (ERP). An internal reference price
(IRP) is based on prices or behavior that the consumer has observed in the past; it
is primarily self-generated from memory and dynamic. As new prices are observed
and assimilated, the IRP is updated appropriately (Yadav and Seider 1998). IRP
are thus assumed to be the price the consumer would be willing to pay for a product
in general and has a positive impact on the consumers’ willingness to pay. In addi-
tion to IRP, consumers also encounter contextual or environmental information that
may provide additional reference points for price expectations. These could include
prices offered for other products in the same category, prices in competing stores or
the presence of advertised sales or promotions (Yadav and Seider 1998; Adaval and
Monroe 2002). These are collectively called external reference prices (ERP) since
they provide an alternative standard for the price of the product that is rooted in
4
the specific context.
While the role of reference prices has been extensively studied in posted price
purchase contexts in marketing (see Mazumdar et al. 2005 for a comprehensive
survey), the effect of reference prices in the auction setting has seen limited work.
Unlike posted price contexts, reference prices in auctions tend to change depending
on the bids of other bidders and auction parameters such as starting and reserve
prices, thereby necessitating research that is more specific to the auction context
(Dholakia et al. 2002; Kamins et al. 2004). Existing research studying reference
prices in auctions are based on mostly cross-sectional B2C data and have not been
privy to the detailed bidding history of individual bidders over time, thus imposing
limits on the extent to which differential effects of reference prices can be studied. In
contrast, we study reference prices in the B2B context using a longitudinal approach
by identifying three types of reference prices that act on bidders as they formulate
specific bids; (i) the bidder’s IRP, using bidder-specific historical bidding data; (ii)
the prices of all open concurrent auctions for comparable goods at the time of
bid; (iii) the final prices of auctions for comparable goods that have just finished.
This conceptualization of reference prices provides a richer set of environmental
information that bidders can use in formulating their bids on the focal auction.
In addition to reference prices captured over time, we are also able to char-
acterize bidder heterogeneity by leveraging historical data on bidding behavior for
each bidder in our dataset, a level of analysis hitherto absent in the literature on
reference prices in online auctions. We capture two forms of heterogeneity in our
analysis; the time-varying bidding experience of the bidder (Wilcox 2000; Wang and
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Hu 2009) and the participation of the bidder in comparable and concurrent auctions
at the time of the bid. The literature on reference prices notes that accounting for
bidder or buyer heterogeneity is critical; indeed, Mazumdar et al. (2005) specifically
point out the confounding effects of customer heterogeneity in reference prices re-
search (p. 97) and argue for the use of panel data to tease out the effects of customer
heterogeneity. Consistent with these suggestions, in this study, we use panel data
to hypothesize and provide evidence for how various reference prices differentially
affect bidders and their bids, moderated by bidder heterogeneity at that point in
time.
Our work in this essay provides several contributions to the literature. This
research is the first, to our knowledge, that (i) quantifies the impact of the first
bid on the final price, (ii) studies the manner in which bidders are influenced by
internal and external reference prices at the bid level, and (iii) explores the inter-
action of reference prices and time-varying bidder heterogeneity in the context of
online auctions. We provide these results in contexts that are far removed from the
well-understood world of consumer goods sold on B2C sites like eBay. Moreover,
we model the bidding behavior of professionals in the field, i.e. buyers in a B2B
market. Thus, the issue of generalizability, which may limit results from eBay or
experimental data, is less of a problem here. From a methodological viewpoint, we
capture arguably the most complete data on reference prices and bidder heterogene-
ity possible through the use of a proprietary panel dataset. We also account for
endogenous entry into the auction, a topic that has been addressed in the auctions
literature (Bajari and Hortacsu 2003) but not in the B2B setting.
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Our results show that the first bid is a significant predictor of the final yield
on the auction. Furthermore, we find that information from comparable and con-
current auctions do serve as reference prices and are influential on the first bid, but
are clearly moderated by bidder heterogeneity, namely bidder experience and par-
ticipation level. In post-hoc analysis, we use clustering methods (similar to Bapna
et al. 2004) to partition the auctions into two clusters based on the type of first
bidder observed. We find that while the majority of the bidders are influenced by
multiple reference price information as expected, there exist a small but influential
set of super-bidders. These super-bidders rely heavily on their own internal reference
prices and the prices of open auctions in which they are bidding, but tend to ignore
other potential reference prices. The identification of these two types of B2B bid-
ders provides several managerial implications and opens up some avenues for future
research on bidder heterogeneity in the formation of and reliance on reference prices
in online auctions.
Before we discuss our research hypotheses, it is necessary to understand the
specific auction setting where we obtained our data. Since the field setting may not
be as familiar to readers as B2C sites such as eBay, we describe the B2B auction
context, its relevant features and the specific dataset next before moving on to the
hypotheses section.
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1.2 Research Site, Context and Dataset
1.2.1 The Secondary Market B2B Auction Platform
The B2B auction platform that we study deals with the resale of excess and
returned consumer electronicsmerchandise from one big-box retailer in North Amer-
ica. As will be evident from our discussion below, the online auction platform we
study differs from the commonly studied B2C platforms in three important ways:
(i) all bidders are professional resellers who, themselves, vary in their experience
bidding on the platform; (ii) there is significant uncertainty regarding the condition
of the contents in pallets, and hence its market value; and (iii) multiple compara-
ble pallets are posted concurrently on the auction site by the liquidator (hereafter
called the seller) as and when inventory arrives from the retailers, providing some
market-level information to the bidders. We elaborate on each of these points below.
The items for sale on the auction site are comprised of excess and returned
inventory. When the participating big-box retailers decide to move these excess
items from their stores, they create pallets of (frequently) disparate products, and
ship them to the seller’s warehouse; the seller has no control over the constitution or
quality of the goods auctioned. Pallets, in their entirety, are auctioned on the site
in ‘as-is’ format, i.e., neither the retailer nor the seller assume responsibility for the
condition of the contents. Since the pallets can include both customer returns and
excess stock items, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the quality and value
of the merchandise in each pallet. Bidders cannot physically inspect the pallets
beforehand, and hence do not know if items are in opened or damaged boxes, or if
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the items themselves suffer from any defects. There is little, if anything, that the
seller or bidders can do with respect to a specific pallet in terms of reducing quality
uncertainty in a systematic manner.
Bidders in these auctions are themselves resellers, e.g., flea market vendors,
wholesale liquidators, eBay Power sellers, ‘mom and pop’ stores, who vary greatly
in their bidding activity and buying volume on the auction site. Their valuation for
the pallets is driven in large part by their assessment of the contents’ resale value,
adjusted by their (private) channel costs. The resale value of a pallet is largely
determined by the condition of its contents, as well as current market trends in
the electronics market. The actual condition and composition of the pallet, and
hence its resale value, is dependent on factors such as the retailer’s diligence when
processing returns (whether the retailer validates the contents of opened boxes),
the retailer’s back-store operations (the manner in which inventory is tracked and
repackaged into pallets, that are then transported to the seller) and the retailer’s
inventory policies (size, frequency and diversity of products ordered). All of these
factors contribute to the degree of variability of goods within the pallet and the
potential resale value of these items. While some of these factors may be learnt over
time by a bidder as pallets won via the auction site are opened and examined, the
uncertainty over the composition and resale value of the pallet’s contents is rarely
ever eliminated. Finally, the design of the platform does not support feedback or
retailer ratings, thereby removing the option of using this data as sources of quality
information.
There is, however, potentially relevant valuation information to be gleaned
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from concurrent auctions for other pallets that are posted on the platform and are
visible to the bidder. The big box retailer in our dataset typically ships multiple
pallets from the same retail store to one of the seller’s warehouses dedicated to
stores in that region. The flow of goods into the warehouse is beyond the seller’s
control; it accepts pallets as and when they arrive from the retailers. The need to
quickly liquidate excess inventory places considerable pressure on the seller to run
multiple auctions concurrently. The design of the auction platform does not allow
the bidder to observe any relevant information about other bidders on both the focal
auction and concurrent auctions, nor does it allow the bidder to track the individual
bids placed by other bidders – it does, however, allow bidders to see the current
winning bids, i.e. highest price only, on concurrent auctions. Given the specific
design of the auction environment, and the uncertainty surrounding the pallet’s
valuation, it is reasonable to posit that current prices on concurrent auctions (from
the same store/warehouse) likely serve as useful sources of information to bidders,
giving them a window into their competitor’ assessments of the value of comparable
pallets. Thus, the reference prices literature from marketing is particularly suitable
here in understanding the impact of these concurrent prices on the bidding behavior
on the focal auction.
Auction researchers (Milgrom and Weber 1982) have long acquiesced that,
despite the theoretical interest in pure private and common valuation settings, a
hybrid valuation model is likely the most appropriate for most auctions. Under a
hybrid valuation model, the bidder’s valuation for a pallet is influenced by both his
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private/idiosyncratic valuation as well as the revealed valuation of other bidders2.
Given the description of the auction platform above, it follows that an appropriate
valuation model for this B2B particular context is that of the hybrid valuation
model. While a formal theoretical exposition of the valuation model is out of the
scope of this work, it is worth noting that the model flexibly allows incorporating
the two forms of reference prices we study in this essay. External reference prices,
formed by the prices on concurrent auctions, represent the (modified) valuations of a
collective of other bidders’ maximum willingness to pay. Similarly, internal reference
prices capture the private elements of the bidder’s valuation, i.e. they represent the
idiosyncratic manner in which the bidder translates pallet-specific information into
a maximum willingness to pay. Thus, the affiliated valuation model provides us a
with a framework to incorporate the influence of both internal reference prices as
well as external reference prices on the focal bid observed on the platform.
In the next section, we discuss in greater detail the specific dataset that we
use in this chapter and the strategy used in variable definitions for reference prices
and bidder heterogeneity.
2The most commonly adopted hybrid valuation model (cf. Levin 2004) is of the form v(si, s−i) =
si + β
∑
j =i sj . In this valuation model, all bidders have the same value, given by some random
variable V . The signals s1,.., sn are each bidder’s private signal, correlated with V but independent
from each other (i.e., si = V + εi where ε1,..,εn are independent). β (β ≤ 1) are also the weights
each bidder puts on their own as well as other bidders’ private signals.
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1.2.2 Dataset
We were provided a dataset of all electronics B2B auctions that were conducted
on the seller’s online auction platform for the period 2003-2008. This dataset consists
of 4308 individual auctions, featuring 1200 B2B buyers (unique bidders). Amongst
the 1200 bidders we observe in our data, we see only 569 bidders that appear as
first bidders on at least one auction. As mentioned earlier, bidders have incomplete
information regarding the condition of the items in the pallets. On the main auction
site, bidders are informed as to the total number of items in the pallet Q, as well
as the pallet’s declared retail value/price E. Interested bidders are able to click and
open a bill of lading, detailing in somewhat vague terms, the contents of the pallet
and for each item the number of units and the per unit retail price.
The bidding format on the site is similar to that seen on eBay auctions, i.e.
proxy auctions. In proxy auctions, bidders submit their maximum willingness to pay
(MWTP) for the specific pallet; the auction tool automatically updates a bidder’s
current bid until it has reached the bidder’s declared MWTP. When auction ends,
the bidder with the highest MWTP wins the auction and pays the second-highest
MWTP plus the minimum bid increment. For each auction, we have information
regarding all the submitted bids, the identity of the bidders who submitted them
(an auction platform generated identification number), and the time of the first bid
for each auction (TOFB)– rescaled to the interval (0,1) to facilitate discussion. We
also collected the number of bids submitted by each bidder, the final price of the
auction, the final number of bidders who participated in the auction(N), the physical
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location of the pallet (the physical warehouse where it is located), the calendar date
and time of the posting of the auction, and the auction’s starting price.
For the specific category that we study (consumer electronics) and during the
period of observation, the seller did not vary the traditional auction parameters
studied in the literature, such as starting (reserve) price or auction duration. All
auctions were initiated for the same duration (2 days), the same starting price (10%
of the pallet’s declared retail value E) and with no reserve price. In addition, all the
pallets in our dataset were obtained from the same big-box retailer, thereby control-
ling for retailer-level idiosyncratic behavior. Thus, the specific set of auctions we
study, in addition to the design of the auction platform described in the previous
section, provide us with almost experimental-level controls on the auction’s param-
eters (i.e. starting price, reserve price, duration), which allows us to estimate the
effects of reference prices and bidder heterogeneity with few confounding sources of
information. Finally, our dataset provides us with complete information over time
regarding bidder behavior, the occurrence of successful and unsuccessful bids on
the platform and any outstanding bids at a specific point in time, allowing greater
levels of granularity in data definition than possible in most cross-sectional studies
on online auctions. We use this additional granularity to define the variables for
the two broad constructs we study - reference prices and bidder heterogeneity. We
describe these variable definitions next.
13
1.2.3 Reference Prices and Bidder Heterogeneity
We focus on three specific reference prices in this study. The first reference
price we measure is the bidder’s internal reference price (IRP). The IRP is assumed
to be the price that the consumer would be willing to pay for a product based on
past purchasing behavior (Mazumdar et al. 2005). The IRP is based on prices or
behavior that the consumer has observed in the past; as new prices are observed and
assimilated, the IRP is updated appropriately (Yadav and Seider 1998). Therefore,
we measure the IRP simply the average normalized final price (as a % of E) of all
comparable auctions won by the bidder in a moving window of six months prior
to the focal auction. This measure is broadly consistent with other measures of
IRP used in the literature (Yadav and Seiders 1998; Rajendran and Tellis 1994).
However, for the IRP to be a reasonable reference price for the focal auction, it is
necessary to condition it on pallets that are similar to the focal auction’s pallet.
Since no two pallets are exactly identical on the B2B auction platform we study, we
must define the notion of a ’comparable auction’. We do so in a manner consistent
with Chan et al. (2007), as described below.
At the time of the focal auction, we consider all concurrent auctions that have
any overlap in time with the focal auction (see Figure 1.1) but that are located in
the same warehouse. We then calculate the means and standard errors of Q and
E for this set of concurrent auctions for the focal auction. The set of comparable
auctions for the focal auction then contains all auctions that are within one standard
deviation of Q and E formed on the set of concurrent auctions; we refer to this set of
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comparable and concurrent auctions as C&C. This definition allows us to condition
the reference prices observed from concurrent auctions such that the aggregate price
signals observed are the most proximal for the focal auction. The IRP of the bidder
in the focal auction now becomes the average normalized final price of all comparable
auctions won by the bidder in the six-month moving window, prior to the observed
bid on the focal auction.
Prior work in marketing has identified that consumers’ willingness to pay for
a product is also influenced by price information in the surrounding environment
(Yadav and Seider 1998; Adaval and Monroe 2002). These prices, such as prices
offered for other products in the same category, prices in competing stores or the
presence of advertised sales or promotions, are collectively called external reference
prices (ERP). While a bidder on the auction site can neither see the number of
submitted bids/bidders at any time, nor the identity of a competing bidders, for
the focal auction, bidders can however see the current winning prices of concurrent
auctions. These can act as ERPs for the focal auction. Therefore, we identify two
sets of ERPs, again by capitalizing on the notion of C&C auctions. From Figure 1.1,
the set of C&C auctions can be divided into two sets. The first set is comprised
of C&C auctions that are open when the focal auction begins, but have closed
before the focal bid is placed in the focal auction; we refer to these as just-finished
auctions (JFA). Alternatively, the second set of C&C auctions is still open when
the focal bid is placed; these are referred to as open auctions (OA). The average
final price of the just-finished auctions (JFAP ) represents reference prices that are
highly informative (Wolk and Spann 2008; Bapna et al. 2009) since they represent
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a current estimate of other bidders’ valuation (cents-on-the-dollar) for comparable
pallets. Alternatively, the average current prices of open auctions (OAP ) serves
as a signal of the eventual price of comparable auctions. We examine the effects
of both these reference prices on the focal bid. We also measure the number of
auctions that are included in the set of open and just-finished auctions, denoted by
NOA (number of open auctions) and NJFA (number of just finished auctions).
Finally, of the set of auctions in NJFA, it is possible that the focal bidder bid on
some auctions (denoted by NJFAbid) and was the eventual winner on some auctions
(denoted by NJFAwon).
We capture bidder heterogeneity using two constructs– bidder experience and
participation in cross-bidding. Bidder experience is captured temporally by the
number of auctions won by the bidder in the previous six months to the focal
auction.3 The use of a moving window of six months also allows us to account for
the effects of bidder inactivity over an extended period of time; in such cases, the
value of bidder experience on the platform should reduce. Measuring participation
in cross-bidding, i.e. bids in concurrent auctions, again involves the use of the
C&C auctions. Cross-bidding behavior suggests that some bidders will likely have
multiple bids on concurrent similar auctions, in the manner proposed by Peters
3In robustness tests, we vary this time period to three months (Bruno et al. 2012) with no
difference in results. We also consider all won auctions in the past indefinitely (Wilcox 2000) and
the number of lost auctions (Wang and Hu 2009). Using all auctions provides weaker empirical
results while lost auctions has no impact on bid formation. Finally, we if define experience as
the number of bids in the previous months, we see consistent results but with less statistical
significance. We use the winning experience in our analysis to stay consistent with the literature.
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and Severinov (2006) and tested by Anwar et al. (2006). It is conceivable that
bidders are differentially influenced by those auctions in the C&C set where they
have issued bids. To capture this effect, we consider the set of JFA and OA auctions
and only identify those auctions where the bidder has made a bid. The average
reference prices from this subset of auctions are therefore denoted as JFAPbid and
OPAbid. Correspondingly, we also create the reference prices from those auctions
where the focal bidder did not have a bid, denoted as JFAPnotbid and OAPnotbid.
These variables capture heterogeneity in bidders by virtue of their participation
in the set of concurrent auctions across the observation period of 2003-2008. The
summary statistics as well as the correlation table for these variables are also shown
in Table 1.1. Also, the individual variable definitions used in our different analysis
throughout this chapter are shown in Table 1.2. Having defined the key variables in
our dataset, we propose our research hypotheses in the next section.
1.3 Theory and Hypotheses
We provide the main arguments for the hypothesized effects of the reference
prices and bidder heterogeneity on the first bid value in the B2B auction platform
described above. Prior work in internal reference prices argues that it has a strong
influence on the valuation and willingness to pay on a given product in the posted-
price environment (Rajendran and Tellis 1994). While the effect of ERP both within
an auction (such as starting price) and surrounding an auction (such as prices on
adjacent auctions) on the final price of an auction have been studied in some depth,
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there is very little work on the role of IRP in the auction context specifically. To the
best of our knowledge, only Wolk and Spann (2008) attempt to measure IRP, using
a survey for the two products they study (sneakers and MP3 player). In all other
cases, IRPs are neither controlled for nor measured, for understandable empirical
reasons; longitudinal data is is not easily accessible in these environments. Wolk
and Spann (2008) show that the IRP does influence the quoted prices in a name-
your-own-price environment. In our context, the historical price information that
the bidder recalls from won auctions for comparable auctions will weigh heavily on
the willingness to pay on the focal auction– the higher the historical IRP, the higher
will be transferred valuation to the focal auction. Thus, as a baseline, we propose:
Hypothesis 1 Higher IRPs will be associated with higher first bids on the focal
auction, all else being equal.
Given our auction environment, there are two natural categories of ERP –
the average just-finished auction prices (JFAP ) and open-auction prices (OAP ).
JFAP is free of any uncertainty since these auctions are over and therefore, to
the focal bidder, will indicate a reasonable anchor of where the focal auction may
end. If the bidder observes higher final prices on these auctions on average, it is
likely that the private valuation he or she assigns to the focal pallet will be higher
as well. Dholakia and Simonson (2005) argue that prices on adjacent auctions can
serve as signals of quality. In addition, Dholakia and Soltysinski (2001) show that
the tendency to emulate other auctions (the herd behavior bias) is exacerbated
when the underlying quality of the product is uncertain. In our setting, clearly
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there exists quality uncertainty about the pallet. However, the bidder can observe
average final prices on C&C auctions which, by virtue of overlapping with the focal
auction, provide reference prices that are clearly proximal and easily available to
the bidder (Ariely and Simonson 2003). Both Ariely and Simonson (2003) and Hubl
and Popkowski Leszczyc (2003) present evidence that higher starting prices may
signal quality and thereby induce consumers to assimilate higher reference prices
for the product, thereby leading to higher final prices. Kamins et al. (2004) find
that seller-provided reference prices in the form of minimum bids lead to higher
prices on average, while Nunes and Boatwright (2004) show that incidental prices
on products that are unrelated to the focal auction can also serve as anchors and
influence willingness to pay. Extending these arguments, it is likely that final prices
on just finished auctions, which represent others’ valuations on similar pallets, can
function as valid external reference prices and lead to higher willingness to pay for
potential first bidders. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Higher JFAPs will be associated with higher first bids on the focal
auction, all else being equal.
The dynamics regarding prices observed in open auctions (OAP ) are somewhat
similar to JFAP but the information they provide to the bidders is still uncertain
since the set of auctions on which they are formed are still unfolding. Higher OAP ,
on average, will induce higher valuations on the focal auctions to the extent that they
provide a signal of value. The observed literature on quality signals from external
sources (Dholakia and Simonson 2005; Kamins et al. 2004) provides reasoning for
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why OAP are likely to influence bidders’ willingness to pay. However, it is also
possible that the bidder may choose to bid instead on a C&C auction, rather than
be the first bidder on the focal auction. Prior work on simultaneous auctions suggests
that this is unlikely – Peters and Severinov (2005) argue that cross-bidding behavior
will tend to drive bidders to the comparable auction that has a lower current price,
which in our case is the auction awaiting the first bid since all starting prices are set
at the same level. Therefore, the cumulative effect, we argue, will be to induce the
first bidder faced with a higher OAP to issue a higher first bid. It is likely that since
the information content of OAP is less compelling (more uncertain) than JFAP ,
the effect size of the OAP may be lower than that of the JFAP on the first bid
value. We allow the empirical analysis to determine this but propose the following:
Hypothesis 3 Higher OAPs will be associated with higher first bids on the focal
auction, all else being equal.
Prior literature suggests that reference prices in the auctions context are
formed from adjacent or C&C auctions, which is captured by JFAP and OAP .
However, it is unlikely that all such C&C auctions have the same effect on the focal
bidder. Prior work has suggested that the act of making certain reference prices ex-
plicit or salient, for instance by making the bidder explicitly compare prices across
adjacent auctions (Dholakia and Simonson 2005), can differentially influence bid-
ding behavior. In a similar vein, Nunes and Boatwright (2004) show that focusing
attention on a particular set of incidental prices increases the extent to which they
impact willingness to pay, compared to the baseline where no specific attention was
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directed. In our setting, the notion of salience or attention is captured by the set
within C&C auctions where the bidder has actually participated by posting a bid.
Therefore, while the set of C&C auctions may be used to set reference prices, the
act of bidding on some of these auctions will make the current prices on this subset
of auctions more explicit and salient; this salience will show up in the specific bids
on the focal auction. Capturing the impact of bidder participation thus introduces
a new dimension of bidder heterogeneity that has been understudied in the liter-
ature since it is bidder-specific rather than auction or market-specific. We argue
that bidders with many bids out on C&C auctions will likely condition their first
bid on the focal auction differently than bidders with relatively fewer bids on C&C
auctions due to the increased salience of this reference price information. Therefore,
we propose:
Hypothesis 4 The impact of JFAP and OAP on first bid value will be positively
moderated by the participation of bidders in JFA and OA.
Bidder experience has been studied in multiple ways in the literature and has
been consistently shown to affect bidding behavior. In an early study, Wilcox (2000)
shows that bidders with a high level of winning history, used as a proxy for bidder
experience, submit fewer bids and also bid late in the auction. However, subsequent
research suggests that winning experience may not necessarily drive bidding behavior
(Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Wang and Hu 2009) captured by willingness to pay,
number of incremental bids or time of last bid. Indeed, the losing experience of the
bidder appears to have a stronger effect on bidding behavior (Wang and Hu 2009;
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Park and Bradlow 2005). Due to the ambiguity in the effect of experience on bidding
behavior observed in the literature, in the B2B context we study, the role of bidder
experience on bidding behavior needs to be established based on an understanding
of the specific context rather than extending existing work.
As participation moderates the impact of reference prices, it is also likely that
bidder experience makes certain reference prices less influential on bidding behavior
(Wilcox 2000). Prior work in the posted-price environment shows that experienced
consumers tend to condition more on IRP and less on ERP since experience allows
consumers to form more robust internal expectations of value (Rajendran and Tel-
lis 1994; Yadav and Seiders 1998). In the specific context of the online auction,
experienced bidders will likely rely more on their historical observations of prices
on the focal auction rather than on the dynamics of the current market condition.
Therefore, while the impact of higher JFAP and OAP may signal higher value from
the focal auction, the effects of these are likely stronger on inexperienced bidders
compared to experienced bidders. Therefore, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 5 The impact of JFAP and OAP on first bid value will be negatively
moderated by bidder experience.
We have hypothesized the moderating effects of bidder participation and expe-
rience on the relationship between ERP and first bids. It is also possible to postulate
a three-way interaction between reference prices, participation and experience on the
first bid. For instance, it can be argued that that the effect of OAPbid and JFAPbid
is lower on bidders with experience than on bidders without experience. This anal-
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ysis is, in effect, a three-way interaction. Providing a priori expectations on the
direction of these effects is hard since the proposed moderating effect of experience
is negative while that of participation is positive; we cannot clearly identify what the
composite effect will be. Therefore, rather than propose a hypothesis, we perform
the analysis and allow the data to provide us with guidance. In the next section,
we discuss the analysis conducted.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
We proceed with the empirical analysis in stages so as to provide adequate
depth of analysis to the research questions we study. First, we address the impor-
tance of the first bid in determining the final price of the auction. Having established
the importance of first bid role, we then study how the first bids are formulated
through the influence of references prices and bidder heterogeneity. Finally, we dis-
cuss the results from this analysis, which point to way for further post-hoc analysis
reported in Section 2.5.
1.4.1 The First Bid’s Effect on Recovery Rate
In this section, we confirm that first bids are critical in determining the final
price of an auction, We start with a simple OLS model with final price as the
dependent variable and the first bid as the key independent variable. Consistent
with the literature on final prices in online auctions (Bajari and Hortacsu 2003;
Bapna et al. 2004), we include the following covariates - NOA, Q, time of first
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bid (TOFB), Y , number of bidders (N), fixed effects of month/year of auction (to
capture seasonality, if any) and physical location of the warehouse (see Table 1.2 for
the summary of variables in final price regression).
The results from the baseline model without first bid are reported in Column
1 of Table 1.3. On adding first bid to the model, we see the results in Column 2 of
Table 1.3. The regression shows good predictive power and a statistically significant
F-statistic, with all covariates showing marginal effects in the expected direction,
based on the literature. Most significantly, the coefficient of first bid is positive and
the most influential in determining final price.
Prior work on the role of the starting price (Bajari and Hortacsu 2003) suggests
that the first bid’s effect on final price manifests through its influence on number
of bidders . For instance, Simonsohn and Ariely (2008) argue that early bidding
is a necessary condition for herding to occur, which results in more bidders on the
auction and therefore higher final prices. Therefore, we account for the endogeneity
of number of bidders in this relationship in the following manner. We instrument
for number of bidders using the hour and weekday of the auction dummy variables,
which are likely unrelated to the final price on the auction but may influence the
number of bidders. The use of exogenous time variables has been used in prior
work as valid instruments (Wooldridge 2002) and we follow this approach. We then
estimate a 2SLS regression with number of bidders in the first stage and final price in
the second stage. Exclusion conditions require omitting the time dummies from the
second stage final price equation. Column 3 of Table 1.3 shows the first stage results
for number of bidders while Column 4 shows the second stage results for recovery
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rate. The results are consistent with our arguments that first bid is influential in
determining final price; all else being equal, an increase of 1% in the first bid value
increases the final price of auction by almost 0.4% of E. Having established the
critical role of the first bid, we move to testing our research hypotheses on the first
bid.
1.4.2 First Bid Formation
To predict the first value for an auction, we specify a regression model of the
following type:
FBij = β0 + β1Experienceij + β2IRPij + β3ERPij + β4BCij + β5ACi
+ β6T imei + β7Warehousei + εij (1.1)
Where FBij is the first bid issued by the bidder j in auction i. Also, Experienceij,
IRPij, and ERPij respectively report on experience, internal, external reference
prices of bidder j prior to the time of the first bid on the auction i. BCij are the
control variables for bidder j in auction i which include: the number of incremental
bids bidder j submitted in auction i and the number of JFA and OA the bidder j
observed prior to the time of the first bid on the auction i (NJFA; NOA). Addi-
tionally, ACi represents the control variables for auction i such as Q, Y , and TOFB.
Finally, we also account for the fixed-effect of time and warehouse location of the
auction i. Table 1.2 summarizes the description of these variables used in Equation
1.1 4. The baseline model introduced in Equation 1.1 does not include interactions
4Although FB and most variables in right-hand-side of Equation 1.1 (Experience, IRP , ERP ,
etc) are also time-dependent, for the sake of exposition simplicity, we suppress the time subscript
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to test moderation, which we discuss shortly.
Estimating Equation 1.1 using OLS is feasible but it is likely that the coef-
ficient estimates of the reference prices and bidder heterogeneity on first bid are
biased (Bapna et al. 2004; Bajari and Hortacsu 2003). The bidder’s entry into the
auction is endogenous, i.e. the focal bidder chooses to enter the auction based on
some underlying decision process, which then leads to the formation of the first bid.
Ignoring this decision introduces bias into the coefficient estimates of the reference
price and heterogeneity variables on the first bid. Jointly estimating fully structural
models of entry and bidding is challenging because of the complexity involved in
characterizing structural properties of the B2B marketplace, specifically regarding
heterogeneous bidder costs, the valuation paradigm (affiliated value versus common
value) and computational complexity (Li and Zheng 2009). Therefore, we use a
simpler and more parsimonious method to account for endogenous entry by lever-
aging the availability of panel dataset and the ability to capture the state of the
market and the bidder specifically at the time of bidding. We are guided here by the
methodology used by Bapna et al. (2009) where, in lieu of a structural model, the
effect of endogenous strategic variables are estimated through the use of instruments
and reduced form equations.
The approach we use to tackle endogenous entry is as follows. At the point
in time when the first bid is entered for the focal auction, there are likely K active
bidders on the platform who form the candidate set of bidders for the auction. Recall
that all auctions in our sample are of 2 days duration. Therefore, even though there
from those variables in the equation.
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are 1200 buyers registered on the site, it is unlikely that all of them are ’active’ on
the platform at the time of the auction’s posting. Therefore, we first identify the
K set of ‘latent’ bidders who form the candidate set. For each focal auction, we
identify all bidders on the comparable set of JFA and OA auctions who have issued
observable bids prior to the time of the first bid on the focal auction (t). These
bidders then form the pool of latent first bidders on the focal auction, of which one
bidder does become the actual first bidder. See Figure 1.2 for a depiction of this
empirical strategy.
The logic for this operationalization is based on three observations. First,
all latent bidders thus identified are clearly active on the platform at the time of
the focal auction. Second, all these bidders are likely interested in the focal pallet,
since they have issued bids for comparable pallets. Third, this approach allows us
to capture greater heterogeneity in time-varying bidder characteristics that help in
more robust estimation of the entry decision. For instance, we can identify, given
the time of first bid on the focal auction, what other outstanding bids the latent
bidder has on other auctions, the prices he or she is observing on other concurrent
auctions and so on; these variables are likely to influence his or her propensity to
bid on the focal auction since they influence his or her valuation for the focal pallet.
Using this approach, for each focal auction, we form a set of Ki latent bidders
for each auction i, of whom one bidder chooses to enter the auction. We stack these
Ki observations and estimate a discrete choice model wherein each latent bidder k
chooses whether to bid or not in auction i. The unit of analysis here is therefore
latent bidder-auction and the analysis predicts whether a realized dyad is formed
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between auction i and bidder k through the first bid. The dependent variable value
(entry) for the actual first bidder is 1 while it is 0 for all other latent bidders. We
use the following variables to parsimoniously predict this choice of entry - bidder
experience, NJFAbid, NJFAwon, NOAbid and fixed effects for time of the auction
and warehouse location (see Table 1.2 for a summary of the variables used in the
choice of entry model). Since the same auction-level variables appear multiple times
within the set of latent bidders for that auction on the right-hand-side, adding these
variables directly to the estimation would lead to biased coefficients (Wooldridge
2002). Therefore, we add interaction terms of Q and Y with bidder experience as
independent variables, essentially accounting for the extent to which bidders with
specific levels of experience will prefer to bid on auctions with certain values of Y
and Q. This discrete choice model is estimated using a probit specification and
the results are shown in Column 1 of Table 1.4. The results show that the three
bidder-specific variables significantly predict the probability that a bidder will be
the first bidder on the focal auction in the expected manner. Bidders who have just
won or bid on a set of just finished auctions are less likely to be first bidders on
the focal auction given volume of demand, all else being equal. If the bidder has an
outstanding bid on a comparable concurrent open auction (where the bidder is not
the current winner), then the odds of the bidder being the first bidder on the focal
auction is higher, given the bidder’s interest in similar pallets. More surprisingly,
the bidder experience variable is not significant; we return to this finding later in
the analysis.
We can now combine the probit model with Equation 1.1 to correct for bias
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from endogenous entry. If we assume that all latent bidders for a focal auction i
have latent valuations Uik for the auction and that only the bidder with the highest
Uik enters the auction, we can model this as a sample selection problem (Heckman
1979). For every latent bidder in every auction, there is an observed variable Dik
which is 1 if the bidder becomes the first bidder and 0 otherwise. We only observe
the first bid FB on auction i from bidder k when Dik = 1. Therefore, we can use
the Heckman sample selection two-stage estimation procedure to first estimate the
probit model in Table 1.4, calculate inverse Mills ratios and then estimate Equation
1.1 as the outcome equation with the first bid as the dependent variable (Maddala
1983)5.
The results from the baseline estimation of Equation 1.1, which test the direct
effects of reference prices and bidder heterogeneity are shown in Column 1 of Table
1.5. The moderation hypotheses require interaction terms between the two ERPs
and the two source of bidder heterogeneity. Therefore, in subsequent columns, we
incrementally add the interaction terms to test the moderation hypotheses. All re-
sults reported in Table 1.5 are based on second-stage Heckman analyses, with the
rho coefficient6 reported across all columns. Column 2 of Table 1.5 adds the interac-
tion term between bidder experience and JFAP/OAP respectively to the analysis.
In order to test the moderation of bidder participation, we replace JFAP (OAP )
5This model is also called the type 2 Tobit model or the generalized tobit model (Amemiya
1985, p. 384). We refer to it here simply as the sample selection model.
6rho indicates the correlation coefficient between error terms in probit model (first stage) and
Equation 1.1 (first bid model). The statistical significance of rho, reported at the bottom of Table
1.5 will show to what degree accounting for sample selection is critical for the sake of our analysis.
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by the two subset variables JFAPbid and JFABnotbid (OAPbid and OAPnotbid) in the
analysis. This allows us to establish the moderation effect. If the marginal effect
of reference prices from those auctions in the comparable set where the bidder has
previously made a bid is higher than those where no such bids exist, the modera-
tion effect is established. Column 3 of Table 1.5 replaces JFAP with JFABbid and
JFABnotbid while Column 4 of Table 1.5 replaces OAP with its subset counterparts.
Finally, Column 5 of Table 1.5 provides the full model.
It is possible that there exists a three-way interaction between the ERPs,
experience and participation on the first bid. While we did not provide a formal
hypothesis, we test to check if these effects exist in the data. Column 6 of Table 1.5
extends the results observed from the earlier interaction analysis shown in Column
3 by adding an interaction term of experience and JFAbid. Similarly, Column 7 of
Table 1.5 augments Column 4 by adding an interaction term between experience
and OAPbid. Column 8 provides the corresponding full model. The results here
provide some evidence for the presence of the three-way interaction between bidder
experience, participation and external reference prices.
In terms of robustness checks, we re-estimated all the models from Table 1.5
using OLS. While individual coefficients change, the direction and significance of the
results are consistent. OLS also allows for the testing of multicollinearity, which is
always a possibility with multiple interaction terms in the same regression. We use
variance inflation factors (VIF) to check for collinearity; the maximum and mean
VIFs in the analysis are respectively 2 and 1.5, which are below the threshold values
indicated by Belsley et al. (1980). We also tested for the presence of outliers, no
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significant outliers were found in the analysis, which is not surprising given the
routinized nature of the B2B secondary market. In roughly 20% of the auctions, the
first bidder also issued a second bid, later in the auction. We therefore re-estimated
the Heckman model after removing all of these cases, i.e. we only consider auctions
where the first bidder issued only one bid. The results are consistent with those
shown in Table 1.5. Finally, a hybrid valuation model rests on the assumption that
bidders do respond to price signals from other auctions, i.e. they do not operate in
a pure private value auction. To establish that this is the case, we run a simple test
for the winner’s curse, in the spirit of Bajari and Hortacsu (2003). For each bidder,
we use the past six months of bidding behavior observed to estimate a linear model
for N , the number of bidders on an auction. Using this model, we predict N for the
focal auction from each bidder’s perspective, using the coefficient estimates from
the linear model. We then find a significant and negative relationship between the
predicted value of N and the bid value on the auction, indicating that bidders do
tend to shade their bids when they expect more bidders to enter the focal auction.
This simple test rules out the pure private valuation model (Milgrom and Weber
1982), providing support for the fact that external price signals are indeed likely to
be influential on bidding behavior. All the tests reported here are available from
the authors upon request.
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1.5 Discussion of Results and Post-Hoc Analysis
We start with discussing the summary statistics that provide some context
for our study. From Table 1.1, we see that the auctions in our context generally
provide relatively low yields to the seller, with a mean of 26% of E. The mean
first bid is considerably lower at 15.6% of E. Each auction has an average of 5.5
bidders, which is lower than B2C settings but is consistent with recent work in
B2B auctions (Langer et al. 2012). The bidders in our sample show considerable
heterogeneity in experience (mean = 13.89, std. dev = 25.72), indicating a mix of
experienced and novice bidders. The environment faced by the bidders also varies
considerably, as seen in the NJFA and NOA statistics; the standard deviations
show that bidders clearly encounter variability in the number of just finished and
open comparable auctions. Finally, we see a small but significant difference between
JFAPbid (OAPbid) and JFAPnotbid (OAPnotbid), suggesting that there is a difference
in prices on auctions where the average bidder has a bid versus those where no
bids have been issued. However, these variables are highly correlated (as expected)
and therefore, we interpret regression results cautiously when the two variables are
present together.
Moving to the main results in Table 1.5, we observe strong statistical support
for Hypothesis 2.3. Across all specifications in Table 1.5, the coefficient for IRP is
positive (0.17, p < 0.01). One standard deviation increase in IRP thus leads to a
1.2% of E increase in the first bid. Since the mean of the first bid in our sample
is 15.6% of E, one standard deviation increase in IRP results in approximately an
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increase in first bid of 8% (1.2/15.6), i.e. an effect size of 8%. Similarly, Hypotheses
2.3 and 3 are also supported; the direct effect of JFAP (from Columns 1, 2 and 4 of
Table 1.5) and OAP (from Columns 1, 2 and 3) increase the first bid significantly.
One standard deviation increase in JFAP leads to an increase in first bid of 0.2%
of E while the increase attributable to one standard deviation increase in OAP is
0.3% of E. The effect sizes for these coefficients on first bid are, respectively, 0.012%
and 0.019%, which are relatively low in terms of economic impact.
Hypothesis 2.3 pertained to the effect of participation on the reference prices.
We see that the effect of participation through cross-bidding significantly increases
the coefficient of JFAP (Column 3 of Table 1.5), providing support for the moder-
ation hypothesis; the coefficient for JFAPbid is roughly three times that of JFAP ,
which indicates that a standard deviation increase in JFAPbid is associated with
an increase in first bid of 0.45% of E. Interestingly, the coefficient of JFAPnotbid is
insignificant, indicating that bidders appears to use only those C&C auctions where
they have previously bid reference prices. Similarly, the coefficient of OAPbid (Col-
umn 4 of Table 1.5) is much higher than the coefficient of OAP , again providing
support for the moderation hypothesis. The effect size of OAPbid, i.e. the incre-
mental contribution of OAPbid on first bid, rises to 0.46%. Again, we find that the
average prices of open auctions in which the bidder is not bidding (OAPnotbid) is
not significant. It is possible that characteristics of the pallets themselves may be
leading to different values of JFAPbid (OAPbid) and JFAPnotbid (OAPnotbid); hence,
it is not the reference prices themselves but some specific attributes of the pallets
posted by the seller that leads to the observed moderation effect. Two arguments
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suggest this is not the case. First, the seller’s incentives are to place pallets on auc-
tion as soon as possible in order to reduce inventory costs. Therefore, there is little,
if any, strategic behavior on the part of the seller in manipulating the concurrence
of auctions or pallets, indicating exogeneity of the auction posting process. Sec-
ond, we compare the the aggregate pallet-level variables, Q and Y , across JFAPbid
(OAPbid) and JFAPnotbid (OAPnotbid) and find no significant differences, indicating
that it is likely the salience associated with participation and bidding rather than
any specifics of the pallet that leads to the moderation effect.
We see no support for Hypothesis 5 which pertained to the moderation effect
of experience. In the case of JFAP , the interaction term in Column 2 of Table
1.5 is insignificant. With respect to OAP , we see the opposite result in Column
2 of Table 1.5, i.e. the effect of OAP is higher on first bid in the presence of ex-
perience. This is contrary to extant work that suggests that experienced bidders
are less influenced by external reference prices (Rajendran and Tellis 1994; Yadav
and Seiders 1998). We also observe that the direct effect of experience across all
specifications is positive, suggesting that experienced bidders bid higher when they
are first bidders. This too is inconsistent with prior work, albeit in the B2C setting
(Park and Bradlow 2005; Gilkeson and Reynolds 2003), showing a negative relation-
ship between bidder’s experience measured by feedback rating and their bid values.
One plausible explanation for our result is based on the uncertain nature of these
resale markets: in interviews conducted with executives who manage seller organi-
zations, they noted that inexperienced bidders are typically uncertain of the market
potential of items (having newly entered into the business) - this uncertainty leads
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them to bid conservatively (low). However, as the bidders win and gain experience
moving items through their own sales channels, their ability to assess the value of a
bundle improves and their bids increase accordingly.
When experience is interacted with JFAPbid and OAPbid in a three-way in-
teraction (Columns 6 and 7 of Table 1.5), we again see results inconsistent with
expectations; no significant effect of JFAPbid and a weakly positive moderation ef-
fect on OAPbid. Recall that the first stage results for endogenous entry (Table 1.4)
also showed an insignificant coefficient for experience, whereas theory suggests that
experienced bidders are more likely to bid late and last (Wilcox 2000). Finally,
we note that the effect sizes for the external reference prices discussed above are
relatively small, especially when compared to prior work, albeit in a name-your-
own-price auction context (Wolk and Spann 2008). All of these results indicate that
there is likely a greater level of heterogeneity in bidding behavior that is masked by
the aggregate analysis that we present in Table 1.5. Through disaggregating bidder
behavior by experience and the market environments bidders face, it is possible that
we will see results that are more consistent with prior work, in addition to more ro-
bust effect sizes. We examine these possibilities through further post-hoc analysis
described next.
1.5.1 Clustering Bidders
Following Bapna et al. (2004), we use a data-driven clustering method to
identify latent clusters of bidding behavior that might allow a more detailed analysis
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of bidder heterogeneity. We use the K-means clustering methodology to identify
clusters of bidding behavior at a more granular level. Note that our objective here
is to identify clusters of bidding behavior rather than bidders; this is an important
distinction since our panel dataset captures bidders over a period of years in which
their bidding behavior may have changed as a result of increasing experience. We
use four variables that characterize the specific bidding context to form our clusters:
experience, number of just finished auctions in which the bidder has bid at the time
of the focal first bid (NJFAbid), the number of open auctions where the bidder has
bid (NOAbid), and the number of just finished auctions where the bidder has won
(NJFAwon). These four variables are highly indicative of the bidder’s propensity
to be the first bidder on the focal auction (note that they match the independent
variables used in the probit analysis reported earlier) and also represent the two
sources of bidder heterogeneity we study in this work (experience and cross-bidding
behavior). The k-means methodology will result in finding two different clusters of
bidding behavior7. The summary of statistics of the resulting two clusters are shown
in Tables 1.6 and 1.7. Cluster 1 comprises of 3369 auctions; representing 78% of the
sample, while Cluster 2 is smaller and comprises 942 auctions (22% of the sample).
More critically, Cluster 2 represents a set of bidding behavior that is character-
ized by high values of experience compared to Cluster 1 (51.5 versus 3.35, difference
7We apply Ray and Turi’s (1999) method of determining the most efficient K by calculating
the ratio of the intra-cluster distance to the inter-cluster distance, called the validity ratio. The
K that minimizes this metric provides a good clustering solution. In our case, the validity ratio is
minimized at K=2.
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of means t-test significant at p<0.01). Similarly, Cluster 2 has significantly higher
values for first bid, cross-bidding behavior, IRP values and the time of first bid.
However, the mean Y and Q are not statistically different across the two clusters,
indicating that the different bidding behavior across the clusters is not related to
the types of pallets. Finally, the difference in final price across the two clusters is
roughly 1% of E and is statistically significant, with Cluster 1 showing a higher final
price. Similarly, the number of bidders in an auction are also statistically higher in
Cluster 1 compared to Cluster 2. On the basis of the clusters, we posit that Cluster
2 represents a set of highly experienced bidders who actively cross-bid and also tend
to bid high when they are the first bidders.
While our clustering was based on bidding behavior rather than on bidder per
se, we investigated the composition of the two clusters at a deeper level. Of the
569 unique first bidders in our dataset, 535 bidders appear only in Cluster 1 and
3 bidders appear only in Cluster 2 across the dataset. The remaining 31 bidders
appear as first bidders in both clusters across the dataset. Therefore, our clustering
appears to be identifying bidders as well, although with a small set of bidders shifting
clusters across the panel. When we examine the distribution of bidding behavior
of the 31 bidders across the time period of our sample, we note that in most cases,
these bidders appear in Cluster 1 in the early years of the panel (in 2003 and
2004) but appear in Cluster 2 more frequently in the later years of the panel. This
distribution supports the thesis that these bidders modified their bidding behavior
and strategy as they gained experience on the platform. In contrast, the bidders
in Cluster 1 appear to still be relatively inexperienced. Not surprisingly, the 34
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bidders in Cluster 2 account for more than 21% of the sales on the platform while
Cluster 1 accounts for the remaining 79%. We thus term the 34 bidders in Cluster
2 as super-bidders. In comparison, Cluster 1 represents a more homogeneous set of
bidders who have lower experience and cross-bid less actively.
The clustering results also indicate some interesting dynamics in the relation-
ship between first bids on the auction and the eventual final prices that obtain.
Auctions where the first bidders are super-bidders see their first bid arrive later in
the auction but the first bid value is higher. This tends to reduce the eventual num-
ber of bidders in the auction, increase the odds of the first bidder being the eventual
winner of the auction but results in a final price that is equal to or slightly lesser
than those observed in Cluster 1. Bidders in Cluster 1, on the other hand, bid early,
low and are less aggressive in their bidding behavior on the platform, as evidenced
by the lower cross-bidding statistics. These bidders are more conservative, allow
more bidders to enter the auction and therefore end up with slightly higher prices
on average. In addition, the odds of winning are lower for the first bidders from
Cluster 1. While these dynamics are based on preliminary analysis, they match with
the varying pricing dynamics that Bapna et al. (2008) show using functional data
analysis.
Having identified these two clusters, we re-estimate our econometric models on
the two clusters separately. The first stage probit results from the sample selection
model are shown in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.4 for the two clusters respectively.
Similarly, the results of the second stage of the sample selection models are shown
in Table 1.8 for the two clusters. We omit the interaction terms with experience
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in this table since the clustering accounts for that variable. Columns 1 through 4
of Table 1.8 provide the first bid results for Cluster 1 while Columns 5 through 8
pertain to Cluster 2. In the interest of space, we only highlight the relevant changes
in the results that obtain through the clustering exercise.
In the first stage probit model shown in Table 1.4, we now see that bidder
experience is a significant predictor of entry into the auction. While inexperienced
bidders tend to be less likely to be the first bidders in Cluster 1, we see that in Cluster
2 more experienced bidders are more likely to be the first bidders (see Column 3 in
Table 1.4). These results are consistent with the conclusions drawn by Dholakia et al.
(2002) where they argue that experienced bidders tend to include more alternatives
in their consideration set of auctions on which to bid. This suggests that experienced
bidders may consider more of the available listings and consequently, be more likely
to come across an auction listing that has not received any bids as yet. A possible
explanation is that Cluster 2 bidders are more confident in their ability to assess
value in the pallet from previous experience, they will tend to enter the auction
pre-emptively with a higher first bid. The relative lower odds of Cluster 1 bidders
to be the first bidder may be driven by their inexperience and resulting difficulty or
inability to assess a MWTP for the pallet; hence the desire to first see the bids of
others on the focal auction that then help inform their own bid. Therefore, we see
that experience has a negative effect on the relative odds of a bidder becoming the
first bidder (see Column 2 in Table 1.4).
Moving to the results in Table 1.8, we first see that the coefficient for IRP
is significantly higher in Cluster 2 than in Cluster 1. Indeed, for Cluster 2, the
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coefficient of IRP (0.26) suggests an increase in first bid of roughly 1.3% of E. Since
the mean first bid in Cluster 2 is 19%, the effect size obtained is almost 7%. The
equivalent effect size of IRP in Cluster 1 is roughly 5.5%. Thus, the effect of IRP is
higher and more influential in Cluster 2 compared to Cluster 1, which is consistent
with expectations given the higher experience levels in Cluster 2 bidders. Both
clusters continue to show a positive effect of JFAPbid on first bid; however they
differ in the effect size as well as significance level of the variables. While Cluster 1
continues to show effect sizes that are comparable to those observed in Table 1.8 for
both JFAP and JFAPbid, Cluster 2’s effect sizes are smaller and less significant (at
the 10% level) for JFAPbid and insignificant for JFAP . Hence, the hypothesized
moderation from Hypothesis 2.3 appears to be hold for both clusters, but the role of
JFAPbid is considerably diminished for experienced bidders. Finally, the effects of
OAP appear to hold in both clusters. As with IRP, the relative weight that bidders
in Cluster 2 place on OAP is roughly double that placed by Cluster 1 bidders. The
impact of OAPbid on first bid in both clusters is correspondingly higher than OAP ,
showing that the moderation hypothesis holds across both clusters but differs in
magnitude; the effect size of OAPbid on first bid in Cluster 2 is roughly 5.5% but is
only 2.6% in Cluster 1.
In summary, the results from the clustering indicate that Cluster 1 appears
to be more consistent with prior theory on experience and reference prices in terms
of their bidding behavior. Bidders in this cluster condition on their IRP as well
as their ERPs. Since these bidders are relatively inexperienced, which in our case
translates to fewer auctions won in the past 6 months, their IRPs are relatively
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weak signals of the pallet’s market value or of the winning price. Therefore, prior
research indicates that they would utilize other salient price signals that are available
in the marketplace (Mazumdar et al. 2005) and hence, the influence of JFAPbid)
and OAPbid. However, prior work argues that experienced bidders are likely to rely
primarily on their IRP and be less influenced by other price signals (Yadav and
Seiders 1998). Therefore, in Cluster 2, we see evidence of this in the significance
and effect size of IRP as well as the non-significance of JFAP . However, OAPbid
continues to influence first bids in Cluster 2. This result is puzzling at first but there
are some potential explanations for this effect, which we describe below.
One explanation is based on the fact that Cluster 2 bidders typically do more
cross-bidding, compared to Cluster 1, and therefore are likely to find the prices
on these open auctions where they have bid (i.e. OAPbid) particularly salient and
easily available (Ariely and Simonson 2003). In contrast, JFAP auctions have
terminated and final prices have been revealed, making them less salient to the
bidder. An alternative explanation is rooted in the differences between the bidders’
average IRP and the ERP values (Mazumdar et al. 2005). For Cluster 2, note
that the mean IRP is 0.23 (std deviation = 0.05), which suggests that the bidders
possess a strong signal of value from their experience. For these bidders, the mean
value of JFAP is 0.19, which is within one standard deviation of the IRP. Thus,
for the experienced bidder who has a strong IRP signal, the marginal information
content from JFAP is likely redundant and trivial. However, the mean OAPbid,
is 0.12, which deviates significantly from the IRP. Additionally, OAPbid provides
information on the level of competition in the current marketplace for comparable
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auctions. Of course, we realize that these are candidate explanations and that
further work is needed to establish the inter-relationships unambiguously between
internal and external reference prices on bidding behavior in the auction setting.
1.6 Conclusion
In this essay we started with the objective of addressing specific gaps in the on-
line auctions literature. First, existing research studying reference prices in auctions
(Dholakia et al. 2002; Kamins et al. 2004) are based on mostly cross-sectional B2C
data from eBay and other similar platforms and have not been privy to the detailed
bidding history of individual bidders. Second, due to the absence of bidder-specific
characteristics and bidding behavior, this literature is unable to tease out the differ-
ential affects of multiple price signals (e.g., bids on comparable/same items or the
declared value of the item) on individual bidders and their bids, focusing thereby
mostly on auction-level outcomes. Third, extant literature has studied bidder het-
erogeneity but has not examined how these factors moderate the use of reference
prices. In this work we complement and extend this literature by explicitly studying
the role of reference prices on the first bid, rather than at the auction level, in a
B2B context far removed from the well-understood world of consumer goods sold
on eBay. Our work here provides several contributions to the literature above and
beyond identifying the positive link between the first bid and the final final price
of an auction. Our work is the first, to our knowledge, that studies, in one inte-
grated setting, (i) the impact of internal reference prices formed by previous winning
42
prices, measured longitudinally, on individual bids, (ii) the manner in which bid-
ders are influenced by price information (external reference prices) both within and
surrounding the focal auction at the bid level, and (iii) the interaction of these
external reference prices and bidder heterogeneity on individual bids, specifically
the first bid. Our results show that reference prices are influential on the first bid,
but are clearly moderated by bidder heterogeneity. In post-hoc analysis, we use
clustering methods to partition bidding behavior and show that while the majority
of bidders are influenced as expected by reference price information, there exist a
small but influential set of ‘super-bidders’ who behave distinctly different in terms
of how they use the available reference price information.
From a methodological viewpoint, we capture arguably the most complete data
on reference prices and bidder heterogeneity possible through the use of a proprietary
panel dataset of B2B auctions. The use of panel data allows us to develop measures
for reference prices and bidder heterogeneity at a level of granularity that is not
possible in cross-sectional data from platforms such as eBay. This additional granu-
larity allows us to account for endogenous entry into the auction, a methodological
issue that has continued to be difficult to account for in empirical auctions research.
While our method for modeling endogenous entry is based on some assumptions,
we utilize the visibility provided by the full dataset to account for entry in the most
parsimonious manner possible. No doubt, more work is required here. Furthermore,
our results also lend support to the presence of hybrid valuation models in B2B
auctions and would suggest that appropriate hybrid valuation models need to be
defined as a function of bidder experience. While our focus here has been on empir-
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ical analysis, future theoretical analyses of the hybrid valuation model in ill-defined
B2B contexts is warranted and a fruitful avenue for future research. Our results
indicate that bidder experience and participation in concurrent auctions may play
a significant role in such theoretical analyses of B2B auction contexts.
From a platform design perspective, our results suggest that sellers may bene-
fit from investing in decision support tools or technologies that strategically market
(possibly overlooked) auctions to bidders based on their experience levels in order
to maximize final prices. However, our results suggest an additional layer of strate-
gic complexity for sellers who undertake such marketing activities. We find that
salience is a key factor in determining the influence of a reference price, particu-
larly for inexperienced bidders. Inexperienced bidders, by definition, participate in
few auctions and win in fewer still, leading to lower IRP values, which provide lim-
ited guidance in helping bidders assess values for new auctions. Additionally, given
their low auction activity levels, the bulk of the ERPs in the auction environment
(JFAPnotbid and OAPnotbid) are rendered ineffective as sources of guidance for bid-
ding, and a cycle emerges. Inexperienced bidders tend to submit relatively low first
bids (based on the low IRP and infrequent use of ERP) and more often than not,
lose, thereby remaining inexperienced. All else equal, our research suggest that the
seller should invest in decision support tools to increase the salience of C&C auc-
tions in which the inexperienced bidders are not bidding; thereby increasing their
first bids and win probabilities by providing them with useful reference information.
Experienced bidders, on the other hand, may not need these decision tools since
they possess a greater level of depth in their understanding of the dynamics of the
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auction environment.
For the seller, however, our work indicates a dark side based on the accumu-
lation of bidder experience. While experience helps increase first bids, too much
experience can have the deleterious effect of decreasing final prices. In our dataset,
auctions in which the first bidder is experienced terminated with slightly lower final
prices. This is (most likely) due to other bidders being deterred from entry into the
auction when they see higher first bids and a quicker pace of price increases. This
dynamic implies that, in addition to the selection of auction format parameters such
as duration and starting price, a rational seller must also consider managing the flow
of information (via decision support tools) to bidders strategically based on whether
the first bidder belongs to Cluster 1 or Cluster 2, i.e. on the bidder’s experience
levels and the actual first bid value. Our analysis suggests that the accumulation of
experience will alter the composition of external reference prices used by a bidder
(by expanding the set of JFAPbid and OAPbid) and the manner in which he uses
them (with a higher reliance on IRP and OAPbid), with the adage of ‘More is Better’
no longer being necessarily true for the seller.
In addition to managing bidders’ information sets through appropriate decision
tools so as to influence the impact of ERPs, a savvy seller faces a similarly difficult
challenge in deciding whom to attract as a first bidder to particular auction listings.
The herding argument would suggest that a first bidder who bids low and early
in the auction would attract more bidders and thereby stimulate a higher yield for
the seller, in the spirit of Simonsohn and Ariely (2008). However, a higher first
bid potentially later in the auction can provide positive externalities on concurrent
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auctions via the ERP route, thereby increasing yields. As suggested by Bapna et al
(2008), an auction is likely to take a certain trajectory based on whether the first
bidder is a Cluster 1 or Cluster 2 bidder; the net effect on seller payoff is still to
be determined and represents a topic for further research. In future work, we are
currently conducting a set of experiments to test out exactly these relationships in
the field and believe there are several insights waiting to be explored in detail.
Finally, looking beyond the first bid leads naturally to the question of how
reference prices affect subsequent bids in an auction. While the theoretical arguments
we make here can be extended to subsequent bids, there are other confounding
behavioral effects such as the signal value of earlier bids (Bajari and Hortacsu 2003),
herding (Simonsohn and Ariely 2008) and opponent effects (Heyman et al. 2004)
that may render the effects of external reference prices and heterogeneity moot as
significant predictors of subsequent bids. However, in an effort to explore these
possible effects, we expanded our analysis to estimate the effect of reference prices
and bidder heterogeneity on all bids in the auction. A simplified OLS analysis
indicated that the effect of the ERP variables do not disappear beyond the first bid,
as suspected. Bidders continue to be influenced by the reference price signals gleaned
from concurrent, comparable auctions. However, as expected, the current price
(current winning bid) becomes an significant determinant of the bid value as well.
Not surprisingly, the relative weight of the ERP is diminished in this analysis but far
from entirely eroded. These results suggest that future work in designing auctions
and decision support systems should take into account the tradeoffs inherent in these
contexts where reference prices and bidder heterogeneity interact to determine not
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just the first bids but all bids in an auction. More work is required to clearly
understand, in the case of B2B secondary markets, strategic questions for sellers
such as deciding what items to place auctions. which items to list simultaneously
and how to extract value from the information that is available to heterogeneous
bidders.
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1.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Reference Prices Formed from Concurrent Auctions


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2 List of Variables Used in our Empirical Analysis of Chapter 1
Analysis Variable description
Predicting first bid value FB: First Bid value of auction as a % of E
in Equation (1) Experience: Number of all auctions won in past 6 months
IRP: Avg. price of comparable auctions won in last 6 months
ERPs:
JFAP : Avg.price of just-finished C&C auctions
JFAPbid: Avg. price of just-finished C&C auctions where a bidder has bid
JFAPnotbid: Avg. price of just-finished C&C auctions where a bidder has not bid
OAP : Avg. price of open C&C auctions
OAPbid: Avg. price of open C&C auctions where a bidder has bid
OAPnotbid: Avg. price of open C&C auctions where a bidder does not have any bid
Bidder’s control variables:
NJFA: Number of just-finished C&C auctions
NOA: Number of open C&C auctions
Number Inc Bids: Number of bids bidder submits in auction
Auction’s control variables:
TOFB: Time of First Bid in auction
Q: Quantity of items in each pallet
Y ($100) = E
Q
: Avg. per-unit price of items in each pallet ($100)
Fixed-effect dummies:
Time: Month/year of the auction
Warehouse: Physical location of the warehouse the pallet comes from
First stage probit model Experience: Number of all auctions won in past 6 months
NJFAbid: Number of just-finished C&C auctions where a bidder has bid
NJFAwon: Number of just-finished C&C auctions where a bidder has won
NOAbid: Number of open C&C auctions where a bidder has bid
Auction’s control variables:
Q: Quantity of items in each pallet
Y ($100) = E
Q
: Avg. per-unit price of items in each pallet ($100)
Fixed-effect dummies:
Time: Month/year of the auction
Warehouse: Physical location of the warehouse the pallet comes from
Predicting final price/ FB: First Bid value of auction as a % of E
Number of bidders Final price of auction as a % of E
N : Final number of bidders come in auction
Bidder’s control variables:
NOA: Number of open C&C auctions
Auction’s control variables:
TOFB: Time of First Bid in auction
Q: Quantity of items in each pallet
Y ($100) = E
Q
: Avg. per-unit price of items in each pallet ($100)
Fixed-effect dummies:
Hour/Day: Hour and weekday of the auction
Time: Month/year of the auction
Warehouse: Physical location of the warehouse the pallet comes from
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Table 1.3 OLS Results Predicting the Final Price and Number of Bidders in B2B Auctions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Final Price Final Price N Final Price
Constant 0.1272*** 0.0811*** 5.5482*** 0.0515*
(0.024) (0.023) (1.561) (0.030)
TOFB -0.0419*** -0.0350*** -1.3329*** -0.0137*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.114) (0.008)
Q 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0405*** 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Y ($100) 0.0247*** 0.0201*** 0.9797*** 0.0078
(0.002) (0.002) (0.066) (0.006)
NOA -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0275*** -0.0007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
FB 0.2653*** -9.4904*** 0.3871***
(0.012) (0.475) (0.053)
Number of Bidders 0.0098*** 0.0122*** 0.0258***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005)
Dummies (Hour/Day) No No Yes Used as instrument
Dummies (Time/Warehouse) Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Stat 176.58** 208*** 81.75*** 117***
R-Square 0.452 0.505 0.314 0.365
Number of auctions 4308 4308 4308 4308
Notes. Column 1 reports on results from our base model with no first bid value. Column 2 adds
the first bid value into base mode. Column 3 will report on the stage 1 of a 2SLS regression
predicting the final price. Finally, Column 4 will report on stage 2 results of the 2SLS in which
final price is estimated. (Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
Table 1.4 Probit Regression (First Stage in Heckman Selection Model),
DV = Probability of Becoming the First Bidder on the Focal Auction
All Auctions Cluster 1 Cluster 2
Experience 0.0000 -0.0023** 0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.000)
Experience×Q 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience×Y ($100) 0.0001* 0.0000 0.0004***
(0.0007) (0.000) (0.0001)
NJFbid -0.001*** -0.003*** 0.0000
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
NJFAwon -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
NOAbid 0.007*** 0.0087*** 0.001
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.001)
Dummies (Time/Warehouse) Yes Yes Yes
Log pseudolikelihood -13827.1 -10448.5 -2884.4
Wald chi2() 2316*** 1610*** 1099***
Pseudo R2 0.067 0.08 0.14
Number of observations 43565 32619 11037
Number of auctions 4308 3366 942
Notes. Entries in table are marginal effect from Probit regression
(dF/dX) with first bids as the unit of analysis. Standard errors are
clustered by each focal auction, and are reported in parentheses.
(Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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Table 1.5 Heckman Second Stage Results of Reference Prices and Bidder Heterogeneity on First
Bid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: FB FB FB FB FB FB FB FB
Constant 0.1095*** 0.0881*** 0.1121*** 0.0951*** 0.0988*** 0.0964*** 0.0841*** 0.0902***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.024) (0.023) (0.009)
TOFB -0.0202*** -0.0201*** -0.0190*** -0.0195*** -0.0184*** -0.0184*** -0.0183*** -0.0183***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Q 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Y ($100) 0.0108*** 0.0108*** 0.0108*** 0.0106*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 0.0107*** 0.0107***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NFA -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NOA -0.0008*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience 0.0007*** 0.0003** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IRP 0.1714*** 0.1711*** 0.1661*** 0.1682*** 0.1635*** 0.1639*** 0.1647*** 0.1651***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Number INC Bids -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0028*** -0.0027*** -0.0029*** -0.0029*** -0.0029*** -0.0029***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)




JFAPbid 0.0915*** 0.0835*** 0.0890*** 0.0833*** 0.091***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
JFAPbid×Experience -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.000) (0.000)
JFAPnotbid 0.011 0.0124 0.01 0.0118 0.009
(0.021) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)




OAPbid 0.2062*** 0.1885*** 0.1887*** 0.1624*** 0.1627***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029)
OAPbid× Experience 0.0018** 0.0019**
(0.001) (0.001)
OAPnotbid -0.0025 0.0007 0.001 0.0029 0.0036
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Dummies (Time/Warehouse) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of auctions 4308 4308 4308 4308 4308 4308 4308 4308
rho -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.27*** -0.15** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.23*** -0.23***
Number of bidders 569 569 569 569 569 569 569 569
Notes. Entries in columns the second stage of the Heckman selection model. The first 5 columns test Hypotheses 1-4.
Column 1 reports on results from our base model. Column 2 adds the interaction term between bidder experience and
JFAP/OAP. Column 3-5 assess the impact of JFAP/OAP depending on whether or not the first bidder has participated
in respectively in any comparable JFA/OA. Finally, Column 6-8 are used to test a three-way interaction between the
JFAP/OAP, experience, and participation level of the bidder on the first bid value. (Standard errors in parentheses,











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.8 Heckman Second Stage Results of Reference Prices and Bidder Heterogeneity on First
Bid, Estimated Separately for the Two Clusters from the K-Means Clustering Analysis
Cluster 1 Cluster 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: FB FB FB FB FB FB FB FB
Constant 0.1214*** 0.1234*** 0.1079*** 0.1112*** 0.1260*** 0.1274*** 0.1112*** 0.1127***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
TOFB -0.0211*** -0.0200*** -0.0205*** -0.0194*** -0.0094 -0.0087 -0.0093 -0.0086
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Q 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Y ($100) 0.0098*** 0.0098*** 0.0097*** 0.0097*** 0.0087** 0.0090** 0.0090** 0.0094**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
NFA -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NOA -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Experience 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0002** 0.0002* 0.0002** 0.0002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
IRP 0.1306*** 0.1302*** 0.1283*** 0.1280*** 0.2555*** 0.2590*** 0.2585*** 0.2622***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Number Inc Bids -0.0020*** -0.0022*** -0.0021*** -0.0023*** -0.0142*** -0.0141*** -0.0142*** -0.0141***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
JFAP 0.0324*** 0.0352* 0.051* 0.044
(0.011) (0.011) (0.03) (0.03)
JFAPbid 0.0868*** 0.0803*** 0.0627** 0.051*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.028) (0.028)
JFAPnotbid 0.0131 0.014 -0.009 -0.011
(0.013) (0.013) (0.030) (0.030)
OAP 0.0685*** 0.0643*** 0.128** 0.1320**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.053) (0.052)
OAPbid 0.1837*** 0.1686*** 0.2555*** 0.2491***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.053) (0.053)
OAPnotbid -0.0020 0.0003 0.0013 -0.0003
(0.022) (0.022) (0.055) (0.054)
Dummies (Time/Warehouse) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of auctions 3366 3366 3366 3366 942 942 942 942
rho -0.02 -0.11* -0.05 -0.07 -0.52** -0.54** -0.47*** -0.49***
Number of bidders 566 566 566 566 34 34 34 34
Notes. Entries in columns report on how reference prices drive the first bid of different clusters of first bidders. Column
1 reports on results from our base model for Cluster 1. Column 2 adds the interaction term between bidder experience
and JFAP/OAP. Column 3 and 4 assess the impact of JFAP/OAP depending on whether or not the first bidder has
participated in respectively in any comparable JFA/OA for Cluster 1. The corresponding results for Cluster 2 are shown
in Columns 5 through 8. (Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
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Chapter 2
The Impact of Auction Starting Price and Supply of Products in
Secondary Market: Evidence from a Field Experiment in online B2B
Auctions
2.1 Introduction
In the Business-to-Business (B2B) secondary market, large retailers (such as
Sears, Target, or Walmart) can liquidate their excess and customer-returned in-
ventory to business buyers (such as off-price retailers, flea markets, or eBay power
sellers). This customer-returned merchandise is a used product that was sold to a
customer, who then either physically brought the item back to a store or mailed it
to a specified location. Although there is no single definition of secondary markets,
there are some reports that estimate the size of the US returns market alone to
be at least $50 billion. In such a supply chain environment, many retailers have
shifted the responsibility of disposing of this leftover inventory to large wholesale
liquidators who have their own online marketplaces and large networks of buyers.
Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of returned inventory is now finding its way
to online marketplaces where buyers can buy it without the big markup added by
a middleman. B2B auctions are a common sale mechanism used by these wholesale
liquidators.
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Due to the nature of secondary market, used products in secondary markets
can arrive at the wholesale liquidator’s in a range of state-of-quality conditions. The
quality conditions are graded from salvage (the lowest quality level) to excellent. The
used products of the same quality condition are then bundled together and sold as
a whole pallet in B2B auctions. At this point, one seller’s decision will come to
determine the auction starting price, which is the minimum price at which a seller
is willing to sell the pallet. The auction starting price is often determined based on
prior sale data or on pricing information gathered from other Business-to-Consumer
or Consumer-to-Consumer online markets (e.g., Amazon, Terapeak) for comparable
product types.
With fast liquidation being a critical part of their daily business model, whole-
sale liquidators often run several auctions simultaneously for identical and compa-
rable products, whereby comparable products differ according to quality condition
and models of the product– vertically differentiated products. Vertical differentia-
tion occurs in this market where the several goods that are present can be ordered
according to their model (from newest to oldest) or quality condition (from the high-
est to the lowest). As wholesale liquidators now operate as multi-product firms, in
addition to choosing the starting price, another challenge these firms face on a daily
basis is to determine the supply of these products the number of posted auctions
for each product. Although posting several auctions simultaneously can of course
increase the speed of the liquidation process, its net effect on the wholesale liquida-
tor’s total profit is unclear. Posting several auctions for identical and/or comparable
products at different starting price levels can depress overall profits by directly in-
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creasing the competition in supply. Additionally, if the auction starting price levels
for these products are within the same ranges, products may become vertically less
differentiated but more substitutable. Due to rise in demand substitution, we may
now face an interconnected market in which some bidders have the opportunity to
substitute their favorite quality and models of the product for others with lower or
similar bids, while still satisfying their original needs.
Further complicating the market dynamics is the price revelation process that
is inherent in auctions. The seller does not dictate a selling price in order to make
products differentiated, but rather sets the tone for the auction via her starting
price or adjusting the supply of the products in market. Both the starting price of
auction and product’s supply (adjusted via the number of daily auctions) can vary
the degree to which demand substitution occurs across different market, and this
can impact the final price.
In such an auction environment, one important and open question to ask is
how a seller should manage positioning her products in the market by, for instance,
auctioning off the right mix and supply of products at a reasonable starting price.
Although, product positioning or product assortment problem has received plenty
of attention in the marketing and operations literature in recent years (e.g., Kök et
al. 2006), it is as yet unexplored in the auction literature. The first step to tackle
such a strategic question is to have the knowledge of how an auction’s final price
is driven by all different factors from the same or different market. Prior auction
literature fails to address this question due to lack of access to a clean and controlled
environment in which researchers can be in control of auction and market specifics
57
(e.g., the auction starting price and number of auctions) while the characteristics of
the products (e.g., models, qualities) are exogenously determined through the sellers
production processes.
In this essay, we address this gap by running a controlled field experiment on
the auction site of one of the nation’s largest online auction wholesale liquidators.
The design of this field experiment was directly aimed at understanding the extent
to which (i) the starting price of the auction, and (ii) the number of auctions for a
specific (model, quality), which implies the market supply for that product, interact
to impact an auction’s final price.
In terms of existing related literature, prior research has extensively studied a
number of factors (e.g., starting price, reserve price, auction duration, seller’s repu-
tation, auction formats, and auction ending rules) that impact the final price/success
of auctions (see Pinker at al. 2003 for a comprehensive study of online auctions).
In particular, prior studies report on mixed results with regard to the relationship
between auction starting price and final price conditional on sale. On the one hand,
other work (e.g., Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007) argue that
starting price could work as an indicator for the auction’s products value, which
impacts the consumer’s valuation construct. This justifies the positive relationship
between auction starting price and final price. On the other hand, some branches
of literature (e.g., Ku et al. 2005 and 2006) report a negative relationship between
auction starting price and final price since a low starting price might increase the
attractiveness of entering into the auction (entry decision), leading to high final
price. Other branches of literature (e.g., Dholakia et al. 2002) also consider the
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starting price presence as the single most important factor in a buyer’s decision to
bid for a listing.
Although most works in this area treat auctions in isolation without account-
ing for interaction with adjacent and open auctions, some auction works explore the
influence of the starting price in other comparable auctions (which are simultane-
ously available) on the final price of the focal auction. In this regard, some works
(e.g., Nunes and Boatwright 2004, Häubl and Popkowski-Leszczyc 2003) show that
consumers use price cues such as starting prices observable from other comparable
auctions as a basis for constructing their own valuations of an auctioned product.
One common ground for this stream of literature is that they ignore how the relative
distance between the starting price of the focal auction and other comparable goods
can change the consumer valuation and, hence, the final price. One related work,
Ariely and Simonson (2003), confirms via an experiment that there is a positive re-
lationship between auction starting price and final price, but only when comparable
items are not available in the immediate context.
Finally, regarding the amount of supply for a product in the market– capture
via number of available auctions– and final price of the auctions, there is only
a handful of papers controlling for number of similar available auctions in their
analyses. The most related one is Chan et al. (2007) who shows the negative impact
of number of available auctions and competition in supply on bidders willingness
to pay. Dholakia et al. (2002) also investigates the degree of herding bias (buyers
tend to bid for listings with existing bids) across bidders as a function of the listing
volume for that category. They show that when they are few auctions open– because
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of few alternative to learn, bidders tend to focus more on the attribute of auctions
like existing bids or auction starting price. On the other hand, when they more
listings to choose, the buyer may now need to rely less on auction’s attribute. They
also argue that when there a few listings in the market, popularity diminishes, and
this attract few new bidders in aggregate to participate.
In a departure from prior literature, which mainly focuses on the impact of
auction starting price and market supply in isolation from the larger market context,
we use a dataset collected from a unique field experiment to account explicitly for
the substitution/market effects raised from the starting price and market supply-
the number of all (generation, quality) auctions simultaneously open. We show how
the starting price and amount of supply for different related (comparable) markets
influence each market’s final price. To support our findings, we raise some arguments
about demand substitution, the bidders entry decisions, and value signaling effect.
We ran the field experiment on a set of electronic products that are well-
understood and clearly specifiable: iPad tablets. We conducted the experiment on
two sets of products: used 2rd generation iPads (iPad2) and 3rd generation iPads
(iPad3). The pallet therefore contain iPads of the same generation (i.e. all iPad3) of
two grades of quality: light-use and moderate-use (a lower quality level). The exper-
iment included 22 days of auctions, excluding the holiday season, within a window
of three months. The experiment consisted of 632 successful auctions totaling over
$1 million revenues. The goods in each auction in the sample consisted of a pallet
of similar iPads that were similar in terms of quality and generation.
Our findings from the experiment shed light on predicting the final price of
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auctions in interconnected markets conditioning on the auction starting price and
the supply of products in each market. First, we find evidence of some bidders
substituting bids on higher-end products for lower-end products. We can find that
an increase in the starting price of low-quality iPad2 auctions will kick in an upward
demand substitution, so that bidders may now more likely to participate in auctions
of high-quality iPad2s or iPad3s. Another significant finding is that an increase in
auction starting price of a high-quality product of an older generation (light-use
iPad2) will have a negative effect on the final prices of all auctions for the newer
generation of products (light-use iPad3). We also tease out some patterns of demand
substitution across generations and quality class, depending on the amount of supply
in each market. For instance, we can show that an increase in the number of low-
quality auctions increases the final price of high-quality product. Finally, we identify
the diminishing importance for the starting price in auctions of a product when the
product’s supply increases.
In terms of the contribution, our field experiment provides the first empirical
evidence in support of demand substitution in a B2B auction marketplace across
different comparable markets. We find clear examples of some bidders substitut-
ing bids on higher-end products for lower-end products. We also provide a more
nuanced understanding of the impact of starting price on the final price of a fo-
cal auction conditioning on the starting price levels of other available comparable
products. To the best of our knowledge, we are among the first researchers who
have accounted simultaneously for auction’s starting price of all related products
in the market as well as their market’s supply amount when studying the perfor-
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mance of auctions for a particular product. We should also point out that despite
the challenges we faced to comply with sellers daily operational requirements, the
scale of our field experiment was by far one of the most extensive run in a real B2B
marketplace with business buyers. Finally, this essay also discusses preliminary re-
sults on the under-studied issue of product differentiation and its implication on the
positioning of different auctions in a B2B secondary market. We provide sellers in
the secondary market with some managerial implications about auctioning off their
products (varying with the model and quality).
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. In the next section, we be-
gin with discussing the specific B2B marketplace we explore in this essay. Then, we
discuss the studied marketplace and describe the experimental design and the data.
In Section 2.3, we review the theory and hypotheses. The empirical analysis and a
discussion of the results are presented respectively in Section 2.4 and 2.5. Finally,
in Section 2.6, we close the essay with conclusions, some managerial implications
and some potential avenues for future research.
2.2 Auction Marketplace, Experimental Design, and Data Descrip-
tion
Before we discuss our experimental design and the data we collected, we de-
scribe the B2B auction marketplace we study in this essay. The company under
study is a publicly traded company and one of the leading B2B online auction mar-
ketplaces for surplus merchandise in the US secondary market. It enables buyers
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and sellers to transact in an efficient, automated online auction environment offering
over 500 product categories. Its marketplaces provide more than a million profes-
sional buyers with access to a global, organized supply of wholesale surplus assets
in a variety of conditions, presented with digital images and other relevant prod-
uct information. The company sells bulk inventory merchandise, including returns,
closeouts, refurbished merchandise, etc
The customer-returned merchandise, which is the focus of this study, is a used
product that was sold to a customer who then either physically brought the item
back to a store or mailed it to a specified location. The customer’s reasons for
returning the product may not have any correlation to its usefulness (i.e., its size,
color, model, etc.), and as a result the product may be in fine working order. The
majority of returns, however, do have some operational and/or cosmetic problem
(e.g., scratches). They generally do not come in the original packaging and often do
not have any of the advertised documentation or additional parts and/or accessories.
The used products are offered in different categories, from consumer electronics to
apparel and scientific equipment.
The returned merchandise comes in a variety of conditions from big-box stores
such as Sears, Target, and Walmart. The big-box stores will only provide the whole-
sale liquidators with a product manifest, which includes the number and retail de-
clared value/price of each product. In fact, the big-box stores are not aware of the
true quality condition of their own merchandise. Based on their historical transac-
tions, the wholesale liquidators will offer the price at which they acquired it. First,
the wholesale liquidators begin processing the items in the warehouses. They sort,
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test and grade the items into one of the following conditions: light-use (the high-
quality condition), moderate-use, heavy-use, or salvage (the worst quality condition).
The final task is to make up pallets of similar products with the same quality grade
by fulfilling certain guidelines, i.e. the total retail value of pallets may not exceed a
certain dollar value, such as $2500.
Due to the nature of returned products, their market value is uncertain, which
can translate into the uncertainty in the final price of auctions as well. This un-
certainty in the final price of auctions can still exist even across the same type
of products as they are auctioned off under different auction and market-specific
conditions (e.g., with a different auction starting price or a different number of sim-
ilar/identical auctions). Besides, as fast liquidation is the part of daily business,
wholesale liquidators need to auction off multiple pallets of comparable or identical
products simultaneously on their auction marketplace. The flow of goods from the
warehouses to the auction marketplace is highly dependent on the inventories ages
and on timing guidelines for selling the products by a certain time.
Going to the demand side, the bidders in the B2B auction platform we studied
are professional buyers who purchase the pallets of products to resell them at higher
prices after-market. The bidders pool can include flea market vendors, eBay power
sellers, offline/online retailers, exporters, ’mom and pop’ stores, etc. Having faced
several listings and comparable auctions open at each time, these bidders (potential
buyers) will find the opportunity to bid across multiple auctions while choosing the
best deal, i.e. bidding at auctions with the lowest standing bid.
In the next section, we describe the experimental design we use to collect the
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dataset needed to answer our research questions.
2.2.1 Experimental Design
In this section we report on the results of a field experiment we ran between
November 2012 and January 2013 on the B2B online auction site of one of the nation
largest wholesale liquidators. The design of this field experiment was directly aimed
at understanding how (i) the starting price of the auction, and (ii) the number of
auctions for a specific (model, quality), which implies the market supply for that
product, interact to impact an auction’s final price.
In order to reduce unobservable heterogeneity in the auction environment and
to standardize the items for auction to the maximum extent possible, we ran the
field experiment on a set of electronic products that were well understood and clearly
specifiable– iPad tablets. Different generations of iPads gross millions of retail dol-
lars annually for the seller where we stage the experiment. Besides, due to the
growing popularity of tablet markets, i.e., Apple products, worldwide since 20101, it
is expected that the seller will keep purchasing and receiving, in particular, millions
of dollars worth of used Apple iPads annually from big retailers over the next few
years.
The primary advantage of data collected from a field experiment versus data
collected from a naturally occurring market with all its unobservable noises is the
1In July of 2012, Apple exceeded the 85 million mark for iPad tablets sold since the product’s
launch in April of 2010 (Apple’s Share of the Tablet Market Nears All-Time High, by Dan Graziano,
Aug 14. 2012, http://bgr.com/2012/08/14/ipad-market-share-all-time-high).
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ability to control on variables of interest and isolate their effects of changes on
some outcome variables. However, in a real marketplace with all real buyers, one
might not be able to design a full-factorial experiment (see Lusk and Shogren 2007,
Chapter 4) without disrupting the daily operations of the marketplace. Instead, to
the extent possible, the researchers could randomize assigning different values for all
variables of interest to the treatments while having fair control on other variables
that ideally should be exogenously determined.
That said, we conducted the experiment on two models of iPad tablets - re-
turned 2nd generation iPads (iPad2) and 3rd generation iPads (iPad3) of varying
levels of prior use. The experiment included 22 days of auctions, excluding the holi-
day season, and consists of 632 successful auctions totaling over $1 million revenues.
The pallet of goods in each auction in the sample consisted of similar iPads, in
terms of quality and generation, as is common in the secondary B2B market, with
an average size of 4.5 units (std. dev.=0.73). The pallet could therefore contain
iPads of the same generation (i.e. all iPad3s) of two grades of quality: light-use
and moderate-use. As the quality grade and characteristics of the products are
exogenously determined through the seller’s production processes, the seller can po-
tentially influence the outcomes of the auctions by manipulating the starting price
or the amount of supply through posting needed number of auctions across different
models and quality grades.
As part of the experimental design, we were allowed the opportunity to ran-
domly set starting prices and the number of auctions2 for each set of auctions (across
2Due to the fact that our seller has a policy to make a pallet of iPads with average size of 4.5
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generations and quality levels) on a given day (within acceptable ranges), thereby
guaranteeing the exogeneity of these parameters. Thus, the design of the experiment
allows us to tease out the effects of varying starting prices and amount of supply on
auctions final prices across the generational and quality dimensions.
For each of the 22 days, we determined the starting price and number of
auctions for each of the four sets of iPad product markets (light-use/iPad2, moderate-
use/ iPad2, light-use/iPad3, moderate-use/iPad3). We synchronized the start of the
auctions so as to have them open simultaneously each day. Also to further ensure
homogeneity across days, we convinced the seller (unlike the current practice) to run
auctions every two days (auctions last approximately two days) instead of every day.
We should note that running auctions every two days will avoid any uncontrolled
competition stemming from overlap across auctions that did not begin on the same
day, and therefore improve the precision of our experiment.
The starting prices of auction for each (generation, quality) pair was fixed
within a day and was set in consultation with the channel manager. Given the
relative abundance of iPad2s inventory compared to iPad3s, we were allowed to
manipulate the starting price for iPad2s. We identified a reasonable low and high
starting price for light and moderate-use auctions of iPad2, respectively, rendering
us four different combinations of starting price pairs. The low (high) starting price
for light-use iPad2 was 55% (70%) of per-unit retail value ($399); the low (high)
starting price for moderated-use iPad2 weas 50% (65% ) of per-unit retail value
units (std. dev.=0.73), she can manipulate the amount of supply for any particular product only
via posting number of auctions needed to meet her supply target.
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($399). The low and high starting prices for each quality class of iPad2 is defined so
that their average comes to approximately the mean starting prices the seller used
before the experiment period (i.e., 66% for light-use iPad2 and 62% for moderate-use
iPad2).
Going to starting prices of iPad3 auctions, due to the limitation in number of
experimented days and the inventory of iPad3s within the firm for the experiment’s
duration, we fixed the starting price level of iPad3 auctions as the percentage of per-
unit retail value ($499 or $5993 throughout the experiment to rule out the effects of
their changes on the final prices.
We provided the iPad channel specialist with the randomized list of iPad2’s
starting prices (one of four combinations of starting price pairs) for each next few
days in advance. While we were able to exert full control over the starting prices,
the number of auctions posted was at the occasional mercy of inventory availability
within the firm. In each given day, on average we had 12.4 light-use iPad2, (min=0,
max=27), 4.5 moderate-use iPad2 (min=0, max=10), 8.6 light-use iPad3 (min=0,
max=17) and 3.2 moderated-use iPad3 (min=0, max=8). Table 2.2 reports on the
exact daily number of auctions for each market, as well as the randomly selected
low or high starting price level for iPad2 auctions, if any exists. Table 2.3 also
summarizes the frequency and number of auctions for each market (varying across
model and quality) across four different combinations of iPad2’s starting price pair.
As Table 2.3 demonstrates, we have almost a balanced and homogeneous sample
for each combination of starting price pairs in terms of the conditions under which
3The price difference for per-unit of iPad3 is due to the memory size (16GB versus 32GB).
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the experiment is run. This will support our randomized block designs, which can
increase the precision of the field experiment.
At the end, it is noteworthy that our field experiment is unique in different
aspects. First, the ability to run a field experiment in a real and well-known B2B
auction marketplace on this scale for over three months is rarely seen in the exper-
imental auctions domain. Secondly, the bidders in the experiment are composed of
real and rational business buyers, and the randomization applied across the exper-
iment will guarantee the buyers lack of knowledge about manipulation of auction
starting prices and the amount of supply for each iPad’s market by the seller, which
is a key condition to corroborate our randomized experiment. Furthermore, since
the degree to which demand substitution occurs is driven by those bidders who
occasionally switch across different markets, we can show that more than 50% of
bidders were interested in both generations of iPads during the experiment. These
key bidders were also winners in more than 80% of the auctions (more than 85% of
seller’s gross revenue). Finally, unlike some prior auction literature that ran field ex-
periments or tracked auctions on eBay for relatively cheap goods (music CDs, books,
movie DVDs), we focused on a relatively expensive and well-understood consumer
electronic device, the iPad tablet, which grosses million dollars in annual sales for
the seller.
In the next section, we discuss in detail the specific dataset we use in this
essay, variable definitions, and some summary of statistics.
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2.2.2 Description of the Data
The data collected from the 22 days of experiment consists of 632 auctions
across 4 markets: 272 light-use iPad2 auctions, 100 moderate-use iPad2 auctions,
189 light-use iPad3 auctions, and finally 71 moderate-use iPad3 auctions. On the
main auction site, as we can see in Figure 2.1, bidders are given information about
the total number of items on pallet Q, as well as the pallets declared retail value
(extended cost) E. For each auction in progress, the bidders can also observe the
existing number of bids and the highest current auction price, as well as the remain-
ing time for the auction. Similar to the auction mechanism used by the wholesale
liquidator studied in essay one, the seller under investigation in this essay also uses
the bidding format seen on eBay auctions, i.e. proxy auctions. As in proxy auctions,
bidders submit their maximum willingness to pay (MWTP) for the specific pallet;
the auction tool automatically updates a bidder’s current bid until it has reached
the bidder’s declared MWTP. When the auction ends, the bidder with the highest
MWTP wins and pays the second-highest MWTP plus the minimum bid increment.
In this essay, the dependent variable of interest is auction’s final price which we
are interested in predicting as a function of auction starting price and market’ supply
amount for all available products while sustaining full experimental control on other
explanatory variables. Hence, the unit of our analysis is auction. We collected the
following information at the auction level. For each auction, we collected the auction
starting price (which can be either low or high for iPad2 and constant for iPad3), Q,
the quality condition of the pallet, the per-unit retail value of the pallet Y (Y=E/Q,
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Y ∈{$399, $499, $599}); the number of unique bidders in the same auction N4; final
price of the auction (the price of the second-highest MWTP on the auction); the
starting and ending times of the auction; and physical location of auction (which is
one of two separate warehouses).
As we run our analysis on auctions of pallets which have nonidentical declared
retail values even within a same model-quality class of iPads, we operationalize the
final price (our dependent variable) by calculating the final price of the auction
as a percentage of the pallets declared retail value E. This rescale the auction’s
final price to the interval (0,1). Furthermore, throughout our iPad experiment, all
the iPad pallets come from a single seller. Also, auctions lasted for roughly for
two days on the marketplace. The same seller and auction length will provide us
with a full experimental-level control on the seller’s reputation and auction length
parameter; previous literature reports on the existing relationship between them
and the auction’s final price (cf Hou 2007). Hence, we can dismiss any effects in
changes from these two parameters on the auction’s final price, and link the changes
in the auction’s final price to our treatment variables: auction starting price and
number of auctions in each market.
In terms of starting price parameters, as the starting price of iPad3 auctions
was constant across 22 days of experiment, we exclude them from our explanatory
variable lists. On the other hand, we measured the starting price level of light-use
4We also collected the total number of submitted bids per auction, but as bidders submitted
on average 1.04 bids (std. dev.=0.12) in each auction, both number of bidders and total bids
represent the same information.
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iPad2 auctions using a binary variable of iPad2Lighthigh that indicates whether the
starting price level of light-use iPad2 was set to be high in the auction (1 when it
is true, 0 otherwise). Similarly, iPad2Modhigh is a binary variable that indicates
whether the starting price level of moderate-use iPad2 in the auction is high (1 when
it is true, 0 otherwise). Although we are able to capture all four possible combina-
tions of starting price pairs in the market (described earlier) with iPad2Lighthigh
and iPad2Modhigh binary variables, we still need to account for their interaction.
The variable iPad2Lighthigh×iPad2Modhigh shows whether the starting price level
of both light-use and moderate-use iPad2 is high (1 when it is true, 0 otherwise).
The iPad2Lighthigh×iPad2Modhigh will help us later to tease out the starting price
effect of light-use (moderate-use) ipad2 auctions on its own auction final price con-
ditioning on the starting price level of moderate-use (light-use) ipad2 auctions.
Going to our other variable of interest; the supply amount of products in each
market, we need to measure the aggregated number of daily auctions for each avail-
able market of light-use iPad2, moderate-use iPad2, light-use iPad3, and moderate-
use iPad3. Use of these four variables enables us to account for competition within
a market or the potential demand substitution between markets. Table 2.4 provides
a summary and brief definition of all the variables used in this essay.
Regarding the bidders pools throughout the 22 days of the experiment, we
can identify 128 unique bidders among whom 57 bidders participate in more than a
single auction. Out of these 57 bidders, there are 10 interested only in iPad2 and 17
interested only in iPad3, while the remaining 30 bidders (more than 50% of bidders)
participated in both markets. We should also note that these 30 cross-bidders are
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those who are potentially subject to substitute different generations of iPads. Also,
they are key bidders in our market as they win in more than 80% of auctions
(providing more than 85% of the seller’s gross revenue). These 30 cross-bidders are
also equally interested in both quality-grade classes within each generation. That
most winners in this market can occasionally substitute iPad products from different
generations and quality grades will motivate us even further to question the existence
of demand substitution in such an interconnected auction marketplace.
Finally, as the objective of this essay to investigate the impact of all available
starting prices and number of available auctions on final auction final price beyond
a single isolated market (or a single auction), we will ask our research questions
separately for each of the four markets (light-use/iPad2, moderate-use/ iPad2, light-
use/iPad3,and moderate-use/iPad3). This is due to the fact that each market can
fundamentally operate differently; due to its own characteristics and that to which
degree they are differentiable from buyers’ perspective. Hence, such an explicit
market segmentation will help us to increase the uniformity of the conditions under
each market when answering our research questions.
Table 2.5 reports on summary of statistics as well as the correlation matrix
for auction/market variables used throughout our different analyses.
Having defined the key variables in Table 2.4 and their summary of statis-
tics in Table 2.5 for each market, we now move forward by proposing our research
hypotheses in the next section.
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2.3 Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, we provide the arguments to introduce our research hypotheses
to investigate the effects of the auction starting price and the amount of product
supply on the final price in the B2B secondary market auctions described earlier.
We begin with positing hypotheses on testing the impact of the starting price of
high-quality (i.e. iPad2 light-use) and low-quality products (i.e. iPad2 moderate-
use) on the overall performance of all available product markets varying via model
and quality. We will conjecture about the effect of supply amount of the product,
captured by number of auctions, on the performance of these markets, as well as
the moderation effect of product’s supply on the starting price/final price relation-
ship. Before delving into our hypotheses, we should point out that throughout this
section we construct our hypotheses at the abstract level and only for those markets
which the number of observations and the experiment’s design would allow. Hence,
although we construct our hypotheses at the abstract level, it is likely that due to
insufficient statistical support, we cannot test some of our hypotheses for a specific
market.
Prior literature on the auction starting price (aka reserve price) and its impact
on final prices (or winning bids) is extensive. In this regard, there are two conflict-
ing theories. First, one branch of the literature (e.g., Bajari and Hortacsu 2003;
Lucking-Reiley et al. 2007) argues that the auction starting price could work as an
anchor (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), or more specifically as a reference price (e.g.,
Wolk and Spann 2008; Bruno et al. 2012). When the auction starting price serves
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as a reference price or value/quality indicator, bidders may perceive a high value or
quality for the focal product. This will increase their willingness-to-pay, leading to a
higher final price. Although most work in this area treats auctions in isolation with-
out accounting for interaction with adjacent and other open auctions, more recent
research further explores the starting price/final price relationship in the presence
of other comparable auctions that are simultaneously open. In this regard, some
work (Nunes and Boatwright 2004, Häubl and Popkowski-Leszczyc 2003) provides
evidence suggesting that consumers use price cues available in purchase and external
environments (i.e., starting price of other auctions) as a basis for constructing their
own valuations for an auctioned product.
Kamins et al. (2004) also show that, on average, seller-provided reference
prices in the form of starting price raise the final price. Similarly, Li et al. (2005)
associate the positive effect of starting price on final price to the quality signaling ef-
fect which helps bidders to construct their valuation. Finally, Brint (2003) finds that
this positive relationship holds only when the item’s value is difficult to determine.
On the other hand, some other branches of literature report a negative rela-
tionship between the auction starting price and the final price. They argue that
a high starting price creates entry barriers into an auction, which will naturally
decrease the final price. For instance, Ku et al. (2005) and (2006) both argue that
a high starting price creates entry barriers into an auction, as opposed to a lower
starting price which facilitates participation. Ku et al. (2006) also argue that the
low starting price will escalate the commitment among early bidders which may lead
to additional bids which will result in pushing final price higher. Furthermore, Si-
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monsohn and Ariely (2008) confirm that conditioning on current price, low starting
price auctions are more likely to receive additional bids. Li et al. (2005) also asso-
ciate the negative positive effect of starting price on final price to the common value
effect (e.g., auction fever). According to their argument, the bidder’s valuation is
affected by other bidder’s behaviors. Hence, the more competitive the bidding pro-
cess, the higher the final price, and this will lead to a negative relationship between
starting price and final price.
Spann et al. (2011) (who study how bid elicitation affects retailer profit)
also show that high prices can impact the construction of bidders’ beliefs about
the potential bid value of the winning bid, which can negatively impact the entry
decision. Field experiments have established this relationship (Reiley 2006). As
Choi et al. (2010) report, when the bidder entry is endogenous (which is the case in
all auctions), the higher starting price does not hurt the entry to such an extent as
to offset the positive impact of the starting price on the winning bid. This suggests
that the auctioneer is unlikely to benefit by setting no starting price at the auction.
As Ariely and Simonson (2003) also discuss, the degree to which the positive
or negative effect of the starting price on the final price will determine the net effect
of the overall starting price will depend on the context and consumer types (i.e.,
quality-sensitive versus price-sensitive consumers). In this regard, Simonsohn and
Ariely (2008) predict and successfully test on eBay’s auctions of DVD movies that
sellers’ expected revenue from a low and a high starting price is the same.
As we study a B2B secondary market with existing after-market where the
true value of items is not certain due to the used condition, we conjecture that the
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positive impact of starting price on final price through signaling effect dominates its
negative impact due to the lowering the number of bidders. Thus, as a baseline, we
propose:
Hypothesis 1: An increase in auction starting price of a (generation, quality)
class will increase the final price in auctions of that product.
Most prior literature has focused on studying the relationship between the auc-
tion starting price and the final price in isolation of the larger market context. How-
ever, given our B2B auction environment in which we can have several co-existing
identical/comparable markets (varying across models and quality conditions) simul-
taneously open, it is not yet known how the relationship posited in Hypothesis 1
would change conditioning on the starting price of other available related products
(i.e., products with lower or higher-quality)– if any other product exists at all.
From the marketing auction literature (e.g., Dholakia and Simonson 2005),
we learn that prices from identical adjacent auctions (i.e., starting prices) can serve
as signals of value and quality. In the extreme, Nunes and Boatwright (2004) also
support the claim that even incidental prices on the unrelated product available at
the time can still influence bidders’ willingness-to-pay and potentially the auction’s
final price. Nevertheless, there is still an open question about how the relative
distance between the starting price of focal auction and that of the other comparable
goods can change the consumer’s valuation and final price in the focal auction.
From demand substitution perspective, we can argue that when the price for a
low-quality product becomes closer to that of the high-quality comparable products,
the demand for the latter one will increase, as an indication for upward substitu-
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tion. Hence, we should expect higher number of bidders to come in auctions of
high-quality product– leading to higher final price. Conversely, if a seller increases
the starting price of auctions in high-quality products, she may decrease the poten-
tial substitution effect from low-quality to high-quality market. In this situation,
an increase in auction starting price of high-quality products will drive away those
potential bidders who could have participated in auctions of the high-quality prod-
ucts if they could have submitted bids when the starting price had been lower. The
emerging negative effect of reduction in substitution and number of new bidders
from lower-quality market may now weaken the positive impact of starting price on
final price, as we discussed in Hypotheses 1.
Another related work here is Ariely and Simonson (2003) which experimen-
tally show that there exist the positive relationship between the auction starting
price and final price (H1) but only when comparable items are not available in the
immediate context. They argue that the salient external reference prices are likely to
diminish the influence of value cues. For instance, to the extent that consumers can
easily compare the focal item with comparable items, the effect of starting price and
other cues is likely to be reduced. Coming to our low/high-quality comparable iPad
markets, the presence of starting price of a low-quality comparable products in the
market and its comparison with the starting price of the focal high-quality products
can provide the bidders with more information about the high-quality products so
that they now rely less on the quality signaling effect of starting price in high-quality
market which was discussed in Hypotheses 1. This will then weaken the relationship
in Hypotheses 1.
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Coming to our auction context, since the starting price of both low-quality
and high-quality iPad2 products is designed to vary on a daily basis, we can extend
the Hypothesis 1 by revisiting the question of the starting price and final price
relationship for high-quality iPad2 conditioning on the starting price level of the
low-quality iPad2 available at the same market5. According to above arguments and
theory, we conjecture that an increase in auction starting price of a non-focal low-
quality product will weaken the relationship stated in Hypotheses 1 in the market
for the high-quality products. Thus, as a baseline, we propose:
Hypothesis 1B: An increase in auction starting price of low-quality products
will weaken the effect of auction starting price of high-quality products on their own
final prices.
As we discussed above in our B2B auction context, the closer the starting
price of low and high-quality products, the higher likelihood for substitution be-
tween them– mostly upward substitution such that some bidders may now have an
opportunity to substitute the low-quality products with higher quality models of the
product for relatively low enough bids. This also can be argued in the same spirit of
Anwar et al. (2006), which provides empirical evidence to validate cross-bidding be-
havior of bidders across identical competing auctions and to show that bidders tend
to bid on auctions with the lowest standing bid. In other words, when choosing be-
tween two auctions with close starting prices, some bidders may desire high-quality
5As the majority of iPad2 and iPad3 products are in high-quality condition, we might not be
able statistically to tease out the impact of the auction starting price of low-quality products on
its own final price conditioning on the auction starting price of the high-quality products.
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items whose starting price is not higher than the starting price of low-quality items.
Similar to our reference price discussion from market literature (Nunes and
Boatwright 2004; Dholakia and Simonson 2005) in Hypotheses 1B, we can first
argue that prices (e.g., starting price) from adjacent auctions can serve as external
reference price to increase the bidders’ willingness to pay for potential bidders in
an auction for the high-quality product.This will drive up the auction final price.
Also, from our prior discussion for Hypotheses 1B we can conjecture that when
the price for a low-quality product or the high-quality products of an old version
becomes closer to that of the high-quality comparable products (either from old
or new version)6, the demand for the latter market will increase. As a result, we
can expect a higher final price in auctions of high-quality products. For the same
exact arguments, we could posit the similar prediction between starting price of
low-quality products of an older version and final price of in auctions of low-quality
products of a newer version; since the latter should be preferred and ranked higher
by bidders when making purchase decision in the absence of any price consideration.
To test above arguments in our B2B auction context, we will propose as follows
Hypothesis 2A: An increase in auction starting price of low-quality products
will increase the final price in auctions of high-quality products.
Hypothesis 2B: An increase in auction starting price of low-quality products
of an older version will increase the final price in auctions of low-quality products
6The practical implication of the argument raised here is commonly used by the offline retailers
such that in order to sell more of a particular product, sellers may need to offer a cheaper product
(http://www.productfocus.com/pricing psychology.php).
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of a newer version.
Finally, another interesting question one could ask regarding starting prices of
different products is how the change in starting price of a high-quality product of
an older generation (e.g., light-use iPad2) will affect final prices of all auctions for a
high-quality but newer generation of products (i.e., light-use iPad3). Note that this
question cannot be addressed by the Hypothesis 2A or 2B, as we now focus on the
starting price of the high-quality products.
There could be different arguments from prior literature in predicting the di-
rection of this relationship. First, again from marketing literature, it is plausible
that prices (e.g., starting price) from adjacent auctions can serve as external ref-
erence price to increase the bidders’ willingness to pay for potential bidders in an
auction in a focal auction, open simultaneously in another market. Hence, this may
drive up the final price in focal auction. Accordingly, one conjecture would be that
an increase in auction starting price of high-quality products of an older version will
increase the final price in auctions of high-quality product.
On the other hand, we can also argue that as the newer generation of products
typically tends to be more expensive across all quality levels than the older genera-
tion (i.e., the retail value for a new iPad2 is $399 while this price is $499 or $599 for a
new iPad3), the likelihood of downward demand substitution (from iPad3 to iPad2)
is higher when an alternative older version of the product is made more attractive
through a higher starting price. In effect, the high-quality iPad2 becomes a viable
substitute for all high-quality iPad3 products available in the market through the
signal of the higher starting price on the iPad2. As a result, the potential downward
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substitution may lower the final price in auctions of high-quality iPad3.
Another valid argument could be raised here, in the same spirit of Spann
et al. (2011), is that when the auction’s starting price of a product of an older
generation goes up, bidders who are interested in the newer generation version of
the product may now perceive more value which is used to shape their beliefs about
what bid amount will be successful. For bidders, the higher auction’s starting price
of the product from an older generation may now necessitate higher bids to submit
in order to win in auction of the new version product. As a result, bidders may
lose their interest to participate in auction of new-version product. This may lead
some bidders to withdraw from the market and postpone their purchase of the new-
version product. Hence, another possible conjecture here could be that an increase
in auction starting price of high-quality products of an older version will decrease
the final price in auctions of high-quality product.
We will allow the empirical analysis to determine the extent to which above
arguments are valid, but we propose the following:
Hypothesis 3: An increase in auction starting price of high-quality products
of an older version will decrease the final price in auctions of high-quality products
of a newer version.
With regards to the amount of supply for each product– which is adjusted by
number of open auctions, we speculate an increase in the number of open auctions
for a (generation, quality) class of products will decrease the final price in auctions of
that product. This is in the same spirit of Chan et al. (2007), who study the negative
impact of number of similar auction on bidders willingness to pay. Another related
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argument raised in Dholakia et al. (2002) is that in a market with relatively large
number of auction listings, there is less likelihood for an auction being overlooked.
Thus, bidders will bid in greater number the auctions rather than being gravitated
toward those auctions with already existing bids. This could naturally reduce the
average number of bidders per auction. Consistent with this literature, we predict
that the presence of competition due to high supply of products, as a result, more
number of auctions will lower the number of bids per auction, and this leads to the
lower final prices (Ariely and Simonson 2003). Therefore, we propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: An increase in supply for a (generation, quality) class will
decrease the final price in auctions of that product.
Due to the characteristics of our auction marketplace, which can host simul-
taneously different types of markets (varying across model and quality condition),
we can also investigate how the performance of a focal auction interacts with the
number of the auctions in all non-focal markets. For instance, we want to find out
how the number of open auctions in the low-quality iPad2 market will impact the
auction’s performance in the market for the high-quality iPad2 and iPad3, or vice
versa.
As Dholakia et al. (2002) mention, when listing volume increases, bidders
have more options to choose and learn. This will then attract more bidders into the
auction marketplace and increase the activity level in the market such that it results
in lower number of overlooked auctions in the market. Higher activity level at the
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aggregated level7 can signal quality and value into the bidders’ valuation problem
when assessing the true value for the superior product on the vertical differentiation
ladder. As bidders may now perceive higher value for the high-quality products
(e.g., Kamin et al. 2004), they are more likely to bid in the market with higher
quality products. This will increase the number of bidders and naturally final price
in the market of high-quality products. Accordingly, we conjecture that an increase
in supply for low-quality products will increase the final price in auctions of high-
quality products
On the other hand, similar to our discussion regarding upward substitution in
Hypothesis 2A and 2B, it is likely that bidders from low-quality market will switch
to the auctions of high-quality market if the auctions in the high-quality market
look more attractive. We know from Hypothesis 4 that more supply of iPads in
high-quality market will reduce the final price in these auctions, and, hence, this
may attract some bidders from low-quality to the high-quality market. Thus, we
can expect to see a decrease in final price of auctions in the market of low-quality
products.
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4A: An increase in supply for low-quality products will increase
the final price in auctions of high-quality products.
Hypothesis 4B: An increase in supply for high-quality products will decrease
the final price in auctions of low-quality products.
7Note that according to Hypothesis 4 due to more supply of goods, we might expect lower
number of bidders and final price per auction.
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The last interesting question which has not been explicitly tested in prior
literature is studying the importance of starting price of final price in a focal auction
depending on the amount of supply for that product in the market. There are some
insightful arguments and findings from literature which can help us to conjecture
about above question. First, Dholakia et al. (2002) report when the volume of
similar listings goes up, due to more existing alternatives, the influence from other
auctions or bidders (e.g., herding bias) in bid formation decreases. Hence, we can
posit that the importance of starting price in driving the final price (Hypothesis 1)
will diminish if there are more supply of the products in the market. Furthermore,
from Ariely and Simonson (2003), we can conclude that the salient external reference
prices are likely to diminish the influence of value cues. As a result, to the extent
that consumers can easily compare the focal item with comparable items due to
more supply of the product, the effect of starting price on final price is likely to be
reduced.
Motivated by above arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: An increase in supply for a (generation, quality) class will
weaken the effect of auction starting price of that product on its own final price.
In the next section, we discuss the empirical analysis conducted before report-
ing on the results in Section 2.5.
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2.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we proceed with the empirical analysis in order to answer our
research hypotheses questions. We use a linear model estimation approach to the
link auction’s starting price and amount of supply in each market to the auction’s
final price, while having control of the other auction parameter variables. Based on
the hypotheses developed in the previous section, the following generalized model
will be used:
Final Price = f
(
Q, Y, iPad2Lighthigh, iPad2Modhigh,




In the above regression model, Q and Y simply capture the pallet-specific
which may also influence the bidders willingness to pay, all else being equal. For
example, the number of iPad3 units available in a pallet and whether each iPad3 has
a 16GB memory may change the percentage of which the pallet will be recovered in
auctions. Control variables also include the fixed effects of the starting/ending time
of auctions and the physical location of the warehouse. Table 2.4 summarizes the
description of all variables used in above equation.
We should note that unlike prior literature, which uses N (the unique number
of bidders in the same auction) in predicting the final price (e.g., Bajari and Hortacsu
2003), we will not use N in the aforementioned model. As a result, our approach
here is to study the impact of the auction starting price and number of auctions
on the final price, which are due to either change in N or some other reason (i.e.,
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reference price argument). Nevertheless, we use the co-variate N to explain some of
our findings8.
The ordinary least square method (OLS) is used to estimate the regression
model in predicting the final price. The results will be shown in Table 2.6 and 2.7
for auctions run between day 1 and 22 of our experiment in which the starting price of
iPad3 auctions is fixed. As a result, the starting price of iPad3 is excluded from our
analysis and RHS variables in Equation 2.1 To answer our research hypotheses, we
first create a basic model for each particular market/markets (base model). Then, to
be able to discern the impact of each variable individually, we will add the variables
of interest one by one. This will allow us to identify the most robust variables
while holding all other variables constant. This is also a cautious approach when
we later interpret regression results if two variables, in particular the iPad’s supply
in different markets, are highly correlated. Hence, Table 2.6 and 2.7 is designed
such that we are able to test different hypotheses which are specific and related to
a particular market through the different columns.
8We also have done a parallel analysis to our current one in which we included N in predicting
the final price of auctions. We treated N as an endogenous explanatory variable which is deter-
mined during the course of the auction. We argue that the number of available auctions (for both
focal and all non-focal market) will impact the auction’s final price via the number of bidders.
Hence, we can use the number of auctions, which determines the supply of the products, as valid
instruments to account for endogeneity of the number of bidder. We used 2SLS regression with
the number of bidders in the first stage and final price in the second stage. The results from 2SLS
regression models are consistent with our findings from the current analysis reported in Table 2.6
and 2.7.
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Table 2.6 shows the result of the estimation for final price in light-use (Columns
1-6) and moderate iPad2 auctions (Columns 7-11). Note that the light-use iPad2
market has the highest number of observations (272 auctions) in our experiment,
in which we manipulated the starting price level (10 days have a low starting price
while 9 days have a high starting price). In addition, light-use ipad2 auctions, on
average, have the highest final price per auction compared to others (mean=0.77,
st. dev.=0.04; from Table 2.5).
Column (1) in Table 2.6 reports on the base model in predicting the final price
of a light-use iPad2 auction including the starting price dummies (iPad2Lighthigh,
iPad2Modhigh) for both light-use and moderate iPad2 auctions, as well as their in-
teraction term (iPad2Lighthigh×iPad2Modhigh). We will add this interaction term
as we are also interested in studying how the relative difference between the starting
price of the adjacent market, which may determine the degree of demand substi-
tutability across markets, will affect the final price. As a result, the interaction
term can differentiate between the impact of starting price in each market condi-
tional on the starting price level in the other market. The model in Column (1)
also includes the number of available auctions for the focal light-use iPad2 market
(NiPad2Light).
In Column (2), we will add the interaction term between the starting price
dummy for light-use iPad2 auctions and the number of auctions in the same market
(iPad2Lighthigh×NiPad2Light) to our base model of Column (1) of Table 2.6.
This allows us to establish the moderation effect and to test whether the main
effect of a focal auction’s starting price variation is weakened or intensified by the
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number of auctions in the the same market. In Column (3) of Table 2.6, we will add
NiPad2Mod into the base model as the moderate-use iPad2 market could have,
arguably, the most comparable iPad-to-iPad in the focal auction. As we can see,
the regression model in Column (3) demonstrates a better predictive power and is
statistically significant in F-statistics compared to that of Column (1).
Columns (4) through (6) in Table 2.6 will respectively add NiPad3light and
NiPad3Mod into the model of Column (3) as the iPad3 may also be substituted for
the iPad2 in the focal auction. The results from Columns (4)-(6) will also confirm
that accounting for the number of auctions from a newer model of the product
(whether at the same or lower-quality level) may play a role in determining the final
price in the focal iPad2 auctions. Column (6) in Table 2.6 will illustrate the model
which includes the starting price dummies and iPad’s supply in all four markets.
The results from Column (6) will confirm the importance of the starting price level
and the amount of iPad’s supply in non-focal auctions on the performance of the
focal auction.
Likewise, we can repeat our step-wise analysis in Columns (1)-(6) of Table
2.6 for the moderate-use iPad2 and report them in Columns (7)-(11) of Table 2.6.
However, it is expected that due to the lower number of observations for moderate-
use iPad2 auctions (100 auctions), we may not have a statistically significant impact
for the starting price level in iPad2 auctions and the variables which represent
number of auctions in the moderate-use iPad2 market. Hence, we will only validate
those hypotheses for which we can find support9.
9Due to the limiting number of the days to run experiment, our experiment was originally
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As light-use iPad3 auctions are the second most populated auction sample in
our experiment (189 auctions), we will report on the performance of this market as
a function of starting prices in the iPad2 market and the number of auctions in all
four markets. Table 2.7 presents the result for regression model in estimating the
final price of light-use (Columns 1-5) and moderate ipad3 auctions (Columns 6-10).
We will repeat our analysis in Columns (1)-(11) (except for Column 2) of Table 2.6
in Table 2.7 to represent the iPad3 market.
To test for multicollinearity– which may exist across the amount of iPad’s
supply (or number of auctions) in different variables, we computed the variance
inflation factors (VIF). The highest VIF across all regression models is 7.2, which is
lower than 10, which is below the threshold value reported by Belsley et al. (1980).
As a result, multicollinearity cannot be an issue in our empirical analysis. We will
present the discussion of results as well as alternative explanations for our findings
in the next section.
2.5 Discussion of Results
In this section, we begin by discussing the summary statistics in order to have a
better understanding of how each of the four markets operated. First, one surprising
observation from Table 2.5 is that there are, on average, less than 3 bidders who
have participated in auctions of iPad2 and iPad3. This number is definitely lower
than B2C settings (e.g., Simonsohn and Ariely 2008) and also less than our other
designed to reveal some information about the performance of the light-use iPad marketplace
(high-quality products) which accounts for the seller’s most gross revenue.
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studied B2B marketplace in essay one. The low number of bidders (mean=2.69, std.
dev=0.7) in each auction of our marketplace can highlight the critical role of the
starting price in further driving the auction’s performance; as Reiley (2006) argues,
the gains to setting an optimal starting price becomes significantly bigger if the
number of bidders is reduced. Besides, the low mean and variance for the number
of bidders in each auction may also imply that we study a market in which bidders
had a fair amount of information about the true value of the items, and they were
not willing to participate in auctions that went beyond certain prices. In such a
marketplace, it is plausible that a seller can significantly benefit by attracting one
more additional bidder into an auction, and this may be achievable via varying the
substitution effect across different markets.
In terms of the final price of auctions, from the Table 2.5 and our pair-wise
t-tests with p-values <.01, we can conclude that light-use iPad2 auctions has the
highest final prices (mean=0.77, std. dev=0.04), moderate-use iPad2 auctions has
the second highest final prices (mean=0.74, std. dev=0.05), light-use iPad3 auctions
has the third highest final prices (mean=0.73, std. dev=0.03), and finally, moderate-
use iPad3 has the worst final prices (mean=0.70, std. dev=0.04) among all four
markets.
That higher-quality products on the vertical differentiation ladder result in
higher prices is not surprising, but that the older model of a product recovers at the
higher prices compared to its newer version counterpart needs some explanation.
From our findings (i.e., the negative coefficients of Y in Table 2.7) and also from
consultation with the channel manager, we can conclude that buyers are willingness
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to pay higher prices, as the percentage of E, for pallets with cheaper per-unit value
Y . There could be different unknown reasonings for this which is not at the scope
of this essay to explore. For instance, bidders’ financial constraint (Che and Gale
1998) may make smaller bidders participate more likely in auctions with cheaper
retail value. Hence, we can expect more number of bidders, and consequently higher
final prices for pallets with cheaper units. As the iPad2 has large Y ($399) compared
to the iPad3 ($499 or $599), for a given condition grade, we can expect higher final
prices for the iPad2. Furthermore, another reason for such an outcome could be the
small difference between the auction’s starting prices in iPad3 and starting prices
in iPad2. As we will show later, this closeness in starting prices may dampen the
final prices in the iPad3.
Going to our hypotheses testing, we divide our discussion of results into three
parts. First, we test the hypotheses related to the auction’s starting prices (Hypothe-
ses 1, 1B, 2A, 2B and 3). We will then report the results on testing the hypotheses
4, 4A and 4B in regard to the supply of iPads through number of auctions. Fi-
nally, we finish our discussion with testing the moderation effect of number of open
auctions (supply of product) on starting price/final price relationship (Hypothesis
5).
2.5.1 The Impact of Starting Prices on Auctions’ Final Price
We can only test hypotheses 1 and 1B across iPad2 markets with varying
starting prices. First, from Column (1)-(5) of Table 2.6, while controlling the start-
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ing price of moderate-use iPad2 auctions and the interaction term between two
starting price dummies, we find enough evidence to support a positive and statis-
tically significant impact of iPad2Lighthigh dummy variable on the final price of
light-use iPad2 auctions. While the coefficient for iPad2Lighthigh in Columns (1)
and (3)-(5) is somewhere between 0.015 and 0.025, in Column (2), this number is
significantly higher due to the interaction term of iPad2Lighthigh×NiPad2Light.
Finally, there is only a weakly positive coefficient at p-value>0.1 significance for
iPad2Lighthigh in Column (6) of Table 2.6. Hence, we cannot reject this hypothesis
in the light-use iPad2 market. One plausible explanation for the lack of statistical
significance in the positive relationship between iPad2lighthigh and the final price in
Column (6) of Table 2.6 is the possible negative correlation between iPad2lighthigh
and NiPad3Light (added in Column 6 compared to Column 5) (See Table 2.5).
Hypothesis 1B investigated the main impact of the starting price of the light-
use iPad2 auction by conditioning on the starting price level of moderate-use iPad2
auctions simultaneously open. The motivation for Hypothesis 1B arose as we pre-
dicted the closeness between the starting price level of a low and high-quality market
may influence the degree to which the substitution varies across two markets, which
can impact the auctions’ performance. We will do this investigation by adding
the interaction term between the two starting price dummies in the iPad2 market
(iPad2Lighthigh×iPad2Modhigh) across all specifications in Table 2.6. As we can
see in Columns (1)-(6) of Table 2.6, we observe a negative and statistically significant
coefficient for iPad2Lighthigh×iPad2Modhigh10. That said, we can provide enough
10Again, due to the possible negative correlation between iPad2lighthigh and NiPad3Light in
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empirical evidence to support Hypothesis 1B for the light-use iPad2 market, and
conclude that the positive impact of an increase in the starting price level of the
light-use iPad2 auction (already established in Hypothesis 1) shrinks when the start-
ing price level in moderate-use iPad2 auctions increases (iPad2Modhigh= 1). To the
extreme, this will turn the overall net impact of the starting price of the light-use
iPad2 on its own final price negative (the sum on coefficients of iPad2Lighthigh and
iPad2Lighthigh×iPad2Modhigh) across all Columns (1)-(6).
In substantive terms and as we discussed in Section 2.3, the new finding of
Hypothesis 1B implies that substitution from the moderate-use iPad2 to light-use
iPad2 market exists and its absence can hurt the light-use iPad2 market. In effect,
when starting prices for the moderate-use iPad2 auctions are high (65%), some
bidders can now choose to bid on the auctions of the light-use iPad2 whose starting
price is lower (55%). In this situation, if a seller decides to increase the starting price
level of the light-use iPad2 from 55% to 70%, this might drive away those bidders
who used to submit bids in the light-use iPad2 auction when the starting price was at
55%. As a result, we will expect a reduction in the bidders’ traffic in light-use iPad2
market when iPad2Lighthigh=1 compared to when iPad2Lighthigh=0 (2.3 versus
3.1 bidders, a difference of means t-test significant at p<0.01), thereby lowering the
final price.
Moving to Columns (7)-(11) of Table 6.2 which report on the moderate-use
iPad2 markets, across all specifications, we can neither support nor reject the Hy-
Column (6) of Table 2.6, the coefficient for iPad2Lighthigh×iPad2Modhigh is smaller compared
to the Columns (1)-(5).
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pothesis 1. One main reason for this result is the low number of observations under
each combination of starting price pairs in the moderate-use iPad2market (see Table
2.3), which is not enough for the sake of testing for the Hypothesis 1. Nevertheless,
we can still see the positive sign for coefficient of iPad2Modhigh in Columns (7)-(11)
of Table 2.6.
Hypotheses 2A and 2B pertained to the effect of the starting price of low-
quality products on the final price of higher-quality products or the low-quality
products of a newer generation. We can test Hypotheses 2A and 2B for both light-
use iPad2 and iPad3 markets. First, across all specifications reported in Columns
(1)-(6) of Table 2.6, we see that the coefficient of iPad2Modhigh is significant and
positive, providing support for Hypothesis 2A in the light-use iPad2 market. The
effect size for the coefficient of iPad2Modhigh simply implies that when the starting
price of the moderate-use iPad2 auction increases from low (50%) to high (65%),
the final price in light-use iPad2 auctions improves by 2-3%. Furthermore, as
we find out from Columns (1)-(6) of Table 2.6, the increase in the final price of
light-use iPad2 auctions due to the increase in the auction’s starting price of the
moderate-use iPad2 is higher when iPad2Lighthigh=0 (no impact from the coeffi-
cient of iPad2Lighthigh×iPad2Modhigh). This is again due to the rise in substitu-
tion from moderate-use to light-use iPad2 market when the difference between the
starting prices of both iPad markets is small.
Similarly, from Columns (1)-(5) of Table 2.7, we can support the Hypothe-
sis 2A with regard to the effect of the starting price in auctions of a low-quality
market (moderate-use iPad2) on the final price of auctions for high-quality product
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(light-use iPad3. Across all specifications in Columns (1)-(5) of Table 2.7, we can
observe a positive and statistically significant coefficient for iPad2Modhigh (0.015-
0.025, p<0.01). This positive coefficient implies that, all else being equal, if the
starting price of the moderate-use iPad2 auction goes up from low (50%) to high
(65%), the final price in light-use iPad3 auctions improves around 2%, and this will
again validate the Hypothesis 2A.
Coming to Hypothesis 2B and from Columns (6)-(10) of Table 2.7, we can
support Hypothesis 2B. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for
iPad2Modhigh in the regression model of Columns (6)-(10) in Table 2.7 will indicate
when the starting price of the moderate-use iPad2 auction increases from low (50%)
to high (65%), the final price in moderate-use iPad3 auctions improves by more
than 3%. Note that as the starting price of moderate-use iPad3 auctions is fixed
at 62%, which is between the low and high starting price of moderate-use iPad2
auctions, the substitution argument still holds and will explain this result between
moderate-use iPad products of the old and new generation.
Finally, Hypothesis 3 predicted that the starting price of high-quality products
of an older generation has a positive impact on the final price of high-quality prod-
ucts of a newer generation. We can only test this hypothesis in the light-use iPad
markets. From Columns (1)-(5) of Table 2.7, we see that across all specifications, the
impact of iPad2Lighthigh on the final price of light-use iPad3 auctions is statistically
significant and negative, all else being equal. Therefore, we have empirical evidence
to support Hypothesis 3. The effect size of iPad2Lighthigh coefficient on the final
price of the light-use iPad3 auctions is somewhere between −0.02 and −0.033 (de-
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pending on the model specification) at the 0.01 p-value significance. As we discussed
earlier, one possible driver of this result is a decrease in the average number of final
bidders in each auction of light-use iPad3 product. In effect, the high-quality iPad2
may now become a viable substitute for all high-quality iPad3 auctions available in
the market. Also, a potential winner in the auction of light-use iPad3 may now have
a belief about paying a higher final price due to the high starting price in light-use
iPad2 auctions. As a result, some potential bidders in light-use iPad3 auctions may
withdraw and postpone their purchase decision, leading to lowering the final price
in light-use iPad3 auctions
Hypothesis 3 would suggest that a seller could improve the auctions’ per-
formance of the most premium products (i.e., light-use iPad3 in our market) by
differentiating this market from others, i.e., choosing a very high starting price com-
pared to other inferior markets. This result looks surprising at first glance, however,
we can find much supportive evidence in offline markets in which sellers of pre-
mium goods are suggested to position their premium goods in strategic locations,
expecting consumers to see these high-priced items first before seeing other cheaper
substitutable products.
2.5.2 The Impact of Number of Auctions (Supply of Products) on
the Auctions’ Final Price
Moving to our hypotheses with regard to supply of the iPad product– deter-
mined by number of auctions, we begin by testing Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4 is
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the most preliminary prediction about the competition effect from other identical
auctions on the performance of a focal auction, all else being equal. We can inde-
pendently test the Hypothesis 4 on four markets. First, Columns (1)-(6) of Table
2.6 will consistently report on a negative and statistically significant coefficient for
NiPad2Light in validation of the Hypothesis 4 in the light-use iPad2 market. In
terms of the effect size, one standard deviation increase in NiPad2Light (5.9 auc-
tions) will lead to, on average, a 1-1.5%of E decrease in the final price in the light-use
iPad2 market. Furthermore, from Columns (1)-(5) of Table 2.7, we observe a nega-
tive and statistically significant coefficient for NiPad3Light which negatively affects
the final price of light-use iPad3 auctions. Likewise, one standard deviation increase
in NiPad3Light (4.2 auctions) will lead to, on average, a 1-1.5% of E decrease in
the final price in the light-use iPad3 market.
Going to the moderate-use iPad3market, we can still provide enough empirical
support for Hypothesis 4 due to the negative coefficient of NiPad3Mod (−0.0035,
p<0.01) in Columns (7)-(8) of Table 2.7. However, we cannot confirm Hypothe-
sis 4 in the moderate-use iPad3 market from Column (6), and (9)-(10) of Table
2.7. One main reason for this could be the significant positive correlation between
NiPad3Mod and NiPad2Mod in the moderate-use iPad3 market (See Table 2.5).
Finally, we can neither support nor reject Hypothesis 4 for the moderate-use iPad2
market in Columns (7)-(11) of Table 2.6. Nevertheless, we can still see the neg-
ative sign for coefficient NiPad2Mod across all specifications, consistent with the
prediction of Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 4A predicted the positive impact of the number of auctions in
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low-quality products on the final price in auctions of high-quality products. First,
Columns (2)-(3) of Table 2.6 report on a positive and statistically significant co-
efficient for NiPad2Mod in predicting the final price of light-use iPad2 auctions.
Furthermore, Column (6) of Table 2.6 will also show a positive and statistically sig-
nificant coefficient for NiPad3Mod while that of NiPad2Mod is insignificant. We
believe the reason for this sudden lack of significance of the NiPad2Mod coefficient
is a high correlation between NiPad3Mod and NiPad2Mod (r=0.72). Neverthe-
less, the evidence from Columns (2), (3) and (6) of Table 2.6 is enough to support
Hypothesis 4A for the light-use iPad2 market.
On the other hand, we can only find support for Hypothesis 4A in the light-use
iPad3 market in which the low-quality market belongs to the same generation as the
high-quality products. In other words, while from Columns (3) of Table 2.7, we can
find a positive coefficient on NiPad3Mod (0.004, p<0.01) in support of Hypothesis
4A, we cannot find support for Hypothesis 4A in the light-use iPad3 market from
Columns (4)-(5) of Table 2.7. The reason for that is when both NiPad3Mod and
NiPad3Mod variable co-exist (Columns 4, 5 of Table 2.7), we will see an unexpected
negative coefficient on NiPad2Mod. We do not yet have a valid explanation for this
result. That said, we can only support the claim for Hypothesis 4A in the light-use
iPad3 market only when the low-quality market belongs to the same model (i.e.,
iPad3 generation).
Finally, in regard to Hypothesis 4B, we could only find support for the impact
of the number of auctions from a high-quality market on the auction’s final price
of the low-quality market only if both low and high-quality markets belong to the
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same model (i.e., same iPad generation). First, for the moderate-use iPad2 market,
Columns (8)-(11) of Table 2.6 consistently show a negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient for NiPad2light (respectively −0.0027, −0.0035, −0.0027, −0.0038,
p<0.01) in support of Hypothesis 4B. In terms of the effect size, one standard
deviation increase in NiPad2Light (5.5 auctions) will lead to roughly a 1%-1.5%
of E decrease in the final price in the moderate-use iPad2 auction. Going to the
moderate-use iPad3 market and NiPad2light coefficient in Columns (7)-(10) of
Table 2.7, we can still support Hypothesis 4B across the iPad3 generation. One
standard deviation increase in NiPad3Light (3.2 auctions) will lead to roughly a
1% of E decrease in the final price in moderate-use iPad3 auction.
2.5.3 The Moderation Effect of Number of Auctions on the Main
Effect of Starting Prices on Auctions’ Final Price
As our last prediction, we hypothesize the moderation effect of the number
of identical auctions on the impact of an auction’s starting price on its own final
price. We could only test this hypothesis on the light-use iPad2 market due to the
relatively large number of observations in this market. This hypothesis can have
a very important implication for the seller as its prediction can guide the seller to
either increase or decrease the auction’s starting price depending on the number of
auctions in that market. Column (2) of Table 2.6 is used to this hypothesis. As
we can see the negative and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction
term of iPad2Lighthigh×NiPad2Light (−0.0046 p<0.01) will validate Hypothesis
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5. This implies when market will supply more identical iPads, the positive impact
of iPad2Lighthigh on light-use iPad2 final price will decrease. Consequently, the
seller may now afford to choose a low starting price to benefit more from increasing
in bidder’s entry into the auctions (i.e., Ku et al. 2005, 2006).
2.6 Conclusion
In this essay, we started with identifying the gap in the online B2B auctions
with regards to product differentiation in used secondary market. We address this
gap by running a controlled field experiment on the auction site of one of the nation’s
largest online auction wholesale liquidators. The objective of our experiment is to
investigate the formation of auction’s final price across different comparable/related
markets (varying via model and quality), beyond a single market (or a single auction)
which is the focus of most prior literature (e.g., Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Lucking-
Reiley et al. 2007). One main challenge in studying a particular market in such an
interconnected marketplace is the ability to tease out the impact of other markets
from its own, which can drive the performance of auctions.
Having fair control on auction and market specifics (e.g., the auction starting
price and number of open auctions in all existing markets) while exogenously de-
termining the characteristics of the products (e.g., models, qualities), we designed
a field experiment which was directly aimed at understanding the extent to which
(i) the starting price of the auction, and (ii) the number of auctions for a specific
(model, quality) which implies the amount of supply for that product, interact to
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impact an auction’s final price.
Our work in this essay contributes to the operations management and auction
literature by providing the first empirical evidence in support of demand substitution
in a B2B auction of used products across different comparable markets. Our results
also provide a more nuanced understanding of the impact of starting price on the
final price of a focal auction conditioning on the starting price levels of other available
competing products. Furthermore, we are among the first researchers who have
accounted simultaneously for both starting price and the supply of different products
when studying the performance of auctions for a particular product. We should
also point out that despite the challenges we faced to comply with sellers daily
operational requirements, the scale of our field experiment was by far one of the
most extensive run in a real B2B marketplace with business buyers.
Our result suggests that, consistent with prior literature, an increase in the
starting price of a focal auction will positively impact the final price of its own
auction; however, this relationship is negativity moderated by the high starting
price level in an auction from a comparable market simultaneously open. This
result is driven due to the potential substitution from the non-focal auction to the
focal auction, in particular when starting price of both non-focal and focal auctions
is close. However, the increase in starting price of focal auction will attenuate the
substitutability, thereby lowering the flow of bidders from the non-focal auction
to the focal auction. This will then negatively impact the final price in the focal
auction.
Our finding also supports the an increase in the auction’s starting price in a
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low-quality market will positively impact the final price in an auction of a higher
quality or new generation model product. From managerial viewpoint, this result
suggests that if, as is the case with many wholesale liquidators, the objective is
to improve the performance of higher-quality or newer-generation inventory, then
the seller would be well advised to set the lower-end product’s starting price high
so as to improve the substitution from an inferior product to a superior one. On
the contrary, it is plausible that the seller should do the opposite if her objective
is the fast-removal of lower-end products in order to prevent directing bidders to
higher-end auctions.
We find evidence that an increase in auction starting price of a high-quality
product of an older generation (light-use iPad2) will have a negative effect on the
final prices of all auctions for the newer generation of products (light-use iPad3).
This noble result in B2B auction context is consistent with the current practice in
offline retail markets in which the sellers of premium goods are suggested to position
their premium goods in strategic locations, expecting consumers to see these high-
priced items first before seeing other cheaper substitution products.
We also tease out some patterns of demand substitution across generations and
quality class, depending on the amount of which products are supplied. We have
successfully tested and showed that an increase in the number of auctions in high-
quality product will decrease the final price in auctions of low-quality products. This
finding will simply show that an increase in the supply of products in high-quality
products will decrease the average auction’s price in the market of the lower-quality
products. On the other hand, we also showed that the opposite statement is true
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with this caveat that the supply of products from low-quality products will benefit
the auction’s performance of the higher-quality products only if they belong to the
same model of the low-quality market.
Finally, we identify a diminishing importance for the starting price as the
market supplies more products. This finding has implications for development some
guidance in choosing the appropriate starting price depending on the volume of
posted auctions. For instance, a seller can still benefit from posting a low starting
price if she is in need of liquidating a lot of products for a given day. A common
concern here raised by the managers of B2B secondary marketplace is the fact that
a low starting price can significantly put making a certain profit at risk; therefore,
to hedge this risk, they choose a high starting prices which may also be hurtful
due to the low bidders’ participation rate in the auction. That said, this result
recommends that if the seller is in need of auctioning off many products, choosing a
low starting price can be beneficial compared to a high starting price, as the former
would attract more bidders into the auction leading to increase the final price.
From the product assortment and policy making perspective, our findings
about the formation of the final price in iPad interconnected market can provide a
seller with some preliminarily managerial implications to strategically manage auc-
tioning off the right mix of products at the right starting price. As a B2B seller
of secondary market merchandise, disregarding the strategic consideration in posi-
tioning the products in a marketplace, like iPad tablet, with no intense competition
(less than 3 bidders per auction) may lead to suboptimal outcomes for the seller.
For instance, a 4% decrease in final price of auctions (one std. dev) in the studied
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iPad marketplace can translate into $ 50000-$ 60000 less revenue on a $ 1 million
market. As a large seller (like the one we studied in Essay 1) can post auctions with
the annual worth of a $billion, a few percentage increase in auctions’ final prices can
lead to million dollars of excess revenue. The decision of choosing the right price
for the right mix of products is highly dependent on the inventory constraint. For
instance, if in our studied iPad marketplace, the seller is left with a lot of light-use
iPad2 auctions, it is recommend to first post a several auctions for the lower-quality
product whose starting price is chosen high in order to benefit from substitution
effect. Also, it is beneficial in order to intensify the substitution effect, the seller
chooses a low auction’s starting price in light-use iPad2 market.
There are a number of limitations in our experiment and analysis that should
be acknowledged and perhaps addressed in future research. First, we should point
out that that our experiment will fail answering the question of which, how a seller
can maximize the expected daily profit. In fact, answering to such a question ne-
cessitates running more extensive field experiments with higher number of days and
treatments (desirably at the full-factorial form) while manipulating for more level
of starting prices in all four markets, as well as different level for supply of iPads
in each market. Another potential avenue for future research is to investigate the
behavior of bidders and their choice models in such an interconnected market, in
which some bidders (i.g., cross-bidders) will substitute their bids in different mar-
kets. Understanding such bidders’ behavior can help the seller to identify the key
bidders who can be explicitly encouraged to bid or not bid in a particular auction
through some appropriate decision tool.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: The Snapshot of the Results Page for iPad Marketplace
Notes. The ’Lot Prices’ will show the current highest price for each auction while ’Bids’
reports on number of existing bids.
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Table 2.3: Breakdown of Auctions for Each Combination of iPad2’s Starting Price
Pair
Combination 1 Combination 2 Combination 3 Combination 4
Light-use IPAD2 (Starting price level) High High Low Low
Moderate-use IPAD2 (Starting price level) High Low Low High
Number of days in experiment 4 5 4 6
Total Number of light-use iPad2 Auctions 63 69 70 70
Total Number of moderate-use iPad2 Auctions 20 24 30 26
Total Number of light-use iPad3 Auctions 42 25 43 40
Total Number of moderate-use iPad3 Auctions 14 16 19 21
Avg. Number of Daily light-use iPad2 Auctions 15.8 13.8 17.5 11.7
Avg. Number of Daily moderate-use iPad2 Auctions 5 4.8 7.5 4.3
Avg. Number of Daily light-use iPad3 Auctions 10.5 5 10.8 6.7
Avg. Number of Daily moderate-use iPad3 Auctions 3.5 3.2 4.8 3.5
Table 2.4: List of Variables Used in Empirical Analysis of Chapter2
Variable Definition
Final Price The price of the second-highest maximum-willingness-to-pay on the auction as a % of E
N The final number of unique bidders in the same auction
Q The number of items in each pallet
E $ declared/retail price of all items in each pallet
Y Avg. per-unit $ declared/retail price in each pallet (E/Q)
iPad2Lighthigh Dummy variable indicating whether light-use iPad2 auction has high starting price (=1)
or low starting price (=0)
iPad2Modhigh Dummy variable indicating whether moderate-use iPad2 auction has high starting price (=1)
or low starting price (=0)
NiPad2Light Number of daily posted light-use iPad2 auctions
NiPad3Mod Number of daily posted moderate-use iPad2 auctions
NiPad3Light Number of daily posted light-use iPad3 auctions
NiPad3Mod Number of daily posted moderate-use iPad3 auctions
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Table 2.5: Summary of Statistics and Correlation Matrix for iPad2 and iPad3 Markets
Market Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Final Price 272 0.77 0.04
2 N 272 2.84 0.74 0.52*
3 Q 272 4.39 0.84 -0.05 -0.29*
4 Y1 272 399 0
Light-use 5 iPad2Lighthigh 272 0.49 0.50 0.15* -0.30* 0.16*
iPad2 6 iPad2Modhigh 272 0.49 0.50 0.21* 0.15* 0.032 -0.023
7 NiPad2Light 272 17.19 5.95 -0.41* -0.28* 0.23* -0.17* -0.15*
8 NiPad2Mod 272 6.00 3.57 0.04 0.24* 0.00 -0.22* -0.28* 0.25*
9 NiPad3Light 272 10.53 4.71 -0.34* -0.27* 0.35* -0.22* 0.24* 0.69* -0.1
10 NiPad3Mod 272 4.10 2.60 0.15* 0.30* -0.11* -0.05 -0.13* 0.14* 0.72* 0.05
1 Final Price 100 0.74 0.05
2 N 100 2.70 0.70 0.28*
3 Q 100 4.85 0.58 -0.06 -0.33*
4 Y1 100 399 0
Moderate-use 5 iPad2Lighthigh 100 0.44 0.50 0.20* -0.13 -0.15
iPad2 6 iPad2Modhigh 100 0.46 0.50 0.25* -0.1 0.06 -0.01
7 NiPad2Light 100 15.82 5.91 -0.44* -0.35* -0.01 -0.14 -0.25*
8 NiPad2Mod 100 7.64 3.07 -0.17* -0.18* 0.08 -0.41* -0.1 0.36*
9 NiPad3Light 100 9.37 3.54 -0.22* -0.18* 0.1 -0.40* 0.1 0.61* 0.35*
10 NiPad3Mod 100 5.02 2.53 -0.1 -0.24* 0.01 -0.26* -0.1 0.10 0.68* 0.32*
1 Final Price 189 0.73 0.03
2 N 189 2.57 0.78 0.89*
3 Q 189 4.25 0.73 0.30* 0.11
4 Y 189 529.16 46.02 -0.38* -0.37* -0.51*
Light-use 5 iPad2Lighthigh 189 0.35 0.48 -0.12* -0.21* 0.21* -0.01
iPad3 6 iPad2Modhigh 189 0.43 0.50 0.21* 0.17* 0.12* 0.03 0.28*
7 NiPad2Light 189 13.79 8.84 -0.18* -0.25* 0.18* 0.02 0.23* 0.27*
8 NiPad2Mod 189 4.60 4.02 0.10 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.50*
9 NiPad3Light 189 12.68 4.26 -0.36* -0.26* -0.03 -0.01 -0.24* -0.05 0.02 -0.5*
10 NiPad3Mod 189 3.90 2.37 0.18* 0.20* -0.29* -0.03 0.11 -0.04 0.12* 0.68 -0.34*
1 Final Price 71 0.70 0.04
2 N 71 2.48 0.69 0.73*
3 Q 71 4.56 0.58 0.27* 0.03
4 Y 71 532.80 47.64 -0.42* -0.10 -0.75*
Moderate-use 5 iPad2Lighthigh 71 0.42 0.50 0.05 -0.14 0.01 -0.01
iPad3 6 iPad2Modhigh 71 0.49 0.50 0.48* 0.33* 0.25* -0.10 -0.05
7 NiPad2Light 71 14.52 6.76 -0.25* -0.20* -0.12 0.03 0.03 -0.27*
8 NiPad2Mod 71 7.07 3.55 -0.28* -0.171 -0.04 0.05 -0.32* -0.28* 0.45*
9 NiPad3Light 71 9.66 3.18 -0.26* -0.15 -0.01 0.15 -0.23* 0.01 0.50* 0.14
10 NiPad3Mod 71 5.68 2.04 -0.27* -0.13 -0.05 0.11 -0.45* -0.16 0.05 0.62* 0.14

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ROFR-of-First-Refusal in Sequential Procurement Auctions
3.1 Introduction
Procurement auctions — where a buyer runs an auction to procure goods and
services from suppliers — have ostensibly saved firms millions of dollars in direct
costs of procurement. For instance, General Electric claimed a saving of $600 million
(a net saving of more than 8%) in 2001, and Ariba, a leading software vendor for
online auctions, reports that it consistently saved its customers an astonishing 20%
on purchases worth more than $30 billion between 1995-2001 by using procurement
auctions, cf. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2006).
Several appealing features of classical procurement auctions, such as transparency,
supplier-competition, etc., contribute to the cost savings, cf. Elmaghraby (2003).
But the one standout feature that exerts an inexorable downward pressure on bids
(and hence procurement cost) is that the winner of the auction is de facto the lowest
bidder (cf. Elmaghraby 2003, Li and Scheller-Wolf 2009, Chen and Vulcano 2009,
and Zhang 2010). The conflation of the lowest bid and ‘allocation’ (winner deter-
mination) scuttles any possibility of a long-term buyer-supplier relationship since,
in each auction, a different supplier may end up being the lowest bidder, and hence
the winner. Not surprisingly then, in recent surveys (Sawhney 2003, Jap 2007),
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more than 95% of the suppliers viewed procurement auctions as toxic to long-term
buyer-supplier relationships. Additionally, because the allocation is based solely on
the lowest bid, the buyer too is forced to award a contract to less preferred or un-
familiar suppliers. As a result, one key reason of using procurement auctions — that
of low procurement cost — does not always materialize either. Such savings in direct
cost often disappear due to post-auction negotiations, or are diluted by increases
in indirect costs of procurement, such as administrative hassles of dealing with a
new supplier. For example, GE later claimed that as much as 50%, or about $300
million, a staggering proportion of the aforementioned $600 million saving, was lost
due to frictions in executing contracts with new suppliers.
To offset the key disadvantage of classical procurement auctions, many academi-
cians and practitioners have explored decoupling allocation from the bids received
(‘price discovery’). In specific, the winner may not necessarily be the lowest bidder —
the final winner is at the buyer’s discretion and may be based on both tangible and
intangible factors, such as quality, lead time, etc. (Wan and Beil 2009, Engelbrecht-
Wiggans et al. 2007, and Kostamis et al. 2009). As Elmaghraby (2007) notes:
“...auctions should be viewed as one tool to enable price discovery...and should not
be considered a substitute for negotiation [i.e., allocation]...” [page 410, emphasis
added].
An auction combined with the Right-of-First-Refusal (ROFR) is a popular, yet
simple, mechanism to decouple price-discovery and allocation. Under ROFR, the
buyer runs an auction and collects the submitted bids. She then offers the ‘preferred’
bidder — the one who enjoys the right-of-first-refusal — the opportunity to match
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the best offer that the buyer has. Thus, in the context of procurement auctions, the
preferred supplier has an opportunity to win the contract by preferentially matching
the lowest bid of the competing suppliers.
ROFR is historically the norm in many industries such as music, entertainment,
real-estate, etc., where the incumbent is typically bestowed with ROFR. For in-
stance, in 2001, Paramount Studios — the producer of the successful TV show Frasier
— had to renegotiate the broadcasting right of Frasier after the original contract with
NBC expired. NBC, as the incumbent network, enjoyed the right-of-first-refusal.
The contract explicitly stated that NBC had “...10 days to match [CBS] terms.”
(Grosskopf and Roth 2009). Similarly, in the National football league (NFL), the
incumbent team has the right to match the best offer a player has once he is eligible
to change teams (Lee 2008).
Even in industries unencumbered by the above historical underpinnings, ROFR
may still be awarded to incumbents. For example, there was a recent uproar in
the automotive industry where suppliers complained that buyer used procurement
auction to “...see how low suppliers are willing to bid — but the buyer has no intention
to re-source...instead the buyer goes to the existing [preferred] supplier to beat down
[match] the price.” [Kisiel 2002, emphasis added.]
ROFR may often be awarded surreptitiously or implicitly to a bidder. In 1999,
Jinro Ltd, a bankrupt Korean brewery, was up for sale. However, the bid by Coors,
a U.S. firm, was leaked to a preferred local brewery, The Oriental Brewery Company
(OBC), despite explicit rules against such leakage. Based on the bid by Coors, OBC
then resubmitted a (slightly) higher bid and won the auction. (Modern Brewery
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Age, 1999.) Political pressure may also result in an implicit ROFR. In 2003, Airbus
sought bids for engines to its A400M military aircraft. Pratt & Whitney of US
and EuroProp International, a consortium of European engine manufacturers, were
the major bidders. Although Pratt & Whitney’s bid was more competitive, but
succumbing to pressure from France and Germany who wanted European engines,
Airbus implicitly granted ROFR to EuroProp which matched Pratt & Whitney’s
bid and won the contract, Lunsford (2003).
(To emphasize, in all the above examples, there is a separation of price discovery
and allocation — the allocation being made, to the extent possible, to a preferred
firm through an explicit or an implicit ROFR.)
Notwithstanding the many reasons for granting ROFR, the overwhelming con-
clusion — from both practitioners and academicians alike — is that, in the absence
of side-payments to confer the ROFR, the only firm that benefits from ROFR is
the preferred supplier. In particular, ROFR creates incentives for the nonpreferred
supplier(s) to bid less aggressively (i.e., bid high in a procurement context) which
increases the procurement cost for the buyer, cf. Chouiard (2005), Bikhchandani et
al. (2005) and Elmaghraby (2007).
The theoretical result that ROFR raises the procurement cost hinges on the
analysis of a single (one-shot) auction. Whereas a one-shot procurement setting
may be justified in many instances, in many others suppliers repeatedly compete
with each other over time; for example in the procurement of defense goods and
services (Burnett and Kovacic 1989, Klotz and Chatterjee 1995), in federal and state
procurement contracts, etc. (cf. Cason et al 2011). A key question that then arises
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is whether the single-auction outcome — that ROFR raises the buyer’s procurement
cost — holds true more generally within repeated (or sequential) auctions?
The short answer is no. We establish that in several reasonable contexts where
buyers runs sequential auctions, granting ROFR to a preferred supplier lowers the
buyer’s total procurement cost when compared to auctions without ROFR. This
result arises due to aggressive bidding by the nonpreferred supplier, in direct contrast
to one-shot auctions with ROFR, which in turn is an outcome of information flows
generated endogenously through ROFR in sequential auctions.
In specific, in this chapter we show that in the context of two sequential pro-
curement auctions with two bidders (or suppliers) — a preferred supplier who enjoys
ROFR and a nonpreferred supplier without ROFR — granting ROFR to the pre-
ferred supplier in only the first auction precipitates an earlier release of information,
compared to a benchmark of running two sequential procurement auctions with-
out ROFR. Such early release of information exacerbates the strategic interactions
between the suppliers in sequential auctions with ROFR, which a one-shot ROFR
auction snuffs out prematurely. In particular, the buyer reveals the bid of the non-
preferred supplier to the preferred supplier in the first auction with ROFR, thus
putting the nonpreferred supplier at an informational disadvantage in the second
auction. In order to blunt this informational advantage enjoyed by the preferred
supplier, the nonpreferred supplier bids extremely aggressively to win the first auc-
tion with ROFR — so much so that it decreases the buyer’s total procurement cost
over the two auctions compared to a benchmark case of running both the sequen-
tial auctions without ROFR. As noted above, this result is in stark contrast and
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contrary to known results on the impact of ROFR on buyer’s procurement cost in
single-auction settings (where nonaggressive bidding by the nonpreferred supplier
raises the buyer’s procurement cost).
3.2 The Model
A buyer wishes to procure  units of a product at  = 1 and  units at  = 2
She runs an auction in each time period to procure her goods — auction 1 at  = 1
and auction 2 at  = 2. For ease of exposition, we assume  = 1. The buyer faces
two potential suppliers — a preferred supplier (PS) who enjoys ROFR if the buyer
decides to run an auction with ROFR and a nonpreferred supplier (NPS) who does
not have ROFR — both of whom bid in both auctions. (The buyer’s preference for
awarding ROFR to the preferred supplier is exogenously determined.) We index the
three players — the buyer, the preferred supplier and the non-preferred supplier — by
,  and  respectively.
Each supplier incurs a (per unit) production/supply cost if he is selected to
supply the product in period  ; this cost can either be high (denoted by ) or
low (denoted by ) with    Each supplier independently draws his cost
at  = 1 and he keeps this cost across both auctions at  = 1 and at  =
2. The probability of drawing a high cost is 1 ∈ (0 1) and the probability of
drawing a low cost is (1− 1)  Although the actual realization of these costs is
private information, the probability distribution is common knowledge. Consistent
with standard terminology in such games of incomplete information, the supplier
that draws a high cost is referred to as the high type, while the supplier that draws
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a low value of cost is referred to as the low type.
In an auction with ROFR, the following events take place. After the initial bids
are placed by the two suppliers, the NPS’s bid is revealed to the PS. If the PS’s
bid is the higher of the two, he then has the opportunity (but not an obligation) to
revise his bid to match the NPS’s lower bid1. Once the decision to ‘match or not’
is made by the preferred supplier, the lowest standing bid is declared the winner.
Alternatively, the buyer can run a (standard) 1 price auction, where the supplier
with the lowest bid wins and is paid his bid. (If an auction is run as 1 price,
then neither supplier enjoys ROFR, and the monikers of preferred and nonpreferred
suppliers are merely placeholders to distinguish the two suppliers.) Elmaghraby
(2007) notes that most procurement auction in practice are 1 -price.
The sequence of events is as follows. At  = 1 the buyer announces her pro-
curement mechanism for both auctions (each auction is run either as 1-price or
as ROFR); and the suppliers independently draw their costs. At the end of each
procurement event, the buyer announces the winning bid and the winner. Dimitri
et al. (2006) note that announcing only the name and bid of the winner dominates
the usage of other disclosure policies in practice (pg. 28, Fig 2.56). Additionally, as
we shall see in Section 3.5, focusing on this particular disclosure mechanism allows
us to tease out the impact of the timing of information flows on sequential auctions
with ROFR.
1It stands to reason that the buyer does not permit the preferred supplier from raising his bid
— and therefore increasing the buyer’s procurement cost — if the preferred supplier’s initial bid is
lower than the nonpreferred supplier’s.
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Four mechanisms (or subgames) potentially arise in our model: () ( 1),
() (1 ), () (), and () (1 1), where the first element
in (· ·) is the auction type for  = 1 and the second element the auction type for
 = 2 No auction in a period is indexed by ∅, e.g., ( ∅) denotes a setting
where a ROFR-auction is held at  = 1 and no auction takes place at  = 2.
Suppliers are risk-neutral expected profit maximizers, while the buyers seeks the
lowest (expected) procurement cost for the two products. There is no collusion
between bidders and there is no participation fee. Without loss of generality, we
normalize  to zero. We index the equilibrium bid of a supplier  ∈ { } with
the cost of  ∈ {} at time  ∈ {1 2} by .
3.3 Sequential Auctions and ROFR
Sequential auctions are underlined by repeated interactions over time between
buyers and suppliers. Typically, a myopic strategy — of maximizing total profits by
optimizing over individual auctions without heed to future interactions — is subopti-
mal. A myopic strategy may indeed be optimal in isolated instances, such as when
future outcomes are independent of the past; for example, when, in each auction,
suppliers draw a new independent value of cost. However, in most cases, such as
in our model, where current (and past) outcomes can reveal critical information to
the competitor (such as high or low cost), and when such information can be used
strategically in future auctions, a myopic strategy may be suboptimal. Specifically
in our modeling context, the players must take into account the impact of their bids
and the information released at  = 1 on the beliefs and strategies of the players at
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 = 2.
Hence, in order to understand if and when it is optimal for a buyer to use a
ROFR in sequential auctions, we must therefore understand and isolate the following
elements of information flows which are either absent or inconsequential in a single-
auction setting: () what information is revealed in auction 1; () when is information
revealed (timing); and () the impact of revealed information on the beliefs (and
hence strategies) of players in auction 2, and then folding back, the impact on
strategies in auction 1.
3.3.1 Literature Review
There are two main streams of work that are pertinent to our own: () Sequen-
tial auctions and (implicitly) the degree to which the potential to learn over time
strategically impacts bidders’ behavior, and () ROFR within a (single) auction.
Sequential auctions There is a small body of literature that addresses procure-
ment in a setting where bidders compete against each other over time, and hence,
learning can occur. This literature (mostly) focuses on 1-price auctions in a two
period setting. Other key model features — namely, the number of bidders, the val-
uation structure (whether discrete or continuous type space, as well as whether the
valuations are common or private), information disclosure policy (what information
is revealed by the auctioneer between auctions), and finally the form of resulting
equilibrium (separating, semipooling or pooling) — are summarized in Table 1 below.
Within sequential auctions, a key pattern emerges between the information dis-
closure policy and the resulting equilibrium: When the auctions are run under the
all-bid revelation policy, win or lose, the suppliers’ bids are revealed at the end
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of each auction. Hence, bidders have a strong incentive to mask their type and
semi-pooling equilibria generally emerge.2 When the auction is run under a less
informative feedback format (e.g., only the winner is announced, or both the winner
and winning bid are announced), then bidders understand that their information
is only revealed if they win. Consequently, the double-whammy of losing both the
informational advantage and the auction is absent; hence the bidders find it optimal
to reveal their true types in equilibrium, i.e., a separating equilibrium emerges.
In our analysis in this chapter, we find that although only the winning bid and
the winner is disclosed at the end of each auction, the information release within
ROFR can mimic all-bid revelation. Despite that, a separating equilibrium can
emerge which lowers the procurement cost of the buyer.
Chouinard and Yoder (2007) is the only paper (other than our own) which in-
vestigates the role of a ROFR within sequential auctions. They characterize the
set of Nash equilibria in an infinite sequence of auctions. In each auction, there is
one incumbent that enjoys ROFR and one new entrant. If the incumbent wins, he
continues on to the next auction and faces a new entrant. If the entrant wins, he
becomes the incumbent (with ROFR) in the next auction and the current incum-
bent leaves the game. Given new participants in each auction, the game reduces
to a series of independent auctions (with ROFR) in which no learning exists across
auctions. Table 3.1 will show the summary of literature on sequential auctions.
ROFR in a single auction The second stream of papers discuss the effect of
2The one exception to this is Ortega (1968); the separating equilibrium arises due to the presence
of two bidders whose valuations are drawn from continuous distributions.
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granting ROFR within a single-auction framework. Researchers are divided as to
the benefits of offering an ROFR in an auction. For example, Chouiard (2005) and
Bikhchandani et al. (2005) find that granting an ROFR to the preferred supplier
leads to inefficiency in the auction (the lowest cost supplier does not necessarily
win), and that the resulting inefficiency increases the right-holder’s expected profit
at the expense of the auctioneer and other bidders.
Although the impact of an ROFR, when considered in isolation may be detri-
mental to the buyer, its overall impact can change when the initial allocation of the
ROFR is considered. For example, Lee (2008) studies procurement auction where
suppliers have private and asymmetric cost structure. He concludes that, if the
buyer knows the suppliers’ cost distributions and is able to identify which supplier
is associated with which distribution, the buyer may gain by granting the ROFR
to the inefficient supplier (the one with the higher cost distribution). This result
is reminiscent of Myerson (1981) result regarding the optimal use of differential
reserves when facing asymmetric bidders. Other researchers (Burguet and Perry
2005, Choi 2009) have concluded that while granting an ROFR for free will never
benefit the buyer, he may benefit if he sells the ROFR before the auction to the
bidder with the highest willingness to pay. In contrast, we demonstrate that even
without transfer payments or asymmetric supplier cost distributions, the buyer can
be strictly better off awarding an ROFR within sequential auctions settings.
ROFR may also arise implicitly due to corruption between a bidder and an
auctioneer (or his agent); for instance, a corrupt auctioneer may reveal the bid of
a bidder to the dishonest bidder in exchange for a monetary payoff, cf. Porter
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and Shoham (2004), Burguet and Perry (2007) and Arozamena and Weinschelbaum
(2009). However, all these paper consider single auctions with continuous types.
In summary, whereas sequential auctions without ROFR and single-shot auctions
with ROFR are reasonably well-studied, there is no paper that meaningfully analyzes
ROFR within sequential auctions (as noted above, in Chouinard and Yoder (2007)
the sequential auctions reduce to a series of auctions with no learning). Our analysis
in this chapter fills the gap.
3.4 Analysis
We now establish the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria of the entire game by
solving backwards beginning at  = 2. Before we proceed with the formal analysis
we characterize the rather simplistic strategy of the high-cost suppliers (preferred
or non-preferred) in our setting (with or without ROFR).
Lemma 1 The high-cost suppliers bid  in any auction with or without ROFR
and always make zero profit in equilibrium.
The lemma allows us to focus much of the discussion on the strategies and payoffs
of the low-cost suppliers without getting unduly distracted by the high types. Nev-
ertheless, for completeness, all propositions that follow explicitly state the strategies
and payoffs of the high types as well.
3.4.1 Equilibrium at  = 2
In the second auction, a supplier may face a ROFR-auction or a 1-price auction.
At the start of  = 2, suppose the PS believes that with probability 

2 ∈ [0 1] the
NPS has a high cost, and suppose the NPS believes that with probability 2 ∈ [0 1]
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the PS has a high cost.
Proposition 1 delineates the equilibrium for a ROFR-auction at  = 2 thereby
establishing the equilibria at  = 2 under () and (1 ); while
Proposition 2 delineates the equilibrium at  = 2 for a 1-price auction thereby
establishing the equilibria at  = 2 under ( 1) and (1 1). (As we prove,
the equilibria of the second auction are linked to the strategies and outcomes of the
first auction only through the suppliers’ beliefs. Hence, the general, and possibly
asymmetric, belief structure noted above allows us to capture all these feasible equi-
librium paths.) Note that since  = 2 is the terminal period, the results of Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 can be also interpreted as the equilibria of a one-shot ROFR-auction
and a one-shot 1-price auction respectively, and our propositions are written as
such.
Proposition 1 The unique Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of a one-shot ROFR-
auction is:
() The low-cost nonpreferred supplier bids at  −  with → 0 The high-cost
nonpreferred supplier bids at  
() The preferred supplier (of either type) initially bids at   Subsequently,
the low-cost preferred supplier always matches the nonpreferred supplier’s bid; the
high-cost preferred supplier matches the non-preferred supplier’s bid whenever the
non-preferred supplier’s bid equals  
3
3If the nonpreferred supplier’s bid is greater than   which is off the equilibrium path, then
the preferred supplier wins the auction without matching. Moreover, the belief structure plays no
role in the equilibrium outcome and therefore has been suppressed for brevity.
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() The buyer’s expected procurement cost is  
It is a dominant strategy for the preferred supplier to initially bid   For two
reasons: () he can subsequently choose whether to match the nonpreferred supplier’s
bid; and () if the PS indeed matches, initially bidding at  affords the PS the
highest winning margin (as against inadvertently bidding lower than the NPS).
In a single ROFR-auction, the low-cost PS always wins auction 1 by matching
the NPS’s bid — matching nets the PS nonnegative profits, while not matching nets
him 0. On the other hand, a high-cost PS matches NPS’s bid only if the bid equals
 ; matching a bid less than  results in negative profit for the high-cost PS.
Thus, because a low-cost NPS can only win against a high cost PS, the low-cost
NPS bids as close to  as possible, thereby maximizing margins while winning
(with certainty) against a high-cost PS.
It is interesting to note that () the equilibrium of a one-shot ROFR-auction
does not depend on the beliefs, provided that they are strictly bounded above 0 and
below 1; and () the equilibrium is extremely ‘unaggressive’ (i.e. the equilibrium
bids are very high). Neither of these statements are true for a one-shot 1-price




2 are not necessarily equal to 1 (the
beliefs at  = 1) and need not be equal to each other (asymmetric beliefs).
Proposition 2 The unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a single first-price auction
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2 = ) and earn a
profit of 0. The buyer’s procurement cost is  
() For all other cases,




2 ) draws his bid (

2)
from a continuous distribution with a cumulative distribution function
 (2) =
2 − (2 2 )
(1− (2 2 ))2
 2 ∈ [ (2 2 )  )
Moreover, this supplier has an atom at 





2 )− (2 2 )
1− (2 2 )





2 ) draws his bid (

2)
from a continuous distribution whose cumulative distribution function (cdf) is
(2) =
2 − (2 2 )
(1− (2 2 ))2
 2 ∈ [ (2 2 )  )
() a high-cost supplier  bids  (

2 = ).





a high-cost supplier earns an expected profit of 0. The buyer’s expected procurement




2 ) [2− (2 2 )] 
A similar proposition with two bidder types is analyzed in Thomas (1996) for
‘forward’ auctions. We briefly elaborate on the relevant technical details below.





2 = 0). Since beliefs are fulfilled in equilibrium, this results in an
4To be strict, the atom is placed at  −  to prevent ties with the high-cost supplier. Since 
is arbitrary small, we ignore it for simplicity.
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unbridled (Bertrand) price competition which precipitates the equilibrium bids to
the suppliers’ marginal costs of zero (since  = 0), and hence zero procurement
cost for the buyer in auction 2
In a similar vein, in part () of Proposition 2, each supplier believes that the




2 = 1). Thus, the equilibrium bids, and thereby
the buyer’s procurement cost, are polarized to the other extreme at  
In all other cases, at least one supplier is unsure about the cost of the other sup-
plier, i.e., at least one supplier has a posterior belief which is bounded strictly away
from both 0 and 1 (part () of Proposition 2). Whereas a high-cost supplier bids





and  in auction 2.
Not withstanding the different bid distributions of the two low-cost suppliers in
case (), both low-cost suppliers make the same expected profit in equilibrium.





2 ). Hence, it behooves both low-cost PS andNPS to manage
the beliefs in  = 1 so as to keep the maximum belief (i.e., the probability of facing
a high-cost opponent) as high as possible.
To summarize our results from this section, the payoff in (the terminal) auction
at  = 2, which is identical to a one-shot auction, is determined by Proposition 1
for a ROFR-auction or Proposition 2 for a 1-price auction. As we show, the beliefs
at the start of  = 2 are critical to the payoffs in that period, especially when the
buyer does not offer an ROFR (Proposition 2). These beliefs emerge endogenously
from strategies and outcomes in auction 1.
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We now establish the equilibria for the metagame by turning our attention back
to  = 1.
3.4.2 Equilibrium at  = 1
Recall that the buyer is faced with four possible procurement mechanisms: ()
( 1), () (1 ), () (ROFR, ROFR), and () (1 1). To conserve
space, we only focus on cases () and () in the main text; a complete analysis of
cases () and () is available with the authors. As we prove, cases () and ()
are dominated by cases () and ().5 Case () is analyzed in Section 3.4.2.1 whereas
case () is analyzed in Section 3.4.2.2. In both cases, the second (terminal) auction
is devoid of ROFR and run as a standard 1 price, analyzed in Proposition 2.
And, as we prove in Proposition 2, when the second auction is run as 1 price,
the profit in auction 2 is determined by the beliefs going into  = 2. Unless both
beliefs are zero, i.e., unless both suppliers know for sure that the other supplier has
low cost, both low-cost suppliers make non-zero profit in equilibrium. Additionally,
the low-cost suppliers’ profits in auction 2 are increasing in the maximum of the two
beliefs. Hence, a consideration of auction 2 (and hence total profits) while deciding
the strategies in auction 1, in both cases () and ()  boils down to a consideration
of beliefs at the end of auction 1.
5When the terminal auction is run with ROFR, as in cases () and ()  the outcome, detailed
in Proposition 1, is independent of beliefs at the end of auction 1. Hence, the two auctions are
independent of each other despite being sequenced in time. The fact that cases () and () are
dominated by cases () and () underlines the importance of ‘linking’ the two auctions through
learning, a la section ??.
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3.4.2.1 Case (i): ( 1)
Auction 1 with ROFR is a dynamic game of incomplete information. The non-
preferred supplier signals his type to the preferred supplier by his bid, and the
preferred supplier in turn signals his type by matching (or not) the nonpreferred
supplier’s bid6. Strategies forge beliefs; as in typical signaling games, posterior be-
liefs are derived, wherever possible, from equilibrium strategies using Bayes’ rule.
Off-equilibrium beliefs are filtered through the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps
(1987).
The strategy space of the low-cost nonpreferred supplier can be broken into two
disjoint subsets: bid at  (pool with the high type) or bid lower than  (separate
from the high type). Bidding at  is suboptimal from the perspective of auction
1 alone; NPS surely loses auction 1 (as we prove, both types of preferred supplier
match his bid). The advantage emerges in shaping the PS’s beliefs (regarding the
NPS’s cost) which possibly reap reward in auction 2: at a minimum the NPS can
hide is true cost and, at best, erroneously convince PS that he has high cost, i.e.,
he can induce posterior beliefs held by the preferred supplier that range anywhere
between the prior of 1 and 1 depending on equilibrium strategies. In contrast, by
bidding lower than  , NPS unambiguously conveys his low cost to PS (by lemma,
1 high-cost suppliers bid ), precipitating PS’s posterior belief to zero and thereby
6The nonpreferred supplier only observes whether he won the auction or not. For a bid  
by the nonpreferred supplier, he wins the auction if and only if the preferred supplier does not
match. Hence, the nonpreferred supplier can perfectly infer the preferred supplier’s decision to
match or not.
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(possibly) compromising auction 2 payoffs. But on the upside, he surely wins the
first auction when facing a high-cost PS and, unlike in a single auction with ROFR,
he can win the first auction even when facing a low-cost PS.
Consider now the preferred supplier. The strategy space of PS has two elements:
the initial bid and whether to match NPS’s bid. As in a one-shot auction with
ROFR, it is optimal for PS to bid  and avoid inadvertently bidding lower than
NPS. The original bid of  is anticipated by NPS and serves no role in forming
new beliefs or in determining the winner of the first auction. We therefore analyze
the tension inherent in the second decision made by the PS: whether to match the
NPS’s bid.
If NPS bids at   it is a dominant strategy for both types of PS to match
and win auction 1 — even with the most favorable belief induced on NPS by not
matching, the resulting profit in auction 2 is insufficient to compensate the loss of
losing auction 1. In fact, a high-cost PS will only match a bid of  . But the low
type PS may find it profitable to match a bid less than  
A low-cost PS presented with a bid below  faces the following tension: By
matching the bid, he signals himself to be a low type (separating from the high type
who cannot match a bid lower than ) and wins auction 1 However, NPS then
knows that the PS has low cost (NPS’s posterior belief is now zero). Since the NPS
has already signaled his low cost by bidding lower than   both players know their
opponent has low cost; consequently, both get zero profit in auction 2 However,
by not matching (i.e., by pooling with the high type), the low-cost PS loses auction
1 but preserves the uncertainty on his cost: the nonpreferred supplier has no way
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to differentiate whether the preferred supplier could not match since he has a high
cost, or chose not to match. The preferred supplier loses auction 1 but leaves the
possibility of earning profit in auction 2 by maintaining uncertainty on his cost.
The above tensions in the strategies of the two suppliers are resolved in two
different ways depending on the probability 1 of initially drawing a high cost. For
1 ≥ (12) there exists an equilibrium in pure strategy of Proposition 3 — the low-
cost NPS separates from the high type, whereas the low-cost PS pools with the high
type. For 1  (12)  there is no equilibrium in pure strategies for the nonpreferred
supplier. Hence we delineate a mixed strategy equilibrium of Proposition 4, where
the low-cost NPS mixes between pooling and separating whereas the PS continues
with the pooling strategy of Proposition 3. (Since the terminal auction at  = 2
has already been analyzed in Proposition 2, we only delineate the equilibrium at
 = 1 in the propositions below.)
Proposition 3 Under the procurement mechanisms ( 1)  the Perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of auction 1 when 1 ≥ (12) is as follows:
() The low-cost preferred supplier initially bids at  (

1 = ), and he
matches the nonpreferred supplier’s bid iff the nonpreferred supplier’s bid is greater
than 1  The high-cost preferred supplier bids at  (

1 = ) and he matches
the nonpreferred supplier’s bid iff the nonpreferred supplier’s bid equals  
() A low-cost nonpreferred supplier bids 1 (

1 = 1) A high-cost non-
preferred supplier bids at  (

1 = ).
() The posterior belief of the preferred supplier at the end of auction 1 condi-
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tional on the nonpreferred supplier’s bid 1 is:
Pr
n








0 if 1  
1 otherwise
(1)
() The posterior belief of the nonpreferred supplier at the end of auction 1,
conditional on the nonpreferred supplier bid 1 and the preferred supplier’s decision
to match or not, is:
Pr
n
preferred supplier has high cost
¯̄̄





0 if 1   and the preferred supplier matches
1 if 





() The expected total profit over both auctions 1 and 2:
() for a low-cost preferred supplier is 1 (3− 1)
() for a low-cost nonpreferred supplier is 21
() for a high-cost supplier (preferred or nonpreferred ) is 0
() The expected total procurement cost for the buyer is: 1[2+(1−1)(3−1)]
When 1 ≥ (12)  the low-cost NPS separates out by bidding 1 ( )  Any
bid weakly lower than 1 is laced with poison for the low-cost PS: if PS matches,
he wins auction 1 at a low profit (equal to NPS’s low bid of less than (or equal to)
1) while making zero profit in the second auction (both suppliers would know
that the other has low cost) By not matching, the low-cost PS loses auction 1, but
cloaks his true cost. Not matching dominates matching7 for any bid (weakly) less
than 1 .
7The total expected payoff for the low-cost preferred supplier of not matching is: 1(+)+
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The separating strategy of a low-cost NPS can be sustained when 1 is relatively
large — implying that the bid that deters a low-cost PS from matching allows the
NPS to accrue modest profits. The certainty of winning auction 1 at a relatively
high bid and the possibility of still earning profit in the second auction renders the
separating strategy more profitable for NPS than pooling at  
Nonetheless, the separating strategy comes at a cost to a low-cost NPS and, not
surprisingly, he earns a lower expected profit than a low-cost PS. Because the NPS
types play a separating equilibrium in auction 1, the PS can detect a high-cost NPS
when he sees a bid of  (equation 1). The low-type PS milks this information
and accrues a winning margin of  in both auctions against the high-type NPS.
In contrast, NPS is locked into a lower bid of 1 in auction 1 even against a
high-cost PS. Furthermore, since both PS types play a pooling strategy (i.e., both
high and low types have the same strategy of not matching a bid less than ),
the NPS cannot distinguish PS’s true type going into auction 2; the low-cost NPS
bids significantly less than  at  = 2 (in expectation, as per proposition 2), thus
sacrificing margins yet again against a high-cost opponent.
(1 − 1)(0 + 1) The first term is the probability of facing a high-cost nonpreferred supplier
multiplied by the winning margin of  in each auction. The second term is the probability of
facing the low-cost nonpreferred supplier, in which case the low-cost preferred supplier nets 0 in
auction 1 and 1 in auction 2 as per Proposition 2 (the posterior belief of the preferred supplier
is 0, while that of the nonpreferred supplier is 1) In contrast, the expected payoff of matching
for the low-cost preferred supplier is: 1( + ) + (1− 1)(1 + 0) where 1 is the low-cost
nonpreferred supplier’s bid in auction 1. Clearly, the payoff of not matching is (weakly) higher
than that of matching for 1 ≤ 1 
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As 1 decreases, the separating bid of 1 decreases, thereby lowering the non-





 the equilibrium breaks down. There is no pure strategy equilibrium for
1  (12) and, as the next proposition proves, the NPS mixes between bidding at
1 and bidding at  
Proposition 4 Under the procurement mechanisms ( 1)  the Perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of auction 1 when 1  (12) is as follows:
() The low-cost preferred supplier initially bids at  (

1 = ), and he
matches the nonpreferred supplier’s bid iff the nonpreferred supplier’s bid is greater
than 1  The high-cost preferred supplier bids at  (

1 = ) and he matches
the non-preferred supplier’s bid iff the nonpreferred supplier’s bid equals  
() The low-cost nonpreferred supplier plays a mixed strategy — he bids  (

1 =
) with probability  and he bids 1 (





2 (1− 1) ∈ [0 1]∀1 
1
2
Moreover, 1  0
() The posterior belief of the preferred supplier at the end of auction 1 condi-
tional on the nonpreferred supplier’s bid 1 is:
Pr
n








0 if 1  
1
1 + (1− 1) = 21 otherwise
(3)
() The posterior belief of the nonpreferred supplier at the end of auction 1,
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conditional on the nonpreferred supplier bid 1 and the preferred supplier’s decision
to matched or not, is:
Pr
n
preferred supplier has high cost
¯̄̄





0 if 1   and the preferred supplier matches
1 if 





() The expected total profit over both auctions 1 and 2:
() for a low-cost preferred supplier is
(1 + 31)
2
() for a low-cost non-preferred supplier is 21
() for a high-cost supplier (preferred or non-preferred ) is 0
() The expected total procurement cost for the buyer is:
(1 + 1 (7− 51))
2
When 1  (12), the small total profit earned in auction 1 by a low-cost NPS
through the pure strategy of Proposition 3 unglues that equilibrium. Since a pure
strategy of bidding higher than 1 does not work either, the low-cost NPS mixes
between bidding at 1 and   The PS matches the opponent’s bid at  but
not the bid at 1  i.e., the low-cost PS plays the pooling strategy of Proposition
3. If the NPS bids at 1 he wins the first auction. If he bids at  he loses
the first auction, but increases the posterior belief of the PS above 1 (to 21 by
equation 3), just enough to make the NPS indifferent between bidding at 1 and
 
3.4.2.2 Case () : (1 1)
When the buyer does not offer an ROFR in auction 1, she runs both sequential
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auctions as 1-price where, in each auction, the lowest submitted bid is declared
the winner.
Define 2 ∈ [0 1] to be the winner’s belief that his opponent is a high type
at the conclusion of auction 1; 2 ∈ [0 1] to be the loser’s belief that the win-
ner is a high type at the conclusion of auction 1, and 1 to be bid of bidder
 ∈ {() ()} of cost-type  ∈ {} in auction 1. Note that the
characterization of the equilibrium in auction 2 is identical to that identified in
Proposition 2, although the notation on beliefs is different (consistent with the
present context of winner and loser in auction 1). Hence, we focus our discussion to
equilibrium bidding strategies in auction 1 in Proposition 5 below. (Thomas 1996
presents a similar analysis for forward auctions but only with 1 = 12)
Proposition 5 In a sequential auction where both auctions 1 and 2 are run as
standard 1 price, (1 1)  the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of auction 1 is
as follows:
1. () A low-cost supplier draws his bid (1) from a unique and continuous cu-
mulative distribution function  () with support [1(1 − ln(1))  ) and
no mass point (atoms) in its domain.
() A high-cost supplier bids  (

1 = ).
() The posterior belief of the winning supplier at the end of the auction 1






1 + (1− 1)(1)




() The posterior belief of the losing supplier at the end of the auction 1





0 if 1  
1 otherwise
(6)
() The expected total profit over both auctions:
() for a low-cost supplier is 1(2− ln(1))
() for a high-cost supplier is 0
() The expected total procurement cost for the buyer is: 21[2 − 1 − (1 −
1) ln(1)]
We are unable to find the closed-form solution for the equilibrium bids 1 and
1. We are, however, able to characterize the support of the bidding strategies
as well as the suppliers’ and the buyer’s expected profits and costs. Given the
symmetry of bidders at the start of auction 1 and in the absence of ROFR (or any
such asymmetries), we focus on a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for auction
1 of (1 1) — there does not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies.
The low-cost suppliers bid strictly less than   i.e., the suppliers play a sep-
arating equilibrium. Because the only information revealed is the winning bid at
the end of auction 1, even with two low-cost suppliers competing and playing a
separating equilibrium, both posterior beliefs do not precipitate to zero.
Notice also that whereas the upper bound of support for a low-cost supplier’s bid
is the same as that of a one-shot 1-price auction of Proposition 2, the lower bound
of support, 1(1− ln(1))  is greater than 1 of Proposition 2, the implications
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of which follow. (When beliefs are symmetric at 1, as in auction 1 above, the lower
bound of the support for the mixed strategy equilibrium in Proposition 2 converges
to 1 )
3.5 Information Flows: ROFR vs. 1 price
As noted earlier in Section 3.3, the key to understanding the use of ROFR in
sequential auctions is to isolate the information flow (‘what’ and ‘when’) and its
associated impact on auction 1 strategies.
Recall that in (1 1), the information on the identity of the winner and the
winning bid is only released at the end of auction 1, after the transactions of auction
1 are complete. In contrast, in ( 1), the same information is released earlier
within auction 1 itself.8 Hence, whereas the ‘what’ part of information flows are
identical across the two settings, the timing and the impact of information differs.
We start with the third element of information flows: their impact on the myopic
auction 1 strategies.
3.5.1 Impact of Information Flows on Myopic Strategies
An obvious and natural way of teasing the impact of information flows on myopic
strategies is to contrast the single auction outcome with the outcome in the first of
the two sequential auctions, which is accomplished in Corollaries 1 and 2 below.
8Since the preferred supplier initially bids at   revealing the nonpreferred supplier’s bid to
the preferred supplier is akin to announcing the current winning bid and the winner. Moreover,
note that the information revealed between auctions in ( 1) is useless since: () it can be
perfectly anticipated by the suppliers, and () it serves no role in forging beliefs (which are entirely
driven by the information released during auction 1).
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Corollary 1 Compared to ( ∅), a low-cost nonpreferred supplier bids more
aggressively, i.e., has a lower (expected) bid in equilibrium, in auction 1 of ( 1).
Existing literature (cf. Bhikchandani et al 2005, Chouiard 2005) highlights
nonaggressive bidding by NPS as a key reason for an increase in the buyer’s pro-
curement cost in a single ROFR-auction. We corroborate their finding in our single-
auction model, while, at the same time, refute this finding in the context of sequential
auctions. When compared to a single ROFR-auction, the presence of a future auc-
tion induces a low-cost NPS to always bids more aggressively when 1 ≥ (12) and
sometimes more aggressively, but certainly not less aggressively, when 1  (12) 
The genesis of such aggression is the lure of auction 2 profits for both suppliers (for
which at least one-sided uncertainty on costs must be preserved when bidding in
auction 2), as well as a (relatively more) unfettered strategic interaction between
the suppliers that unfolds in a sequential auction.
The NPS knows that the dice is loaded in favor of the PS who can see the NPS’s
bid and can accordingly revise his own. A one-shot auction snuffs out strategic
interactions prematurely — for instance, the strategic implications of matching (or
not) by the PS are rendered moot in a one-shot auction — denying the NPS an op-
portunity to neutralize the advantage enjoyed by the PS. However, in the sequential
auction setting, the PS’s decision to match or not has strategic implications through
beliefs induced for auction 2. In specific, the lure of the second-auction profit weak-
ens the PS’s myopic incentive to always win auction 1 by matching the NPS’s bid.
This weakness is cleverly exploited by the low-cost NPS in a sequential setting, who,
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by submitting a low bid at  = 1, reveals his type and entrusts the onus of sus-
taining uncertainty over cost in  = 2 onto the PS. In effect, by submitting a low
bid the NPS makes it unattractive for PS to match (and reveal his type) thereby
blunting his advantage. Such attempts at leveling the playing field comes at a cost
for NPS in the form of smaller spoils of winning the first auction due to a low bid,
but, nonetheless, is more profitable than simply ‘giving up’ as in the single auction
setting.
It is similarly useful to contrast the first of the sequential auctions, (1 1) 
with the corresponding one-shot auction (1 ∅), whose equilibrium is captured in









2 = 1 we find,
Corollary 2 Compared to a single auction, (1 ∅), the low-cost suppliers bid less
aggressively in the first auction of two sequential (1 1) auctions.
Consider first the single auction (1 ∅) setting. The equilibrium strategy is
mixed, which implies that the suppliers are indifferent toward any bid in the support
— each such bid nets them the same expected profit. There are two forces that
support the mixed strategy equilibrium and hence the indifference. First, the higher
the winning bid, the higher the margin, which, ceteris paribus, favors a higher bid.
However, a countervailing second force comes in play. The higher the bid, the lower
the probability of winning. These two tensions fuse to support the mixed strategy
equilibrium.
Now consider the first auction in the sequential (1 1) auction setting. The
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second auction, disturbs the fine balance of the single-auction equilibrium. Since
the winning bid is revealed after the first auction (which forges posterior beliefs for
both suppliers), a third factor comes into play: the higher the winning bid, the
higher the beliefs9, and hence the higher the profit in the second auction (as before,
the profit in the second auction increases in the maximum of the suppliers’ beliefs).
The third factor upsets the finely-tuned balance of the single auction equilibrium —
specifically, whereas a supplier was earlier indifferent between a bid 1 +  and
1 in the support, he now prefers 1+ to 1 due to increased total profits.
Since, ceteris paribus, bidding less aggressively in auction 1 of (1 1) improves
total expected profits, the equilibrium bid in auction 1 of (1 1) is tweaked to a
(relatively) nonaggressive one as compared to the equilibrium bid of a single auction
(1 ∅).
3.5.2 The Timing of Information Flows: ( 1) vs. (1 1)
A stark contrast emerges when we compare Corollaries 1 and 2. The suppli-
ers bid more aggressively in auction 1 of ( 1) compared to ( ∅) —
Corollary 1. In contrast, the suppliers bid less aggressively in auction 1 of (1 1)
compared to (1 ∅) — Corollary 2. Hence, a 1-price when juxtaposed after a
ROFR auction induces aggressive bidding compared to the corresponding one-shot
equilibrium; but when juxtaposed after a 1-price auction weakens the aggression
9For example, if a supplier wins at the lowest bound of the mixed strategy support, the posterior
belief that he assigns to the opponent beinng a high cost is just the priors 1 However, at the
extreme, if a supplier wins at a bid of  −  he is convinced with probability 1 that his opponent
has a high cost.
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in the corresponding one-shot equilibrium. A critical driver of the above differences
between ( 1) and (1 1) is the timing of information released: whereas
information on the winner and the winning bid is revealed in-between auctions in
(1 1)  the same information is released within auction 1 itself in ( 1)  see
footnote 8. Such early release of information exacerbates the strategic interactions
between the suppliers implicit in auction 1 with ROFR.
Recall that only with some residual uncertainty over opponents types can either
(low-cost) supplier earn a positive expected profit in  = 2. This uncertainty
‘comes for free’ under (1 1) — under no circumstances are both posterior beliefs
zero (refer to the discussion below Proposition 5). In contrast,the early release of
information in ROFR, while conferring an advantage to the preferred supplier who
can exploit this information to revise his initial bid, also has the potential to unveil
the suppliers’ costs possibly precipitating both posterior beliefs to zero. Hence, (at
least) one sided uncertainty on costs must be endogenously generated in ROFR, as
noted in Section 3.5.1 which is costly for the suppliers. the suppliers’ cost is the
buyer’s gain.
Indeed, as Figure 3.1 demonstrates, the buyer enjoys lower procurement cost
(for the most part as long as 1 is not too high or too low) under ( 1
)
than under (1 1) The figure shows the buyer’s total procurement cost on the
vertical axis and the prior probability of drawing a high cost, 1 on the horizontal
axis. For most value of 1 except when 1 is very small, ( 1
) results in a
lower procurement cost for the buyer as compared to (1 1)  The reason can be
attributed to the aggressive bidding by the nonpreferred supplier in the first auction
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of ( 1)  (When 1 is very small, the mixed strategy equilibrium in the first
auction of ( 1) puts increasingly more weight on the nonpreferred supplier
bidding at the upperbound of   which raises the buyer’s procurement cost. Also,
our analysis for ROFR breaks down when 1 = 0)
In summary, two factors collude together to create the aggression in the ROFR-
auction in the sequential ( 1) setting: () the looming second auction; and
() the early release of information hardwired into the ROFR mechanism itself. The
first factor allows for a more elaborate window of time for the suppliers to strategi-
cally exploit the information revealed in auction 1, which differentiates ( 1)
from ( ∅) ; whereas the second factor fuels a more intense strategic-crossfire
between suppliers in the first auction of the sequential ROFR setting — the key
differentiator of ( 1) and (1 1) 
3.6 Concluding Remarks
The Right-of-First-Refusal is a popular, yet simple, mechanism to decouple price
discovery and allocation in auctions. A theoretical understanding of ROFR has been
restricted to (single) one-shot auctions, and the prognosis is bleak for the buyer in
procurement settings: the consensus, more or less, is that ROFR raises the buyer’s
(direct) procurement cost in one-shot auctions. Our work in this chapter takes
important first steps towards understanding ROFR in the context of sequential
(or repeated) auctions, where suppliers’ strategies anticipate, exploit and manage
information flows within and across auctions. (In contrast, such information flows
are snuffed out prematurely by a single auction.) We show that the richer strategic
interactions in sequential auctions with ROFR, specifically the need to strategically
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manage information flows, leads to more aggressive bidding by the nonpreferred
supplier, which lowers the buyer’s procurement cost.
It is worth noting that the objective of our work in this chapter is not to propose
an optimal mechanism for running sequential auctions or, indeed, to even contrast
with one if one were known. The leitmotif of the paper is to spotlight the impact
of information flows within and across sequential auctions with ROFR, and to show
that ROFR can generate lower expected procurement cost for the buyer as compared
to other sequential auction settings commonly seen in practice, such as (1 1).
Our stylized and parsimonious model of sequential auctions relies on several as-
sumptions but at the very core, our model of sequential auctions with a small pool
of suppliers competing over time captures several practical procurement contexts in
industries such as automotive, aircraft manufacturing, military and defense, cf. Li
(2012); or the procurement paradigm of Japanese manufacturers which encourage a
small pool of suppliers, cf. Dyer (1996). But whether firms actually follow the fairly
sophisticated equilibrium predictions remains to be tested empirically. (It is worth
noting that Cason et al. (2011) experimentally demonstrate that subjects indeed fol-
low the essentials of the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, such as deceiving their
opponents by strategically manipulating beliefs, in sequential procurement auctions
without ROFR; this suggests that some of our results may hold in an experimental
setting.) However, there should be little doubt that our work develops and en-
hances our understanding of the role of ROFR in precipitating an earlier release
of information and the possibility of exploiting and managing this information for
potential gains, above and beyond the qualitative benefits that are associated with
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ROFR. In essence, we show that analyzing information flows and strategies together
is indispensable for understanding ROFR within the context of sequential auctions.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Tabe 3.1 Summary of literature on sequential auctions
Figure 3.1 Buyers total expected procurement cost across both auctions
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3.8 Appendix
In this section, proofs of all the various lemmas, propositions and corollaries in
Chapter 3 are presented.
[Although for expositional clarity we dropped  in the main paper (since  is
arbitrary small), to validate the robustness of our results we explicitly account for 
in our all our proofs in the Appendix. In specific, the lowerbound and upperbound
of the support of the mixed strategy profile of the low-cost suppliers in a single-





2 ) ( − ) and  −  Hence, the equilibrium profit of the low-cost
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Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose the high-cost supplier bids    in equilibrium But the equilib-
rium breaks down since the opponent can bid  (→ 0) lower and win the auction
for sure. Repetitive application of this argument implies that a high-cost suppliers
will bid  (equal to their costs) in any auction (with or without ROFR), and this
nets them 0 profit in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. A low-cost NPS faces two bidding situations: A bid greater than (or equal)
to  can and will be (profitably) matched by both types of PS, and render the NPS
zero profit. Conversely, any bid less than  will be matched only by a low-cost PS
(since the high-cost PS nets negative profit by doing so). Thus, the low-cost NPS
only wins against a high-cost PS by bidding less than  . To maximize his profit,
the low-cost NPS bids  −  (→ 0) to secure his most profitable and certain win
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against a high-cost PS. The buyer thus incurs a procurement cost of  (or −).
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proof for this proposition follows the logic of Proposition 1 derived for
a forward auction in Thomas (1996), and hence is not restated here.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider an equilibrium where a low-cost NPS separates from the high type
by bidding strictly lower than  (

1  ) in auction 1 (separating equilibrium).
If a low-cost PS matches this bid, the low-cost NPS nets 0 profit in auction 1 as well
as 0 profit in auction 2 as per Proposition 2. On the other hand, a low-cost PS who
matches the bid of 1   will only gain 

1 in auction 1 while making 0 profit
in auction 2.
In contrast, if a low-cost PS does not match 1   , the low-cost NPS will
now win and receive his bid (1) as a payment in auction 1. Moreover, he will
net 1( − ) in auction 2 from Proposition 2 since the low-cost PS hides his cost
by not matching (2 = 1, 

2 = 0). Unlike the previous case, the low-cost NPS
will make the total expected profit of 1+ 1( − ). Note that the low-cost PS
who declines to match and ”let go” of the auction 1 will only make the profit of
1( − ) in auction 2 (2 = 1, 2 = 0).
Certainly, a low-cost NPS with the bid of 1   prefers the latter case in
which the low-cost PS decides to not match. To induce not matching by the PS,
the low-cost NPS must bid low enough in auction 1. As the low-cost PS only nets
1 in total by matching and 1( − ) by not matching, the low-cost NPS can
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achieve this by bidding 1 in auction 1 which is (weakly) lower than 1( − )
to maximize profits As a result, the low-cost NPS will make the total expected
profit of 21( − ): he makes 1( − ) auction 1 and 1( − ) in auction 2 of
( 1). The low-cost PS will net 0 in auction 1 and 1( − ) in auction 2
when he faces a low-cost NPS.
Since the low-cost NPS play a separating strategy in auction 1, if PS observes
the bid of  in auction 1, he immediately infers that 

2 = 1. In this situation, the
low-cost PS not only earns  in auction 1 by matching, he also obtains  −  in
auction 2 as per Proposition 2 (2 = 1, 

2 = 1). We summarize the total expected
profit each low-cost supplier for this separating equilibrium as following:


(1) = (1− 1)[0 + 1( − )] + 1( +  − ) = (1− 1)1( − ) + 1(2 − )(7
(1) = 21( − )
The last step for our proof is to check for deviations. It is straightforward to
check that deviations for the low-type PS are not profitable (i.e., matching bids
lower than 1 ( − ) and not matching bids greater than 1 ( − )) For the
low-cost NPS the only (possibly) profitable deviation is to bid  in auction 1 and
erroneously convince the PS of his high cost. Suppose that a low-cost NPS were
to deviate from the proposed strategies and bid  in auction 1, behaving as if he
were a high-cost NPS. The low-cost PS would update his beliefs to 

2 = 1, assuming
that his opponent must have high cost. Thus, he will bid always at  −  in
auction 2 from Proposition 2 (2 = 1, 

2 = 1). The low-cost NPS can then win
in auction 2 by bidding very close to the bid of low-cost PS which is  −  By
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comparing the potential profit from deviating (−) and the payoff from bidding at
1 = 1(− ) for low-cost NPS (Equation 7), we conclude that when 1 ≥ (12) 
the proposed equilibrium holds and bidding at 1 = 1( − ) is optimal.
To calculate the total procurement cost of the buyer in ( 1), we extract
the total expected surplus and the cost of each winner across two auctions under
different possibilities of having cost types for the suppliers.
There are four cases (denoted by  = 1 2 3 4). For ( = 1) both suppliers are
low-cost, for ( = 2) there is a low-cost PS and a high-cost NPS, for ( = 3) there
is a high-cost PS and a low-cost NPS and for ( = 4) both suppliers are high-cost.




Pr (possibility )×[winners’ expected profit + winners’ expected cost]
We expressed the expected profit of both low-cost PS and NPS in equation 7. If
there exists at least one low-cost supplier in each auction, the winner is the low-cost
supplier. The only situation where the winner is a high-cost supplier is when both
suppliers are high-cost. Inserting the derived supplier profits expressions, associated
probabilities and costs, we find that the buyer’s total expected costs (as  → 0) is
given by,
(1) = 1[2 + (1− 1)(3− 1)]
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The proposed separating equilibrium in auction 1 cannot hold when 1 
(12). We find that there does not exist a pure strategy equilibrium of 1 =
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1( − ) in auction 1 so that a low-cost NPS mixes between bidding at 1  
and 1 =  . Similar to our discussion in proof for Proposition 3, if a low-cost
NPS decides to bid strictly lower than   he should bid at 

1 = 1( − )
We consider a mixed strategy, where a low-cost NPS bids at  with a positive
probability of  while he bids at 1( − ) with the probability of (1 − ). Note
that similar to Proposition 3, the low-cost PS never matches the opponent’s bid at
1( − ) On the other hand, PS (low/high-cost) always matches the bid of 
in auction 1.
The beliefs are derived from equilibrium strategies and Bayes’ Rule. Hence, the





However, any bid less than  by the NPS precipitates the posterior belief of PS
to 0. On the other hand, since any PS matches the bid of  in auction 1 the
posterior belief of NPS when he bids at  in auction 1 is 

2 = 1.
To satisfy the indifference property of a mixing strategy, the low-cost NPS faces
a following trade-off. His total expected profit from bidding at 1(−) must equal
his total expected profit from bidding at  . We know from Proposition 3, the
former payoff is 21( − ) (see Equation 7). However, when a low-cost NPS bids
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(1) = 21( − ) =
1
1 + (1− 1) ( − ) (8)
⇒  = 1− 21
2 (1− 1) (9)
It is easy to see when 0  1  (12) we have  ∈ [0 1] such that 1  0.
The low-cost NPS nets the same payoff as he does in Proposition 3 of (21(− )).
On the other hand, the profit function of a low-cost PS has two parts. As we
demonstrate in Equation 10 (the first term), upon seeing the opponent’s bid at
1(−) with the probability of (1−1)(1−) a low-cost PS only nets 1(−)
in auction 2 (since he never matches in auction 1). Moreover, as we see in the
second term of Equation 10, if the low-cost PS is leaked the bid of 1 =  in












auction 2, we can conclude:


(1) = (1− 1)(1− )1( − ) + [1 + (1− 1)][ +
1






( − ) + 
2
We derive the total procurement cost of the buyer from the total expected surplus
of the winners (from Equation 10 and 8) as well as their costs across two auctions
for different possibilities of cost types.
The only difference between calculating the buyer’s procurement cost in Propo-
sition 4 and 3 is that due to the mixed strategy of a low-cost NPS in auction 1 the
winner of the first auction may now become a high-cost PS with the cost of  if
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there exists a high-cost PS and a low-cost NPS who bids at  in auction 1 (w.p of
). In all remaining cases, if there is at least a low-cost supplier, we always have a
low-cost winner (PS/NPS) with no cost. This yields to:
(1) = (1− 1)2 × [21( − ) + 31
2
( − ) + 1
2
 ] + 2
2
1
+(1− 1)1 × [31
2
( − ) + 1
2
 ] + 1(1− 1)× [21( − ) +  ]
By further simplification and when  → 0, the final term for (1) will
become:
(1) =
(1 + 1 (7− 51))
2
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. We generalize the proof of Proposition 1 in Thomas (1996) which was stated
for 1 = 12
Consistent with Thomas (1996), we focus on a symmetric equilibrium where
both the low-cost suppliers in auction 1 follow a strictly continuous mixed bidding
strategy. There cannot exist an equilibrium in pure strategy in auction 1 of (1 1)
Suppose there does. Then for a low-cost supplier () who bids at 1, the other low-
cost supplier (−) can bid at −1 = 1− (→ 0) and win the auction with certainty.
Thus price competition will precipitate the equilibrium bids in auction 1 to 0 which
is not desirable for any low-cost supplier. That necessitates both low-cost suppliers
to play mixed strategies in equilibrium of auction 1 of (1 1) One can invoke
similar argument to rule out atoms in the support of the mixed strategy profile for
low-cost suppliers.
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Low-cost suppliers always bid strictly lower than  in auction 1 of (1
 1)
to avoid ties with high-cost opponents. Moreover, since only the winning bid is
announced in auction 1, the low-cost suppliers have no incentive to bid at  in
auction 1 to hide their cost types. Thus, upperbound support of mixed strategy of
the low-cost suppliers in auction 1 of (1 1) is  − 
Now suppose that each low-cost supplier (1 or 2) draws his bids (

1 ∈ [∗1 −
]  ∈ (1 2)) in auction 1 from a cumulative density function like (). Without
loss of generality, we can write down the expected profit of the low-cost supplier 2
in (1 1) as following:
2(11)(
2
1) = [1 + (1− 1) Pr(21  11)][21 +max(2  2)( − )] +(11)
(1− 1) Pr(21  11)[(max(2  2))( − )]
In Equation 11, the first term is the expected profit 2 nets if he wins auction
1 Upon winning, he is paid his bid of 21 in auction 1 while in auction 2 his payoff
is max(2  

2)( − ) or 2 ( − ). (The loser of auction 1 who sees a wining
bid which is strictly lower than , can infer 

2 = 0) Note that the formation of 

2
depends on the winning bid in auction 1 Hence, the low-cost supplier 2 (winner)
will now update his posterior belief according to the Bayes’ rule conditional on his
winning bid (21) as following:
2 =
1
1 + (1− 1)(21)
(12)
It is easy to see if 21 turns out to be the winning bid, the winner can infer that
the losing opponent has low cost with the probability of (1− 1)(21) On the
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other hand, the second term in Equation 11 is the expected profit of the low-cost
2 if he loses in auction 1 While he gains no profit in auction 1, there still exists
one-sided asymmetry from the winner’s perspective (the low-cost 1) in auction 2
(max(2  

2)  0). This brings a positive expected profit into the auction 2 which
is again 2 ( − ) with 2 = 11+(1−1)(11) .
As we can see the expected profit of the low-cost 2 (loser) in auction 2 will now
depend on the winning bid (11) as well as the mixed strategy of () in auction
1. Since this winning bid is not known prior to the auction 1, in forming his profit
function when bids at 21, the low-cost 2 should take expectations regarding the
winning bid to determine his expected future profit in auction 2. This expectation
is taken conditional on all possible winning bid which is between the lowerbound
(∗1) and the losing bid of 
2
1 in auction 2. Rewriting Equation 11 results in:
2(11)(
2
1) = [1 + (1− 1)(21)][21 +
1( − )




1 + (1− 1)(11)
)( − )]
The last step to find out 2(11)(
2




that in Equation 13 (the second term), the losing bid is 21. Thus, the probability
distribution of the winning bid given the losing bid (21) simply equals the proba-
bility density function of the mixing bidding strategy () given the winning bid is


























Equation 13 and 14 yields to:
2(11)(
2
1) = [1+(1−1)(21)]21+1(−)−1 ln(1+(1− 1)(21))(−)
(15)
Due to the nature of the mixed bidding strategy in auction 1, we are not able to
find the closed-form solution for the equilibrium bidding strategy from Equation 15.
We are, however, able to characterize the support of the bidding strategies which is
sufficient to discover the profit function of each low-cost supplier in (1 1) From
Equation 15, a low-cost supplier makes the following total expected profit by bidding





1 + 1( − ) (16)
Furthermore, he also makes the following total expected profit by bidding at the
upperbound ( − ) in auction 1
(11)( − ) = 21( − )− 1 ln(1)( − ) (17)
Both low-cost suppliers should be indifferent across all strategies they mix over
including ∗1 and  −  From Equation 16 and 17 we can first conclude ∗1 =
1(1− ln(1))( − ) in auction 1 of (1 1) and the following:
(11)(

1) = 1(2− ln(1))( − ) 1 ∈ [∗1  − ] (18)
Similar to how we extracted the total procurement cost of the buyer for different
possibilities of cost types for Proposition 3 and 4, we use the expected profit of
low-cost suppliers in (1 1) Again, if there exists at least one low-cost supplier in
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each auction, the winner is low-cost with a positive expected profit (Equation 18)
and zero cost. Finally, only if the buyer faces two high-cost suppliers, the winner is
exposed to the cost of  in each auction.
(11) = (1− 1)2 × [21(2− ln(1))( − )] + (1− 1)1 × [1(2− ln(1))( − )[
+1(1− 1)× [1(2− ln(1))( − )] + 221
(11) = 21(1− 1)(2− ln(1))( − ) + 221
By further simplification and when → 0, the final term for (11) becomes:
(11) = 21[2− 1 − (1− 1) ln(1)]
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Consider two cases:
Case () 1 ≥ (12)  The low-cost NPS always bids at 1( − ) in auction 1 of
( 1) This is strictly lower than  − , the equilibrium bid in a one-shot
auction.
Case () 1  (12) The low-cost NPS bids 1( − ) with the probability of
(1− ) = 1
2(1−1) and bids at  with the probability of  =
1−21
2(1−1) in auction 1 of









2(1− 1)   −  (19)
Proof for Corollary 2
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Proof. First of all, it is easy to see the lowerbound support for the mixed strategy
profile for low-cost suppliers in (1 ), which is 1( − ), is smaller than the
lowerbound support in auction 1 of (1 1) which is 1(1− ln(1))( − )
We now prove that the bid distribution (()) for a low-cost supplier in auction 1
of (1 1) stochastically dominates the bid distribution ( ()) for a low-cost supplier
in (1 ) That is, we need to show (1)   (

1) when 1(1− ln(1))( − ) 
1  ( − ) (Since the lowerbound support for  () is smaller the lowerbound
support for () we only check this dominance across the domain of ())
Since in (1 ) Proposition 2, 2 = 









→ 0 This leads to:
 (1)(1− 1)1 = 1[( − )− 1] (20)
In (1 1) from the RHS of 15 and from the fact that low-cost suppliers make
the expected profit of 1(2− ln(1))( − ) in (1 1), we obtain:
1[ln(1+(1−1)(1))− ln(1)](−) = −1[(−)−1]+(1−1)(1)1
(21)
Since the LHS of Equation 21 is always positive for all 0  1  1, the RHS of
this Equation must be positive as well. Thus:
(1− 1)(1)1  1[( − )− 1] (22)
Equation 20 and 22 yields:
(1− 1)(1)1   (1)(1− 1)1 (23)
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⇒ (1)   (1)
159
Bibliography
[1] Adaval, R., Monroe, K. B. 2002. Automatic Construction and Use of Con-
textual Information for Product and Price Evaluations. Journal of Consumer
Research, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 572-588.
[2] Amemiya, T. 1985. Advanced Econometrics. Harvard University Press.
[3] Anand, K. S., M. Goyal. 2009. Strategic Information Management Under Leak-
age in a Supply Chain. Management Science, Vol. 55, No. 7, pp 438-452.
[4] Anwar, S., McMillan, R., Zheng, M. 2006. Bidding Behavior in Competing
Auctions: Evidence from eBay. European Economic Review, Vol. 50, pp. 307-
322.
[5] Ariely, D., Simonson, I. 2003. Buying, Bidding, Playing or Competing? Value
Assessment and Decision Dynamics in Online Auctions. Journal of Consumer
Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 1/2, pp. 113-123.
[6] Bajari, P., Hortacsu, A. 2003. The Winner’s Curse, Reserve Prices, and En-
dogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions. Rand Journal of
Economics, Vol. 34, Part. 2, pp. 329-355.
[7] Bapna, R., Goes, P., Gupta, A., Jin, Y. 2004. User Heterogeneity and its Im-
pact on Electronic Auction Market Design: An Empirical Exploration. Man-
agement Information Systems Quarterly, Vol. 28, Part. 1, pp. 21-44.
[8] Bapna, R., Jank, W., Shmueli, G. 2008. Price formation and its dynamics in
online auctions. Decision Support Systems, Vol. 44, Issue. 3, pp. 641-656.
[9] Bapna, R., Chang, S. A., Goes, P., Gupta, A. 2009. Overlapping online Auc-
tions: Empirical Characterization of Bidder Strategies and Auction Prices.
Management Information Systems Quarterly, Vol. 22, part. 4, pp. 763-784.
[10] Belsley, D. A., Kuh, E., Welsch, R. E. 1980. Regression Diagnostics: Identify-
ing Influential Data and Sources of Collinearity. Wiley, New York.
[11] Bruno, H. A., Che, S., Dutta, S. 2012. Role of Reference Price on Price and
Quantity: Insights from B2B Markets. Working paper, January 2012, IN-
SEAD.
[12] Bikhchandani, S., S. A. Lippman, R. Ryan. 2005. On the Right of First Re-
fusal. Advances in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 4.
160
[13] Brint, A. 2003. Investigating Buyer and Seller Strategies in Online Auctions.
Journal of Operational Research Society, Vol. 54., pp. 1177-1188.
[14] Burguet, R., M. Perry. 2005. Preferred Suppliers and Vertical Integration in
Auction Markets. Mimeo. Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Rutgers
University.
[15] Burnett, W. B., W. E. Kovacic. 1989. Reform of United States Weapons Ac-
quisition Policy: Competitions, Teaming Agreement, and Dual-Sourcing. Yale
Journal of Regulation, Vol. 6, pp. 249-317.
[16] Cai, G., P. R. Wurman, X. Chao. 2007. The Non-Existence of Equilibrium in
Sequential Auctions when Bids are Revealed. Journal of Electronic Commerce
Research, Vol. 8(2), pp. 141-156.
[17] Cason, T. N., Kannan, K. N., Siebert, R. 2011. An Experimental Study of
Information Revelation Policies in Sequential Auctions. Management Science,
Vol. 57(4), pp. 667-688.
[18] Chan, T. Y., Kadiyali, V., Park, Y. 2007. Willingness to Pay and Competition
in Online Auctions. Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 44(2), pp. 324-356.
[19] Che, Y. K., Gale, I. 1998. Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained
Bidders. Review of Economics Studies. Vol. 65, pp. 1-21.
[20] Chen, Y., G. Vulcano. 2009. Eects of Information Disclosure under First- and
Second-Price Auctions in a Supply Chain Setting. Manufacturing and Service
Operation Management, Vol. 11(2), pp. 299-316.
[21] Choi, A. 2009. A Rent Extraction Theory of the Right-of-First-Refusal. The
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 57(2), pp. 252-262.
[22] Choi, S., Nesheim, L., Rasul, I. 2010. Reserve Price Effects in Auctions: Es-
timates From Multiple RD designs. cemmap working paper, No. CWP30/10,
doi:10.1920/wp.cem.2010.3010, http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64638
[23] Cho, I., D. Kreps. 1987. Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, pp. 179-221.
[24] Chouinard, H. 2005. Auctions with and without the Right of First Refusal and
National Park Service Concession Contracts. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, Vol. 87, pp. 1082-1087.
161
[25] Chouinard, H., J. Yoder. 2007. Repeated Auctions with the Right of First
Refusal. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 7: Iss. 1 (Contribu-
tions), Article 21.
[26] Dellarocas, C. 2006. How often should Reputation Mechanisms Update a
Trader’s Reputation Prole?. Information Systems Research, Vol. 17, No. 3,
pp. 271285.
[27] Dholakia. U. M., Soltysinski, K. 2001. Coveted or Overlooked? The Psychol-
ogy of Bidding for Comparable Listings in Digital Auctions. Marking Letters,
Vol. 12, Part. 3, pp. 225-237.
[28] Dyer, J.H. 1996. How Chrysler Created an American Keiretsu. Harvard Busi-
ness Review. July-August.
[29] Dholakia. U. M., Basuroy, S., Soltysinski, K. 2002. Auction or Agent (or both)?
A study of Moderators of the Herding Bias in Digital Auctions. International
Journal of Research in Marketing, Vol. 19, No. 2. pp. 115-130.
[30] Dholakia. U. M., Simonson, I. 2005. The Effect of Explicit Reference Points
on Consumer Choice and Online Bidding Behavior. Marketing Science, Vol.
24, No. 2, pp. 206-217.
[31] Dimitri, N., G. Piga, G. Spagnolo. 2006. Handbook of Procurement. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
[32] Elmaghraby, W. J. 2003. The Importance of Ordering in Sequential Auctions.
Management Science, Vol. 49(5), pp. 673-682.
[33] Elmaghraby, W. J. 2007. Auctions within E-sourcing Events. Production and
Operations Management, Vol. 16(4), pp. 409-422.
[34] Enkhbayar, T. 2004. Information Transmission in Repeated Auctions. Working
paper, Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo.
[35] Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., E. Katok. 2006. E-Sourcing in Procurement: Theory
and Behavior in Reverse Auctions with Non-Competitive Contracts. Manage-
ment Science, Vol. 52(4), pp. 581-596.
[36] Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., E. Haruvy, E. Katok. 2007. A Comparison of Buyer-
Determined and Price-Based Multi-Attribute Mechanisms. Marketing Science
, Vol. 26 pp. 629-641.
162
[37] Fevrier, P. 2003. He Who Must Not be Named. Review of Economic Design,
Springer Vol. 8(1), pp. 99-119.
[38] Gilkeson, J. H., Reynolds, K. 2003. Determinants of Internet Auction Success
and Closing Price: An Exploratory Study. Psychology & Marketing , Vol. 20,
Issue. 6, pp. 537566.
[39] Grosskopf, B., A. Roth. 2009. If You Are Oered the Right of First Refusal,
Should You Accept? An investigation of Contract Design. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, Special Issue in Honor of Martin Shubik, Vol. 65(1), pp.
176-204.
[40] Haruvy, E., Popkowski Leszczyc, P. T. L. 2010. The Impact of Online Auction
Duration. Decision Analysis, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 99-106.
[41] Hubl, G., Popkowski Leszczyc, P. T. L. 2003. Minimum Prices and Product
Valuations in Auctions. Marketing Science Institute Reports, Vol. 3, 03-117:
pp.115-141.
[42] Hausch, D. B. 1986. Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs Simultaneous Sales.
Management Science, Vol. 32(12), pp. 1599-1610.
[43] Heckman, J. J. 1979. Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econo-
metrica, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 153-161.
[44] Heyman, J., Orhun, Y., Ariely, D. 2004. Auction Fever: The Effect of Oppo-
nents and Quasi-Endowment in Product Valuations?. Journal of Interactive
Marketing, Vol. 18, pp. 7-21.
[45] Hou, J. 2007. Price Determinants in Online Auctions: A Comparative Study
of eBay in China and US. Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, Vol. 8,
No. 3, pp. 172-183.
[46] Jap, S. D. 2007. The Impact of Online Reverse Auction Design in Buyer-
Supplier Relationships. Journal of Marketing, Vol. 71, pp. 146-159.
[47] Kalayanaram, G., Winer, R. S. (1995). Empirical Generalizations from Refer-
ence Price Research. Marketing Science, Vol. 14, No. 3, Part 2 of 2: Special
Issue on Empirical Generalizations in Marketing , pp. G161-G169.
[48] Kamins, M. A., Drze, X., Folkes, V. S. 2004. Effects of Seller-Supplied Prices
on Buyers’ Product Evaluations: Reference Prices in an Internet Auction Con-
text. Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 30, pp. 622-28.
163
[49] Kisiel, R. 2002. Supplier Group Seeks Conduct Code for Auctions. Automotive
News.
[50] Klotz, D., K. Chatterjee. 1995. Dual Sourcing in Repeated Procurement Com-
petitions. Management Science, Vol. 41(8), pp. 1317-1327.
[51] Kök, A. G., Fisher M. L., Vaidyanathan R. 2005. Assortment planning: Re-
view of literature and industry practice. In Retail Supply Chain Management,
eds Agrawal N., Smith S. (Kluwer, Amsterdam, The Netherlands).
[52] Kostamis, D., D. Beil, I. Duenyas. 2009. Total-Cost Procurement Auctions:
Should the BuyerReveal Suppliers Quality?.Management Science, Vol. 55(12),
pp. 1985-1999.
[53] Krishna, V. 2009. Auction Theory. Academic Press, San Diego (Second edi-
tion), pp. 46-49.
[54] Ku, G., Malhotra, D., Murnighan, J. K. 2005. Toward a Competitive Arousal
Model of Decision-Making: A Study of Auction Fever in Live and Internet
Auction. Organizational Behavior and Human Decisions, Vol. 96, pp. 89-103.
[55] Ku, G., Galinsky, A. D., Murnighan, J. K. 2006. Starting Low but Ending
High: A Reversal of the Anchoring Effect in Auctions. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, Vol. 90, No. 6, pp. 975-98.
[56] Langer, N., Forman, C., Kekre, S., Sun, B. 2012. Ushering Buyers into Elec-
tronic Channels: An Empirical Analysis. Forthcoming at Information Systems
Research.
[57] Lee, J. S. 2008. Favoritism in Asymmetric Procurement Auctions. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Vol. 26(6), pp. 1407-1424.
[58] Levin, L. 2004. Auction Theory. Manuscript available at
www.stanford.edu/ jdlevin/Econ%20286/Auctions.pdf.
[59] Li, C., A. Scheller-Wolf. 2009. Push or Pull? Auctioning Supply Contracts.
forthcoming in Production and Operations Management.
[60] Li, T., Zheng, X. 2009. Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions:
Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions. The Review of Economic
Studies, Vol. 76, No. 4, pp. 1397-1429.
164
[61] Li, C. 2012. Sourcing for Supplier Effort and Competition: Design of the Sup-
ply Base and Pricing Mechanism. Working Paper, University of Connecticut.
[62] Li, S., Srinivasan, K., Sun, B. 2005. The Role of Quality Indicators
in Internet Auctions: An Empirical Study. available at https://student-
3k.tepper.cmu.edu/GSIADOC/WP/2006-E48.pdf.
[63] Lucking-Reiley, D., Bryan, D., Prasad, N., Reeves, D. 2007. Pennies from
eBay: The Determinants of Price in Online Auctions. Journal of Industrial
Economics, Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 223-233.
[64] Lusk, J. L., Shogren, J. F. 2007. Experimental auctions: methods and ap-
plications in economics and marketing research. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK.
[65] Maddala, G. S. 1983. Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econo-
metrics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[66] Milgrom, P., Weber, R. 1982. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding.
Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 5. pp. 1089-1122.
[67] Mazumdar, T., Raj, S. P., Sinha, I. 2005. Reference Price Research: Review
and Propositions. Journal of Marketing, Vol. 69, pp. 84-102.
[68] Mithas, S., Jones, J. L. 2007. Do Auction Parameters Affect Buyer Surplus in
E-Auctions for Procurement?/ Production and Operations Management, Vol,
16. No. 4, pp. 455-470.
[69] Myerson, R. 1981. Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Re-
search, Vol. 6 (1), pp. 58-73.
[70] Nunes, J. C., Boatwright, P. 2004. Incidental Prices and Their Effect on Con-
sumer Willingness to Pay. Journal and Marketing Research, Vol. 41, pp. 457-
466.
[71] Ortega Reichert, A. 1968. A Sequential Game with Information Flow. Chapter
VIII of Ph.D. Thesis, Stanford University, reprinted in P.D. Klemperer (ed.),
The Economic Theory of Auctions, 2000, Volume 1, Edward Edgar Pub.,
Cambridge, UK.
[72] Park, Y. -H., Bradlow, E. T. 2005. An Integrated Model for Bidding Behav-
ior in Internet Auctions: Whether, Who, When, and How Much. Journal of
Marketing Research, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 470-482.
165
[73] Peters, M., Severinov, S. 2006. Internet Auctions with Many Traders. Journal
of Economic Theory, Vol. 130, No. 1, pp. 220-245.
[74] Pinker, E. J., Seidmann, A., Vakrat, Y. 2003. The Design of Online Auctions:
Business Issues and Current Research. Management Science, Vol. 49, No. 11,
pp. 14571484.
[75] Ranjendran, K. N., Tellis, G. J. 1994. Contextual and Temporals of Reference
Price. Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 58. pp. 22-34.
[76] Ray, S., Turi, R. H. 1999. Determination of Number of Clusters in K-Means
Clustering and Application in Color Image Segmentation in N M Namazi
(ed). Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Advances in Pattern
Recognition and Digital Techniques (ICAPRDT99), Calcutta, India, pp 137-
143.
[77] Reiley, D. H. 2006. Field Experiments on the Effects of Reserve Prices in
Auctions: More Magic on the Internet. Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 37,
pp. 195-211.
[78] Roth, A. E., Ockenfels, A. 2002. Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending
Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the
Internet. The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, Part. 4, pp. 1093-1103.
[79] Sawhney, M. 2003. Forward Thinking about Reverse Auctions. CIO Magazine.
[80] Simonsohn, U., Ariely, D. 2008. When Rational Sellers Face Nonrational Buy-
ers: Evidence from Herding on eBay. Management Science, Vol. 54, No. 9, pp.
1624-1637.
[81] Spann, M., Hubl, G., Skiera, B., Bernhardt, M. 2011, Bid-Elicitation Inter-
faces and Biding Behavior In Retail Interactive Pricing. Journal of Retailing,
Vol. 88(1), pp. 131-144.
[82] Thomas, C. 1996. Market Structure and Flow of Information in Sequential
Auction. Working Paper, Federal Trade Commission.
[83] Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. 1974. Judgment and Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases. Science, Vol. 185, pp. 1124-1131.
[84] Wang, X., Hu, Y. 2009. The Effect of Experience on Internet Auction Bidding
Dynamics. Marketing Letters, Vol. 20, Part. 3, pp. 245-261.
166
[85] Wilcox, R. T. 2000. Experts and Amateurs: The Role of Experience in Internet
Auctions. Marketing Letters, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 363-374.
[86] Wolk, A., Spann, M. 2008. The Effects of Reference Prices on Bidding Behavior
in Interactive Pricing Mechanisms. Journal of Interactive Marketing, Vol. 22,
pp. 2-18.
[87] Wan, Z., D. Beil. 2009. RFQ Auctions with Supplier Qualification Screening.
Operations Research, Vol. 57(4), pp. 934-949.
[88] Wooldridge, J. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data.
MIT Press, Cambridge.
[89] Yadav, M. S., Seiders, K. 1998. Is the Price Right? Understanding Contingent
Processing in Reference Price Formation. Journal of Retailing, Vol. 74, pp.
311-329.
[90] Zhang, F. 2010. Procurement Mechanism Design in a Two-Echelon Inventory
System with Price Sensitive Demand. Manufacturing and Service Operations
Management, Vol. 12(4), pp. 608-626.
167
